Antenor v. D & S Farms

• Decision Date: 19 July 1996
• Docket Number: AG-T,No. 95-4292,95-4292
• Citation: 88 F.3d 925
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
• Parties: 133 Lab.Cas. P 33,541, 3 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 677 Immacula ANTENOR, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, Ysnel OSNEL, Plaintiff, v. D & S FARMS; Iori Farms, Inc.; Virgil S. Gil Turke, a/k/a Virgil Banciu;ech Services, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

Page 925

88 F.3d 925

133 Lab.Cas. P 33,541, 3 Wage & Hour Cas.2d

(BNA) 677

Immacula ANTENOR, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, Ysnel OSNEL, Plaintiff, v. D & S FARMS; Iori Farms, Inc.; Virgil S. Gil Turke, a/k/a

Virgil Banciu; AG-Tech Services, Inc.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 95-4292.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

July 19, 1996.

Gregory S. Schell, Florida Rural Legal Services, Inc., Belle Glade, FL, for Appellants.

Mary J. Rieser, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Washington, DC, for Amicus/Sec. of Labor.

Bruce Goldstein, Washington, DC, for Amicus/Miller, Ford, Berman.

Paula Wright Coleman, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Washington, DC, for Amicus/Secretary of Labor.

David J. Stefany, Hogg, Allen, Norton & Blue, Tampa, FL, Monte B. Lake, McGuiness & Williams, Washington, DC, John J. Rademacher, American Farm Bureau Federation, Park Ridge, IL, for D & S Farms, Iori Farms.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before CARNES and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and DYER, Senior Circuit Judge.

BARKETT, Circuit Judge:

Immacula Antenor and 610 other seasonal agricultural workers ("farmworkers" or "pickers") appeal from a summary judgment in favor of D & S Farms and Iori Farms, Inc. ("growers") on their claims under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act. ¹ The district court granted the judgment after concluding that the farmworkers presented insufficient evidence that they were "employed" by the growers under these statutes. Upon de novo review of the record, we find substantial evidence that the growers, along with a labor contractor, were "joint employers" of the farmworkers. Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts relevant to the existence of an employment relationship between the growers and pickers can be summarized as follows. ² In the mid-1980s, the growers began producing snap beans for fresh market sale. In search of a steady supply of labor to pick the beans, the growers turned to Virgil Turke, owner and operator of Ag-Tech Services, Inc. ("Ag-Tech"), a labor contracting business. The growers and Turke agreed that he would assume responsibility for hiring, furnishing and paying the pickers, and that he would be paid $3.90 per box of beans. The farmworkers were among the people hired by Turke to pick the growers' crops between 1986 and 1989.

Based on planting schedules and market demand, the growers decided when to harvest a particular bean field. After selecting a field, they told Turke its location and the number of workers needed. Turke then arranged for subcontractors to recruit and hire pickers. After arriving at a field, the pickers were assigned rows by Turke and his subcontractors. They could not begin picking, however, until the growers and their onsite foremen gave the command to start work, because it was essential, for commercial reasons, that picking not begin until the morning dew had lifted from the beans. The pickers filled the boxes that were brought to the field by the growers and distributed by Turke and the subcontractors. As the pickers filled the initial allotment of boxes, they walked to the growers' field trucks, where one of the growers' employees gave them additional boxes.

Two sets of supervisors, also known as "field walkers," oversaw the pickers' work. One set was hired by Turke and the other set was hired by the growers. Both sets of field walkers passed through the rows of beans, checking the work of individual pickers and, when work was found to be deficient, spoke directly to the picker to ensure that corrective steps were taken; the growers' field walkers also complained about deficient work to Turke and his subcontractors.

The subcontractors' assistants carried full boxes to the growers' trucks, where they were weighed and closed by the subcontractors or their assistants. The growers' field walkers then loaded the boxes on trucks and drove them to the growers' packing facility. As the day progressed, more and more of the growers' field walkers' time was absorbed in stacking and loading boxes, with a corresponding decrease in the time devoted to supervision of individual bean pickers.

Work normally concluded when the pickers completed the rows assigned to Turke by the growers. On some occasions, however, the growers decided the crew would work longer or shorter hours, depending on their harvest needs. If the growers decided, for example, to halt picking to avoid overloading their packing and storage facilities, their field walkers went to the field and removed the picking buckets from the pickers' hands.

