Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC
| Citation | 880 F.Supp.2d 629 |
| Decision Date | 09 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 10–1283. |
| Parties | Rudolph A. KARLO, Mark K. McLure, William S. Cunningham, Jeffrey Marietti, David Meixelsberger, Benjamin D. Thompson, and Richard Csukas, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. PITTSBURGH GLASS WORKS, LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. Western District of Pennsylvania |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Andrew J. Horowitz, Bruce C. Fox, Mary Elizabeth Fischman, Yuanyou Yang, Obermayer Rebmann Maxwell & Hippel LLP, Pittsburgh, PA, for Plaintiffs.
Tina C. Mazzulla, David S. Becker, Jeffrey J. Mayer, Jennifer L. Fitzgerald, John T. Shapiro, Freeborn & Peters, LLP, Chicago, IL, Nancy L. Heilman, Robert B. Cottington, Robert F. Prorok, Cohen & Grigsby, P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendant.
Pending before the Court is the “Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Class Certification and Court Facilitated Notice” (“the motion”). (Docket No. 88). The motion is ripe for adjudication. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification (Docket No. 88) is GRANTED, in part, in accord with the following.
This action is brought by named Plaintiffs Richard Csukas, Jeffrey Marietti, Mark K. McLure, Benjamin D. Thompson, