City of Chicago v. Kemp
| Decision Date | 23 April 1909 |
| Citation | 88 N.E. 284,240 Ill. 56 |
| Parties | CITY OF CHICAGO v. KEMP et al. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County, Edgar Eldredge, Judge.
Petition by the City of Chicago against Mary Kemp and others to condemn certain land for the opening of a street. From an order dismissing the petition, the City appeals. Affirmed.
George A. Mason and William T. Hafeman (Edward J. Brundage, Corp. Counsel, of counsel), for appellant.
Hugh L. Burnham, Lyman, Lyman & O'Connor, and Joseph H. Fitch, for appellees.
This was a proceeding by petition in the circuit court of Cook county, under the local improvement act, for the condemnation of certain real estate for the purpose of opening South Park avenue from 115th street to Kensington avenue, in the city of Chicago, and for the assessment of benefits against property found to be benefited by the proposed improvement. Commissioners were appointed, who assessed benefits aggregating $26,487. Upon a hearing certain property owners against whose property benefits had been assessed appeared and filed a number of legal objections, several of which were sustained and the petition was dismissed. The city of Chicago has appealed. It will be necessary to consider but one of the objections.
The land proposed to be taken consists of four lots, being a strip running north and south, and being of the width of two lots from east to west. Two of the lots abut on 115th street and the other two abut on Kensington avenue. A copy of the improvement ordinance was made a part of the petition. That ordinance provides that South Park avenue be opened from 115th street to Kensington avenue ‘by condemning therefor’ the four lots, describing them, ‘in accordance with the plan hereto annexed.’ The plan annexed shows that facing on Kensington avenue there are two frame buildings, each two stories in height, and facing on 115th street there are two buildings, each two stories in height, party brick and partly frame, all upon the lots proposed to be taken; that these buildings, both on Kensington avenue and 115th street, occupy practically the entire frontage of the lots on the street or avenue; and that there are six other smaller structures on the lots. It was objected that, inasmuch as the ordinance provided for the opening of the avenue only ‘by condemning’ the strip of real estate, it did not appear that the buildings would be removed and the surface of the ground put in condition to be used as an avenue; that the property specially assessed would not be benefited, except this work was done; and that, as no provision was made for doing this work, the property could not be specially assessed.
This ordinance provides only for condemning the land. No other ordinance is found in the record, and the position of the city seems to be that it should be...
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