The growers' payment to Turke was based on the number of boxes of beans delivered to the packinghouse. Although the price was to be $3.90 per box, the actual payment was less. Because Turke was financially unable to purchase worker's compensation insurance for the farmworkers, the growers withheld 11cents per box from his compensation to purchase a worker's compensation policy, which named the growers as the insured parties and employers of the farmworkers. The growers also computed social security taxes due on the workers and issued Turke two checks--one for the taxes and another for the agreed upon price per box less the social security taxes and the 11cents per box for worker's compensation insurance. From his payment, Turke paid the subcontractors a set amount for each box picked by their workers, which varied depending on whether the subcontractor provided transportation to the farmworkers. The subcontractors then paid the farmworkers their wages.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The farmworkers filed suit against the growers, Turke and Ag-Tech under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-72 (1994) ("AWPA"), and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1994) ("FLSA"). ³ Their complaint alleged that the growers, Turke and Ag-Tech violated the AWPA by failing to keep hourly records, pay unemployment compensation and social security taxes, and pay wages promptly when due, id. §§ 1831(c)(1), (2) & 1832(a), (c). The farmworkers alleged that the growers also violated the AWPA by using labor contractors to recruit and transport them without reasonably ensuring that the contractors were registered and insured, id. §§ 1841(b)(1)(C) & 1842. The farmworkers claimed that defendants violated the FLSA by failing to keep hourly records and pay minimum wage, id. §§ 206(a), 211(c). Defaults were entered against Turke and Ag-Tech for failure to file responsive pleadings.

Following discovery, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on the growers' liability under the FLSA and the AWPA. The farmworkers argued that the growers were liable because they, along with Turke and Ag-Tech, were "joint employers" of the farmworkers. The growers contended that they were not liable because Turke was the farmworkers' sole employer. The district court granted summary judgment to the growers and denied summary judgment to the farmworkers, finding that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the growers were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Antenor v. D & S Farms, Inc., 866 F.Supp. 1389 (S.D.Fla.1994).

III. DISCUSSION

A determination of employment status under the FLSA and the AWPA is a question of law subject to our de novo review. Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, Inc., 20 F.3d 434, 440 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 943, 115 S.Ct. 351, 130 L.Ed.2d 306 (1994). Because we are reviewing a summary judgment in favor of the growers, we must determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact and, if not, whether the growers are entitled to judgment on the question of joint employment as a matter of law; stated differently, we must determine whether the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the pickers, support a reasonable conclusion that they were employed by the growers for purposes of the AWPA and the FLSA. See Parks v. City of Warner Robins, GA, 43 F.3d 609, 612-13 (11th Cir.1995). To do this, we initially consider the statutory definition of "employ" under the FLSA and AWPA and their legislative history.

A. Statutory Background

The FLSA was enacted in 1938 in order to eliminate "labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers...." 29 U.S.C. § 202(a), (b). It requires that employers, among other things, keep payroll records and pay employees a minimum hourly wage and overtime. Id. §§ 201-11. The AWPA, enacted in 1983, was intended "to assure necessary protections for migrant and seasonal agricultural workers...." Id. § 1801. Among its provisions, the AWPA requires agricultural employers to register with the government, maintain employment records for workers, and comply with various compensation, housing and transportation provisions. Id. §§ 1811-44.

The growers' liability under the FLSA and the AWPA depends on whether they "employed" the farmworkers furnished by Turke. See id. § 203(d), (e)(1); id. § 1802(2). Both statutes utilize the same definition of "employ," so if the growers employed the farmworkers under one statute, they necessarily employed them under the other. Aimable, 20 F.3d at 440. In defining "employment" under both statutes, Congress expressly rejected the common-law definition of employment, which is based on limiting concepts of control and supervision. See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150-51, 67 S.Ct. 639, 640-41, 91 L.Ed. 809 (1947); Aimable, 20 F.3d at 439. ⁴ Rather, an entity "employs" a person under the FLSA and the AWPA if it "suffers or permits" the individual to work. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g); id. § 1802(5). ⁵ An entity "suffers or permits" an individual to work if, as a matter of economic reality, the individual is...