Selwyn v. Ward

• Decision Date: 07 July 2005
• Docket Number: No. 2002-637-Appeal.,2002-637-Appeal.
• Parties: Bridget SELWYN v. Karen WARD et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

879 A.2d 882

Bridget SELWYN v. Karen WARD et al.

No. 2002-637-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 7, 2005.

Sean Feeney, Esq., Providence, for Plaintiff.

Robert A. Scott, Esq., Westerly, for Defendant RC Liquors.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., GOLDBERG, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

It's an all too familiar scenario — a group of high school students manage to procure some alcoholic beverages, act irresponsibly, and someone gets hurt. In this version, however, the injuries did not result from the consumption of illegally obtained alcohol but from a minor igniting it and causing an explosion. The plaintiff, Bridget Selwyn (Selwyn or plaintiff), is the victim in this tragedy, and she sought to recover for her injuries from several named defendants, including RC Liquors, Inc. (RC Liquors or defendant). It is from a grant of summary judgment in favor of that defendant that the plaintiff appeals.

This case came before the Supreme Court on May 12, 2005, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not summarily be decided. After hearing arguments of counsel and reviewing the memoranda submitted by the parties, we are satisfied that cause has not been shown. Accordingly, we shall decide the appeal at this time.

Facts and Travel

In the early morning of August 26, 2000, plaintiff and several others gathered at the home of Karen Ward (Ward), on Warwick Neck Avenue, in Warwick. The Ward property included an outbuilding, referred to as "the barn," in which Ward's son, Taylor, and his friends often socialized. On the night of the incident, the gathering at the barn consisted of: Bridget Selwyn, Taylor Ward, Michael A. Buonanno (Buonanno), John Cronin (Cronin), Eric Machala, Kathryn A. Marciano (Marciano), Peter Keene, Jason Petrarca, James Carvalho, and Richard Cole.¹

The accounts of the evening's events indicate that various people were smoking marijuana and/or ingesting ecstasy in the barn.² There also was a partially consumed 1.75-liter bottle of 190-proof grain alcohol or "Everclear" in the barn. At about 4:30 a.m. on August 26, 2000, the bottle of Everclear became the catalyst for disaster when Buonanno poured some of the grain alcohol onto an open flame, causing an intense explosion that burned plaintiff, Marciano, and Cronin.

It was revealed during discovery that a bottle of Everclear had been purchased by another adolescent, Lauren Andrews (Andrews), for a gathering at the barn the previous month.³ Andrews said that she purchased the Everclear at RC Liquors and was not asked for proof of age. Earlier, at that gathering, Andrews mixed up a batch of "Jungle Juice" — a combination of "Kool-Aid, Everclear, and vodka" — and left the remaining grain alcohol in the barn. The plaintiff amended her complaint to include RC Liquors as a party defendant. She alleged that defendant directly and proximately caused her injuries by providing Andrews with the grain alcohol when it "knew or should have known [(1)] that [Andrews] was underage to lawfully possess and/or consume alcoholic beverages[; and (2)] that it was unlawful and dangerous to others to provide grain alcohol to minors." RC Liquors moved for summary judgment.

In support of her opposition to defendant's motion, plaintiff submitted the affidavit of Thomas J. Paolino, Jr., M.D. (Dr. Paolino). Doctor Paolino is a physician and psychiatrist who devotes a substantial portion of his practice to treating substance abuse issues in adolescents and young adults. In the affidavit, he said that "[t]he possession and use of grain alcohol by adolescents and young adults is extremely dangerous." He explained that consuming grain alcohol can lead to "rapid intoxication" and that "adolescents and young adults will typically engage in risky and dangerous behavior when severely impaired." He further averred that grain alcohol is extremely flammable and that "[f]requently adolescents and young adults who use grain alcohol light it on fire." Doctor Paolino expressed his opinion that: "It is very foreseeable that adolescents and young adults in the possession of * * * grain alcohol will frequently light it on fire." The plaintiff also supplied a picture of the Everclear bottle, which includes a warning about the product's flammability.

