Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp.
| Decision Date | 12 July 1989 |
| Docket Number | 87-1387,Nos. 86-2074,s. 86-2074 |
| Citation | 879 F.2d 1326 |
| Parties | 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3022, 56 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1848, 50 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,139, 58 USLW 2064, 4 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. 976 Stanley SMOLAREK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. Ralph FLEMING, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation; Louis Ebaldi and Lyndon Verlyndon, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Alan B. Posner (argued), Kelman, Loria, Downing, Schneider & Simpson, Detroit, Mich., for Ralph Fleming.
William T. McLellan, Chrysler Corp., Steven B. Hantler, Joseph C. Marshall, III, Robert W. Powell, Dickinson, Wright, Moon, Van Dusen & Freeman, Detroit, Mich., Thomas Keinbaum (argued), for Chrysler Corp. et al.
Jordan Rossen, General Counsel, Daniel W. Sherrick, Ass. General Counsel, Intern. Union, UAW, Detroit, Mich., amicus curiae.
Monica Farris Linkner, Lopatin, Miller, Freedman, Bluestone, Erlich, Rosen and Bartnick, Richard E. Shaw (argued) Detroit, Mich., for Stanley Smolarek.
William T. McLellan, Chrysler Corp., Robert W. Powell, Dickinson, Wright, Moon, Van Dusen & Freeman, Detroit, Mich., Thomas Keinbaum (argued), for Chrysler Corp.
Before ENGEL, Chief Judge, KEITH, MERRITT, KENNEDY, MARTIN, JONES, KRUPANSKY, WELLFORD, MILBURN, GUY, NELSON, RYAN, BOGGS and NORRIS, Circuit Judges, and PECK, Senior Circuit Judge.
These combined cases present close and difficult questions regarding whether Sec. 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185, preempts plaintiffs'
actions claiming violations of Michigan's Handicappers' Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. Sec. 37.1101 et seq. (HCRA), and retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy relating to the filing of workers' compensation claims. In each case the district court found plaintiff's state cause of action preempted by Sec. 301 and dismissed the suit for failure to exhaust remedies. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988), holding that an action under Illinois law for the tort of retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim was not preempted by Sec. 301, guides our decision in these cases.
Smolarek was employed by Chrysler from 1953 until his lay off in 1984 and was a member of the United Automobile Workers (UAW). 1 Since an injury in 1955, Smolarek has suffered from a seizure disorder, which normally has been controlled by medications. In October 1984, he suffered a seizure at work and was absent from work for the following two weeks. When he returned to work, he was informed that no jobs consistent with the medical restrictions, under which he had worked for nearly thirty years, were available. In 1985 Smolarek again attempted to return to work and was told no work was available within his restrictions. Plaintiff alleges that at that time his foreman made the comment,
In April 1986, Smolarek filed a two count complaint in Michigan state court alleging discrimination under the HCRA and workers' compensation retaliation. He claimed that Chrysler discriminated against him by refusing to return him to his former position based on a handicap unrelated to his ability to perform his job duties, and that Chrysler also refused to reinstate him based on its fear that he might injure himself during a seizure on the job and file a workers' compensation claim. Smolarek did not allege any violation of the collective bargaining agreement between the UAW and Chrysler.
Chrysler removed the case to federal district court claiming federal question jurisdiction. Smolarek filed a motion to remand, which the district court denied on the grounds that Sec. 301 preempted Smolarek's claims. The district court then dismissed Smolarek's action because he had failed to exhaust his intra-union remedies before filing a Sec. 301 action. Smolarek now appeals the district court's denial of his motion to remand solely on the handicap discrimination issue.
Chrysler hired Fleming, also a UAW member, in 1976 as a painter-glazer. In August 1984 Fleming was injured while leaving the Chrysler plant, and as a result he suffered some loss of balance, severe headaches, muscle spasms in his back, and nausea. Fleming continued to work with some medical restrictions on the kind of work he could do. Fleming claims that following his injury he was given job assignments inconsistent with his limitations. Fleming further contends that this "harassment" increased when he expressed his intent to file a workers' compensation claim. In October 1984, Fleming was laid off indefinitely. Chrysler claims his lay off was due to lack of work, as allowed by the collective bargaining agreement. Fleming claims that, while technically on lay off, he was told he was being dismissed.
In December 1984 Fleming grieved his lay off. This grievance was pursued to the third step of a four-step grievance procedure before Fleming voluntarily terminated his employment in May 1986 by relinquishing his recall rights as part of a settlement of his workers' compensation claim filed in February 1985.
Fleming filed a complaint in state court in July 1985, alleging violation of HCRA, discharge in retaliation for expressed intent to file a workers' compensation claim, breach of implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional interference with his quiet and peaceful pursuit of a lawful occupation. In August 1985 Chrysler removed the suit to federal district court. In October 1985 the district court denied Fleming's motion to remand on the grounds that the latter two counts of Fleming's complaint conferred original jurisdiction on the federal court.
Chrysler then filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Fleming's claims were preempted by Sec. 301. Finding that all of Fleming's claims were preempted, the district court granted the motion and dismissed the case. Fleming appeals this dismissal only with regard to the HCRA and retaliatory discharge claims.
Ordinarily, the question of removability to federal court under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1441 turns upon application of the "well-pleaded complaint rule." Federal jurisdiction exists only when a plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint presents a federal question on its face.
The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the "well-pleaded complaint rule," which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint. See Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-113, 57 S.Ct. 96, 97-98, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936). The rule makes the plaintiff the master of the claim; he or she may avoid the federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987) (footnote omitted); see also Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Graham, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1519, 1521, 103 L.Ed.2d 924 (1989) (per curiam) (discussing Caterpillar ). In the context of employment-related actions, however, a claim purportedly based solely on state law may, under appropriate circumstances, be removable because Sec. 301 of the LMRA has preempted that particular area of state law. In other words, "any claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law." Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S.Ct. at 2430. Thus, in the cases we now consider, the issues of federal preemption and removability largely merge; we must focus on whether plaintiffs' state-law claims are preempted by Sec. 301 so as to place them within the scope of the "complete preemption" corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule.
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has made clear that Sec. 301 of the LMRA preempts any state-law claim arising from a breach of a collective bargaining agreement. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 82 S.Ct. 571, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1962); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985); see also Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988). The purpose of this rule is to require that all claims raising issues of labor contract interpretation be decided according to the precepts of federal labor law in order to prevent inconsistent interpretations of the substantive provisions of collective bargaining agreements. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 103, 82 S.Ct. at 576.
Thus, Lueck faithfully applied the principle of Sec. 301 preemption developed in Lucas Flour: if the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective bargaining agreement, the application of state law (which might lead to inconsistent results since there could be as many state law principles as there are States) is pre-empted and federal labor-law principles--necessarily uniform throughout the nation--must be employed to resolve the dispute.
Lingle, 108 S.Ct. at 1881 (footnotes omitted).
In Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, the Court expanded the preemptive reach of Sec. 301 to state-law tort claims. In Lueck the Court considered whether a state-law cause of action for bad faith handling of an insurance claim was preempted because the insurance plan provisions were included in a collective bargaining agreement. The Court found the state claim was preempted because an essential element of the tort (i.e., bad faith handling) required interpretation of the labor agreement regarding whether the plaintiff was due...
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