Rice v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 19 July 1996
• Docket Number: Nos. 93-6940,94-6482,s. 93-6940
• Citation: 88 F.3d 914
• Parties: Mary RICE; Brent Puckett; Randall Hallmark, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellant. Brent PUCKETT, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Randall Hallmark, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 914

88 F.3d 914

35 Fed.R.Serv.3d 962

Mary RICE; Brent Puckett; Randall Hallmark, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellant.

Brent PUCKETT, individually and on behalf of all others

similarly situated; Randall Hallmark,

individually and on behalf of all others

similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 93-6940, 94-6482.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

July 19, 1996.

Joseph S. Bird, III, Lee M. Pope, Brian D. Boyle, O'Melveny & Myers, Washington, DC, for appellant in No. 93-6940.

Richard A. Freese, Peter A. Grammas, Langston, Frazer, Sweet & Freese, Birmingham, AL, for appellees in No. 93-6940.

Joseph S. Bird, III, Matthew H. Lembke, T. Michael Brown, Bradley, Arant, Rose & White, Birmingham, AL, Brian D. Boyle, O'Melveny & Myers, Washington, DC, for appellant in No. 94-6482.

Richard A. Freese, Birmingham, AL, for appellees in No. 94-6482.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Before ANDERSON and COX, Circuit Judges, and RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge.

COX, Circuit Judge:

In this proposed class action, the named plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. The district court, which had not yet determined whether to certify the proposed class, summarily approved the notice and dismissed the action without prejudice. The defendant, Ford Motor Company, filed a "Motion for Review of Dismissal of the Complaint," in which it argued that the court was required under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e) to conduct an inquiry, before approving the dismissal, as to the effect of the dismissal on absent members of the proposed class. The district court denied Ford's motion, concluding that Rule 23(e) does not apply to putative class actions before certification of the class by the district court.

Ford now appeals the denial of its motion. Because we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of the motion, we affirm.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The plaintiffs filed this action in August 1993 against Ford Motor Company, alleging that Ford's Bronco II vehicles contained design defects and asserting claims under both state and federal laws. Puckett v. Ford Motor Company, No. CV-93-G-1592-S (N.D.Ala. filed Aug. 6, 1993). The suit was filed on behalf of a proposed class of "all United States residents who own a ... Bronco II vehicle." (2nd Supp. R.1-1 at 1 (Compl. p 1).) The original complaint parallels three others that the plaintiffs' attorneys filed in other federal courts on behalf of similar classes of Bronco II owners.

On August 24, 1993, before Ford filed any responsive pleading, the named plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(i). ¹ (2nd Supp. R.1-4.) The trial court acknowledged the notice on the same day and dismissed the action, without conducting any sort of inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the dismissal. (Id. at 1-5.) Two days later, the plaintiffs filed an action in state court on behalf of the same class of Bronco II owners. Rice v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV-93-065 (Cir.Ct. of Greene County, Ala. filed Aug. 26, 1993). The new suit was similar to the first, except that the new complaint was pruned of the allegations and claims that supplied federal jurisdiction. ²

Apparently unaware that the plaintiffs had voluntarily dismissed Puckett, Ford filed a motion to dismiss on August 31, 1993. (2nd Supp. R.1-6.) On September 3, the district court denied Ford's motion as moot. (Id.) Ford contends that it did not learn of the court's ruling, which led it to discover the notice of voluntary dismissal, until September 8, when it examined the court's docket. The next day, September 9, Ford removed the second action from state court to federal court and filed an answer to the complaint. Once in federal court, the Rice plaintiffs moved to remand the case to state court.

The district court remanded the action, concluding "to a legal certainty that the requisite federal jurisdictional amount does not exist...." (R.1-8.)

On September 23, 1993, Ford filed a motion in Puckett requesting that the district court review under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e) ³ the plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal of their original complaint. (2nd Supp. R.1-7.) Ford argued that Rule 23(e) applied to the plaintiffs' attempt to dismiss the case, even though no class had been certified at the time of the dismissal. Ford contended that notice to putative class members was required in order to avoid a multiplicity of litigation and prejudice to unnamed members of the proposed class. To safeguard against such risks, Ford argued, the court had to conduct an inquiry under Rule 23(e) before approving the dismissal.

