Eder Bros. v. WINE MERCHANTS OF CONN., No. 17382.

Decision Date06 September 2005
Docket NumberNo. 17382.
Citation275 Conn. 363,880 A.2d 138
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesEDER BROTHERS, INC., et al. v. WINE MERCHANTS OF CONNECTICUT, INC.

Charles D. Ray, with whom were David A. Reif and, on the brief, Salvatore N. Fornaciari, Hartford, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Jeffrey J. Mirman, Farmington, for the appellee (defendant).

SULLIVAN, C.J., and BORDEN, KATZ, PALMER and ZARELLA, Js.

KATZ, J.

The present case involves an action by the plaintiffs, Eder Brothers, Inc., Alan S. Goodman, Inc., Brescome Barton, Inc., Mid State Distributors, LLC, Hartley and Parker, Inc., and Connecticut Distributors, Inc., who are wholesale wine distributors, against the defendant, Wine Merchants of Connecticut, Inc., a competitor in the wholesale wine distribution business, seeking money damages and injunctive relief on the ground that certain of the defendant's practices violate the Liquor Control Act, General Statutes § 30-1 et seq., and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's practice of shrink-wrapping 180 bottles of 1.5 liter Redwood Creek brand wine on a pallet, surrounding the bottles with cardboard, and then posting a "jumbo case" per bottle sale price with the department of consumer protection (department) when the palletized case was not a "case," as that term is defined by General Statutes § 30-1(6),1 constituted an illegal offering of quantity discounts in violation of General Statutes § 30-94(a).2 Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that, because the defendant offered the "jumbo case" to only a select group of retailers, it violated General Statutes § 30-64a.3 Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's conduct amounted to unfair trade practices in violation of General Statutes § 42-110b.4

The defendant moved to dismiss the action on four grounds: (1) the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant because of untimely service of process; (2) the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the action; (3) the department has exclusive jurisdiction over alleged violations of liquor control statutes; and (4) the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies available through the department. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the action on the second and third grounds raised, concluding that "regardless of the interest of the plaintiffs as competitors of the defendant, the plaintiffs lack standing to maintain this action because there is no statute that permits them to sue the defendant for violation of the liquor pricing laws. Enforcement of these statutes in a civil context lies solely with the [department]. Moreover, couching their claim as one under [CUTPA] does not save their claim, since the claimed violations are ones that arise under the liquor pricing laws, over which the legislature has determined that the [department] shall have exclusive jurisdiction." The plaintiffs then appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(c) and Practice Book § 65-1. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly determined that it did not have jurisdiction to consider either their claim alleging a CUTPA violation or their claim alleging a violation of the Liquor Control Act. In addition to defending the trial court's judgment, the defendant contends that, even if we were to agree with the plaintiffs' claims, we should affirm the judgment nonetheless based on the alternate grounds that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and failed to join the department as an indispensable party. We reject the plaintiffs' claim that the trial court improperly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claimed violations of the Liquor Control Act. We agree with the plaintiffs, however, that the trial court improperly dismissed their claim under CUTPA.

I

The plaintiffs' claims both implicate the issue of standing. We begin, therefore, with our well settled principles dictating the nature of that inquiry. "The issue of standing implicates this court's subject matter jurisdiction." Fish Unlimited v. Northeast Utilities Service Co., 254 Conn. 21, 31, 755 A.2d 860 (2000), overruled in part on other grounds, Waterbury v. Washington, 260 Conn. 506, 545, 800 A.2d 1102 (2002); Steeneck v. University of Bridgeport, 235 Conn. 572, 580, 668 A.2d 688 (1995) ("[w]here a plaintiff lacks standing to sue, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction"). "Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.... Gay & Lesbian Law Students Assn. v. Board of Trustees, 236 Conn. 453, 466, 673 A.2d 484 (1996). When standing is put in issue, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue .... Malerba v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 210 Conn. 189, 192, 554 A.2d 287 (1989). Standing requires no more than a colorable claim of injury; a [party] ordinarily establishes ... standing by allegations of injury. Similarly, standing exists to attempt to vindicate arguably protected interests.... Gay & Lesbian Law Students Assn. v. Board of Trustees, supra, at 466, 673 A.2d 484." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. DeCaro, 252 Conn. 229, 253-54, 745 A.2d 800 (2000).

Standing is established by showing that the party claiming it is authorized by statute to bring an action, in other words statutorily aggrieved, or is classically aggrieved. Steeneck v. University of Bridgeport, supra, 235 Conn. at 579, 668 A.2d 688. "The fundamental test for determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: [F]irst, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in [the challenged action], as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the [challenged action]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest ... has been adversely affected." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pomazi v. Conservation Commission, 220 Conn. 476, 483, 600 A.2d 320 (1991). "Statutory aggrievement exists by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case. In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 487, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). A statute need not specifically provide that certain persons come within its protection in order to establish aggrievement as long as that protection may be implied fairly. Buchholz's Appeal from Probate, 9 Conn. App. 413, 421-22, 519 A.2d 615 (1987); see, e.g., Tomlinson v. Board of Education, 226 Conn. 704, 721, 629 A.2d 333 (1993).