The plaintiff argued that defendant breached its duty of care when it sold the grain alcohol to Andrews with actual or constructive knowledge of the "fire play" allegedly linked to Everclear.⁴ She conceded that there was "no allegation that this incident occurred due to the intoxication of a minor [or] that [RC Liquors] sold grain alcohol that occasioned, in whole or in part, the intoxication of a minor." She instead asserted that the cause of the incident was "horseplay." The plaintiff argued that "[a] number of drink recipes and web sites encourage this fire play" and that purveyors of grain alcohol should be aware that those drinks are lit on fire. The plaintiff also argued that defendant's violation of the state law prohibiting sales of liquor to minors⁵ was evidence of its negligence and that the statute is intended "to protect minors from injury by alcohol." Further, plaintiff asserts that the state Dram Shop Act⁶ "broadens liability."

The trial justice granted defendant's motion. After rejecting the testimony of Dr. Paolino on the ground that he was not qualified to give the proffered opinion, the trial justice ruled that plaintiff's claim failed on the element of foreseeability. The trial justice reasoned:

"[T]here is no nexus, by statute or by common law, that would find that the conduct, if any, of the defendant in selling grain alcohol * * * to the minor, who then allegedly gave it to her friend and went to Italy, would be liable under the circumstances of this case where there is no allegation that the injury occurred because any minor — or adult, for that matter — imbibing the alcohol, which caused, in whole or in part, that individual's intoxication. It would seem that there's no statutory authority for this cause of action [and] that the misconduct, if any, of the defendant was rendered remote by intervening independent acts of others."

Judgment entered pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, and plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal.

Issues on Appeal

The plaintiff argues that the trial justice erred by granting summary judgment in favor of RC Liquors because the documents produced illustrate that defendant negligently caused Selwyn's injuries by selling the Everclear to Andrews. In addition, plaintiff contends that defendant's alleged violation of state liquor laws establishes a cause of action in negligence against defendant under the Dram Shop Act. Lastly, plaintiff asserts that defendant can be held strictly liable because selling grain alcohol to a minor is an ultrahazardous activity.

Standard of Review

This Court reviews the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo, according to the same standards applicable to the trial justice. Town of Cumberland v. Rhode Island Interlocal Risk Management Trust, Inc., 860 A.2d 1210, 1214 (R.I. 2004). We consider the evidence presented, without evaluating its weight or credibility, and will affirm the granting of summary judgment "if, after reviewing the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (quoting Rotelli v. Catanzaro, 686 A.2d 91, 93 (R.I.1996)); see also Weaver v. American Power Conversion Corp., 863 A.2d 193, 200 (R.I.2004)

.

Did Defendant Owe a Duty of Reasonable Care to Plaintiff?

To prevail on a claim of negligence, "a plaintiff must establish a legally cognizable duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff, a breach of that duty, proximate causation between the conduct and the resulting injury, and the actual loss or damage." Mills v. State Sales, Inc., 824 A.2d 461, 467-68 (R.I.2003) (quoting Jenard v. Halpin, 567 A.2d 368, 370 (R.I.1989)). The crux of this appeal is whether defendant owed plaintiff a legal duty, which is a question of law. Martin v. Marciano, 871 A.2d 911, 915 (R.I.2005) (citing Volpe v. Gallagher, 821 A.2d 699, 705 (R.I.2003)). If no such duty exists, then plaintiff's claim must fail, as a matter of law. If the evidence establishes that a duty did run from defendant to plaintiff, then plaintiff is entitled to a determination of the remaining factual questions — did defendant breach the duty of care, and if so, was that breach the proximate cause of plaintiff's harm? See Terry v. Central Auto Radiators, Inc., 732 A.2d 713, 718 (R.I.1999)

("Whether [defendant's] inaction amounted to a breach of the duty owed to [plaintiff] was a question of fact[,] which should have been put to the trial jury."); Splendorio v. Bilray Demolition Co., 682 A.2d 461, 467 (R.I.1996) ("Ordinarily the determination of proximate cause * * * is a question of fact that should not be decided by summary judgment.").

This Court determines whether a duty exists on a "case-by-case basis," considering "`all relevant factors, including the relationship between the parties, the scope and burden of the obligation to be imposed upon the defendant, public policy considerations,' * * * and the `foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff.'" Martin, 871 A.2d at 915 (quoting Volpe, 821 A.2d at 705, and Banks v. Bowen's Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222, 1225 (R.I.1987)). The linchpin in the analysis of whether a duty flows from a defendant to a plaintiff is foreseeability. Splendorio, 682 A.2d at 466; see Volpe, 821 A.2d at 705

. As Justice Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals said: "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension." Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E....