Ford's motion was referred to the district judge considering the Rice litigation. (See 2nd Supp. R.1-8.) Without commenting on the nature of the motion, its timeliness, or the court's jurisdiction to hear it, the district court denied Ford's motion on the merits. The court rejected Ford's contention that Rule 23(e) applied to suits brought as class actions but not yet certified as such by the court, concluding that "an action brought as a class action does not become a class action until the Court says so." (2nd Supp. R.1-9 at 3.) See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1) (providing that the "court shall determine by order whether [a proposed class action] is to be so maintained"). Because the proposed class had not been certified when the original action was dismissed, the court held that Rule 23(e) did not apply. The court declined to conduct a Rule 23(e) review and affirmed the dismissal of the original action. This appeal followed. ⁴

ISSUES ON APPEAL

Ford contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying Ford's motion for review of the voluntary dismissal of the Puckett action. Ford argues that because Rule 23(e) applies in cases where the court has not yet certified a proposed class action, the district court was required to conduct a review before it approved the plaintiffs' Rule 41(a)(1)(i) dismissal. In response, the named plaintiffs argue that the court properly denied Ford's motion for review, because they complied with Rule 41(a)(1)(i), and because Rule 23(e) does not apply until a court certifies a proposed class.

Before we address the substance of Ford's appeal, however, we must address the assertion raised by the plaintiffs at oral argument that Ford's motion is untimely, depriving us of jurisdiction to hear this appeal. ⁵ The plaintiffs contend that Ford's motion, if cognizable under the Rules of Civil Procedure at all, is in effect a motion "to alter or amend the judgment" under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Because that rule requires such motions to be filed within ten days of the entry of judgment, the plaintiffs argue that Ford's motion, and its appeal, are untimely. Ford counters that its motion falls not under Rule 59(e) but under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), ⁶ which

provides a more liberal time period for filing motions for relief from a final judgment or order.

DISCUSSION

A. Timeliness of Ford's motion

The named plaintiffs contend that Ford's "Motion for Review of Dismissal" should be treated as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the final judgment dismissing Puckett. Such a motion had to be made within ten days after the district court approved plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal. Because Ford did not file its motion until September 23, 1993, the plaintiffs argue, the motion was untimely and thus did not extend the period for filing a timely notice of appeal to this court. See Fed.R.App.P. 4(a) (providing thirty-day period from entry of judgment, or from order responding to timely filed motion under Rule 59, for filing notice of appeal). Ford's notices of appeal are timely only if the district court's denial of the motion for review effectively extended the period in which to bring this appeal. Clearly, if we treat Ford's motion as arising under Rule 59(e), the motion was untimely, the thirty-day period provided by Rule 4(a) expired in September 1993, and we are without jurisdiction to consider Ford's appeal.

But Ford contends that its motion should not be construed as a Rule 59(e) motion, both because of the nature of relief sought and because Ford could not have filed a timely Rule 59 motion under the circumstances of this case. Ford argues that its motion for review is instead properly viewed as a Rule 60(b) motion. Rule 60(b) allows a more generous time period for filing motions than does Rule 59(e). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) (allowing the filing of motions within a "reasonable time"). Ford argues that it filed its motion within a reasonable time after it discovered that the named plaintiffs had voluntarily dismissed Puckett.

While Ford's motion does not cite Rule 60(b) or recite any of the specific grounds listed in the rule as a basis for relief, we construe the motion as a Rule 60(b) motion rather than one made under Rule 59(e). See Nisson v. Lundy, 975 F.2d 802, 806 (11th Cir.1992) (Motions that would be untimely under Rule 59(e) "may, however, be treated as Rule 60(b) motions if grounds stated would be a basis for Rule 60(b) relief.") (citations omitted); United States v. Real Property & Residence, 920 F.2d 788, 792 (11th Cir.1991) (Rule 60(b) is to be given a liberal and remedial construction in order to do "substantial justice.") (citations omitted). Specifically, we treat Ford's motion as arising under Rule 60(b)(6), the "catch-all" provision allowing motions based on any "reason justifying relief" not included in the preceding clauses of the rule. ⁷ Ford alleges that it did not learn of the voluntary dismissal until September 8, 1993, the last day on which Ford could have filed a timely Rule 59(e) motion. It would hardly promote "substantial justice" to pigeonhole Ford's motion under Rule 59(e), with which Ford arguably could not have...