Shovah v. Mercure

• Decision Date: 19 July 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:11–CV–201.
• Citation: 879 F.Supp.2d 416
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Vermont
• Parties: Michael SHOVAH, Plaintiff, v. Fr. Gary MERCURE, The Roman Catholic Church of Albany, New York, Inc., Defendants.

879 F.Supp.2d 416

Michael SHOVAH, Plaintiff,

v.Fr. Gary MERCURE, The Roman Catholic Church of Albany, New York, Inc., Defendants.

Case No. 2:11–CV–201.

United States District Court, D. Vermont.

July 19, 2012.

John F. Evers, Jerome F. O'Neill, Esq., O'Neill Kellner & Green, Burlington, VT, for Plaintiff.

Matthew G. Hart, Kenlan, Schwiebert, Facey & Goss, P.C., Rutland, VT, Michael L. Costello, Esq., Tobin and Dempf, LLP, Albany, NY, Thomas E. McCormick, McCormick, Fitzpatrick, Kasper & Burchard, P.C., Burlington, VT, for Defendants.

Memorandum Opinion & Order

WILLIAM K. SESSIONS III, District Judge.

Plaintiff Michael Shovah filed suit against Defendants Father Gary Mercure and the Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, New York (the “Diocese”), seeking recovery for damages related to sexual abuse. There are five motions before the Court: (1) the Diocese's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Supplemental Jurisdiction (ECF No. 61); (2) the Diocese's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (ECF No. 22); (3) the Diocese's Motion for Protective Order Re: February 2012 Interrogatories (ECF No. 47); (4) the Diocese's Motion for Protective Order Re: April 2012 Interrogatories (ECF No. 66); and (5) Plaintiff's Motion to Compel April 2012 Interrogatories (ECF No. 68).

For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the Diocese's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Supplemental Jurisdiction. The Court also DENIES as premature the Diocese's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. All other motions related to interrogatories are DENIED in part and GRANTED in part, consistent with the Order below. The Court provides the Diocese thirty days to comply with pending interrogatories.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On August 10, 2011, New York resident Michael Shovah filed suit against Mercure and the Diocese. Shovah bases jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367 as well as 18 U.S.C. § 2255, which states that certain victims of sexual abuse may file personal injury suits “in any appropriate United States District Court.” See18 U.S.C. § 2255(a).

In his Complaint, Shovah alleges that Mercure was a priest and employee of the Diocese during all relevant times and that the Diocese presented Mercure as a trustworthy priest of good standing. Shovah claims he came to know and trust Mercure as an employee of the Diocese and that in the late 1980's Mercure brought Shovah (a minor at the time) from New York to Vermont for the purpose of sexually abusing him and did sexually abuse him during that trip.¹

Shovah's Complaint seeks compensatory and exemplary damages as well as reasonable attorney's fees as prescribed by 18 U.S.C. § 2255. The Complaint includes five counts. Count I alleges Mercure engaged in sexual exploitation and abuse of Shovah when he was a child pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2255, 2422, and 2423, which provide a monetary remedy for victims transported interstate for purposes of sexual abuse. See18 U.S.C. §§ 2255(a), 2422, and 2423. Counts II, III, and IV raise state law claims for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Negligent Supervision, and Failure to Prevent Harm against the Diocese. Count V is a state law claim for outrageous conduct against the Diocese and Mercure. Thus, Shovah brings no federal claim against the Diocese.

The parties began discovery in September 2011, but the process eventually came to a halt. In February 2012, Shovah propounded interrogatories inquiring into the Diocese's contact with Vermont. Many of these interrogatories went unanswered and in March 2012 the Diocese filed a Motion for Protective Order Re: February Interrogatories. The Diocese then filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, arguing that the Diocese has insufficient contact with Vermont to make it amenable to suit in this Court.

This Court held a hearing in late March 2012, issuing a ruling from the bench that discovery should continue on the limited issue of personal jurisdiction. In accordance with the ruling, Shovah propounded further interrogatories in April 2012, which were limited to the issue of personal jurisdiction. However, the Diocese refused to answer these interrogatories, resulting in a pair of new motions—the Diocese's Motion for Protective Order Re: April 2012 Interrogatories and Shovah's Motion to Compel April 2012 Interrogatories.