II

We first address the plaintiffs' claim that the trial court improperly determined that they lacked standing to bring a private right of action for claimed violations of the Liquor Control Act. The plaintiffs claim that the statutory framework governing conduct of wine distributors under that act demonstrates that the legislature intended to confer upon them standing to challenge the alleged violations. The defendant contends that the enforcement of the Liquor Control Act is vested exclusively within the department and that no private right of action to enforce its provisions exists. We agree with the defendant.

Although the plaintiffs do not state expressly the ground on which they assert standing, their claim—that the statutory framework of the Liquor Control Act demonstrates that the legislature intended to create a private cause of action conferring standing upon them to challenge the claimed violations—sounds in statutory aggrievement.5 The issue, therefore, is whether the Liquor Control Act establishes standing for the plaintiffs in their capacities as competitors by creating an arguably protected interest, within the meaning of the statute. We disagree that the statute confers such a right.

Whether the plaintiffs are statutorily aggrieved under the Liquor Control Act is a question of statutory interpretation. Carmel Hollow Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Bethlehem, 269 Conn. 120, 129, 848 A.2d 451 (2004). Our legislature recently has enacted General Statutes § 1-2z, which provides: "The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extra-textual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." In the present case, neither of the parties claim that the Liquor Control Act yields a plain and unambiguous answer to the question of whether it conveys a private right of action. Indeed, that act is silent with respect to that question. Accordingly, our analysis is not limited, and we, therefore, apply "our well established process of statutory interpretation, under which we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
114 cases
  • Cenatiempo v. Bank of Am., N.A.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • November 26, 2019
    ...of statutes or regulations that themselves do not allow for private enforcement. See Eder Bros., Inc. v. Wine Merchants of Connecticut, Inc. , 275 Conn. 363, 381–82, 880 A.2d 138 (2005). Recovery under CUTPA for violations of HAMP is compatible with the objectives of HAMP, which is to help ......
  • Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • April 15, 2008
    ...to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.' Eder Bros., Inc. v. Wine Merchants of Connecticut, Inc., 275 Conn. 363, 372, 880 A.2d 138 (2005)." Rollins v. People's Bank Corp., 283 Conn. 136, 141, 925 A.2d 315 (2007). We also note that, althou......
  • West Farms Mall, LLC v. West Hartford, 17464.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • July 11, 2006
    .... . . has been adversely affected." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Eder Bros., Inc. v. Wine Merchants of Connecticut, Inc., 275 Conn. 363, 369-70, 880 A.2d 138 (2005). The plaintiff contends that the trial court misconstrued its claim of classical aggrievement as subs......
  • Cambodian Buddhist v. Planning and Zoning
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • February 12, 2008
    ...... has been adversely affected." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Eder Bros., Inc. v. Wine Merchants of Connecticut, Inc., 275 Conn. 363, 369-70, 880 A.2d 138 (2005). "[I]f the injuries claimed by the plaintiff are remote, indirect or derivative with respect to the def......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
6 books & journal articles
  • 2005 Connecticut Appellate Review
    • United States
    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 79, 2005
    • Invalid date
    ...A.2d 1198 (2005). 96 273 Conn. 487, 870 A.2d 1066 (2005). 97 273 Conn. 759, 873 A.2d 175 (2005). 98 275 Conn. 38, 881 A.2d 194 (2005). 99 275 Conn. 363, 880 A.2d 138 (2005). 100 272 Conn. 734, 865 A.2d 428 (2005). 101 272 Conn. 410, 862 A.2d 292 (2004). 102 278 Conn. 163, 896 A.2d 777 (2006......
  • The Standard for Determining "unfair Acts or Practices" Under State Unfair Trade Practices Acts
    • United States
    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 80, 2005
    • Invalid date
    ...1985) ("It is clear to us that a violation of the Franchise Act would not necessarily implicate the interests protected by CUTPA."). 189 275 Conn. 363, 380-82, 886 A.2d 138, 149-50 (2005). 190 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). See, e.g., Dial Corp. v. Manghnani Inv. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1230, 1239......
  • Unresolved Issues Under the Unfair Trade Practices Act
    • United States
    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 82, 2008
    • Invalid date
    ...policy so as to amount to an established concept of unfairness."). 41.See, e.g., Eder Bros. v. Wine Merchants of Connecticut, Inc., 275 Conn. 363, 380-82, 886 A.2d 138, 149-50 (2005) (Liquor Control Act); Macomber v. Travelers Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 261 Conn. 620, 645, 804 A.2d 180, 19......
  • A Rule for All Reasons: the Professional Services Exemption to Liability Under Connecticut's Unfair Trade Practices Act
    • United States
    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 85, 2011
    • Invalid date
    ...See supra, notes 70-71. 184. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110a(4) (emphasis added). See Eder Bros., Inc. v. Wine Merchants of Connecticut, Inc., 275 Conn. 363, 380, 880 A.2d 138, 149 (2005) ("CUTPA, by its own terms, applies to a broad spectrum of commercial activity."); Willow Springs Condominium......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT