Jackson v. State

Decision Date11 December 2017
Docket NumberCourt of Appeals Case No. 82A04–1609–CR–2074
Citation88 N.E.3d 1106
Parties Marquell M. JACKSON, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

88 N.E.3d 1106

Marquell M. JACKSON, Appellant–Defendant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.

Court of Appeals Case No. 82A04–1609–CR–2074

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Filed December 11, 2017


Attorney for Appellant : Matthew J. McGovern, Anderson, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee : Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Justin F. Roebel, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

OPINION ON REHEARING

Najam, Judge.

1] Marquell Jackson and the State each petition for rehearing following our opinion in Jackson v. State, 84 N.E.3d 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (" Jackson I"). In Jackson I, we held, in relevant part, that the trial court committed fundamental error when it permitted the State to amend its charging information on an alleged criminal gang enhancement such that the amended charge no longer stated an offense under Indiana law. Id. at at 711–14. Thus, we "reverse[d] Jackson's enhancement and remand[ed] with instructions that the trial court vacate the enhancement and the sentence imposed on it." Id. at 714. We grant the petitions for rehearing, decline to reconsider our opinion in Jackson I, and clarify our remand instructions.

Jackson I

[2] On rehearing, we first address the State's argument that we should reconsider our opinion in Jackson I because, according to the State, the amendment to the charge for the criminal gang enhancement was merely "an unintentional typographical or copying error." State's Pet. for Reh'g at 7. The State further contends that the amendment was made at the behest of the trial court and was "not an intentional bait-and-switch or misdirection." Id. And the State argues that Jackson's "arguments at trial show he was not confused by the State's typographic mistake but instead attempted to benefit from it."

1 Id.

[3] We decline to reconsider Jackson I. We ascribe no ill intent to the State in the erroneously worded amendment to the charging information. But, regardless of whether the mistake was intentional, the following conclusions remain true as a consequence of the State's amended information:

1. The amended information omitted all references to an essential element of the correct offense, namely, the mens rea.

2. The amended information included as an element of the offense that Jackson was "a known member" of a gang, an act that is not within the statute.

3. The State had no discretion to charge the act alleged as if it were a criminal offense.

[88 N.E.3d 1108

4. Because the amended charge stated a nonexistent offense, Jackson had no notice at the time of the offense that the act alleged would have been an offense.

5. A conviction for the incorrect and confusing amended charge does not protect Jackson from double jeopardy.

6. Jackson's counsel expressly and substantially relied on the erroneous language of the amended charge in presenting Jackson's defense.

7. Even if the charge were valid as amended, the State presented no evidence, let alone sufficient evidence, to support the offense as charged.

In its petition for rehearing, the State does not suggest that any of those seven conclusions was erroneous. Neither does the State suggest that the authorities on which we relied for each of those conclusions are not applicable here.

[4] Further, with respect to the State's argument that Jackson's counsel used the erroneous language of the amended charge to Jackson's benefit at trial, the State's position seems to be that Jackson's counsel had no right to rely on and contest the amended information as written. The State's argument is directly contrary to our Supreme Court's reasoning and holding in Young v. State, on which we relied in Jackson I. See Jackson I, 84 N.E.3d at 714 (citing Young v. State, 30 N.E.3d 719, 726–28 (Ind. 2015) ). As the Young Court stated with respect to the facts before it:

The error here ... placed Defendants in an unworkable Catch–22. When the State specifically relied on shooting as the "means used" to support the murder charge, Defendants relied on it—as they had the right to do—to frame their defense solely in terms of a shooting, to the exclusion of any other means.

30 N.E.3d at 726 (citation omitted). Likewise here, when the State amended the charge for the criminal gang enhancement to allege that Jackson was "a known member" of a gang and omitted the correct statutory language, Jackson relied on it, which he had the right to do, to frame his defense solely in terms of whether he was a known member of a gang and to the exclusion of the correct statutory language.

5] In its petition for rehearing,...

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4 cases
  • Jackson v. State, Supreme Court Case No. 18S-CR-00113
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Indiana
    • 24 d5 Agosto d5 2018
    ...agreed and reversed the enhancement. Jackson v. State , 84 N.E.3d 706, 711–14 (Ind. Ct. App.) (" Jackson I "), clarified on reh'g , 88 N.E.3d 1106 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (" Jackson II "). It instructed the trial court on remand to "vacate the enhancement and the sentence imposed on it." Id. a......
  • Reis v. State, Court of Appeals Case No. 65A01–1707–CR–1563
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • 11 d1 Dezembro d1 2017
  • Bryson v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • 20 d3 Julho d3 2022
    ...and inability to adhere to the terms of his sentencing support the trial court's decision to impose the maximum sentence. See Reis, 88 N.E.3d at 1106 (holding sentence imposed was not inappropriate given Reis's long criminal history and the egregious nature of his crimes). II. Revocation of......
  • Bryson v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • 20 d3 Julho d3 2022
    ...and inability to adhere to the terms of his sentencing support the trial court's decision to impose the maximum sentence. See Reis, 88 N.E.3d at 1106 (holding sentence imposed was not inappropriate given Reis's long criminal history and the egregious nature of his crimes). II. Revocation of......

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