The Diocese thus has two pending motions for a protective order—one each for the February 2012 and the April 2012 interrogatories. In its motions, the Diocese states that Shovah's interrogatories are unjustified, claiming that Shovah makes no prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction sufficient to subject the Diocese to discovery. The Diocese also insists that, as separate legal entities from the Diocese, the various parishes from which Shovah seeks information are not subject to discovery. Furthermore, the Diocese sets forth individual objections to almost all of Shovah's interrogatories, arguing privilege, irrelevance, and unwarranted burden.

In addition to its motions for a protective order and its Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, the Diocese recently filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Supplemental Jurisdiction, arguing that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over all claims alleged against the Diocese. The argument is that only the one federal claim against Mercure falls within this Court's original jurisdiction and that there is no common nucleus of operative facts between that claim and the four state law claims alleged against the Diocese. The Diocese further states that even if all causes of action involve a common nucleus of operative facts, this Court should nevertheless decline supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), since the state law claims alleged against the Diocese substantially predominate this dispute as well as raise novel and complex issues of New York law.

Shovah disagrees, claiming that supplemental jurisdiction is proper. Shovah also maintains that his interrogatories related to personal jurisdiction are justified, believing that he adequately alleged a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. In support of his personal jurisdiction allegations, Shovah submitted testimony stating that the Diocese, through a Father Thomas Zelker, acted in a substantial capacity to “support the sacramental and liturgical life” of the parish at St. Frances Cabrini in West Pawlet, Vermont between 2002 and 2009. In addition to Father Zelker, Shovah claims that other Diocese priests have come to Vermont during pertinent time periods for purposes of providing Vermonters with the Catholic sacraments. The Diocese's presence in Vermont is further evinced by its Vermont-targeted internet advertisements as well as its weekly publication—the Evangelist²—which is mailed to numerous Vermont residents.

As to the Diocese's claim that parishes are separate legal entities from the Diocese and thus not subject to discovery, Shovah argues that as “head of the Albany Diocese” the Bishop of Albany can produce any parish documents needed for discovery, rendering the Diocese's argument misleading and tenuous.

DISCUSSION

I. The Court Denies the Diocese's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Supplemental Jurisdiction.

A. Supplemental Jurisdiction is Proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), a district court “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.” Supplemental jurisdiction thus requires (1) a federal “anchor” claim sufficient to confer subject-matter jurisdiction, and (2) that the anchor claim and the state law claim are “part of the same case or controversy.” See Montefiore Med. Ctr. v. Teamsters Local 272, 642 F.3d 321, 332 (2d Cir.2011).

Here, there is no dispute that Shovah's claim against Mercure under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 is within the Court's federal-question jurisdiction and as such may serve as an anchor claim. The question is whether Shovah's federal claim and his state law claims constitute the same case or controversy.

In determining whether federal and state law claims constitute the same case or controversy, courts look to whether the claims “share a common nucleus of operative facts” and whether the claims are “such that the plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding.” See id. (internal quotations omitted); Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 704 (2d Cir.2000) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966)). The Second Circuit has “routinely upheld the exercise of [supplemental] jurisdiction where the facts underlying the federal and state law claims substantially overlapped.” Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 211 F.3d at 704;Achtman v. Kirby, McInerney & Squire, LLP, 464 F.3d 328, 335 (2d Cir.2006). Courts find that claims constitute the same case or controversy even when “the state law claim is asserted against a party different from the one named in the federal claim.” Achtman, 464 F.3d at 335 (quoting Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 308 (2d Cir.2004)).

Shovah's federal claim against Mercure and his state law claims against the Diocese constitute the same case or controversy. The alleged facts underlying the claims substantially overlap: Mercure sexually abused Shovah and Shovah suffered injuries as a result. While Mercure is charged with committing the assault, the Diocese is charged with responsibility for the assault via its negligent supervision, breach of fiduciary duty, and failure to prevent harm. A trial against the Diocese would necessarily involve the same facts as a trial against Mercure. Shovah would ordinarily be expected to try all his claims in one judicial proceeding.

B. Supplemental Jurisdiction is Appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

When claims form part of the same case or controversy for purposes of 28...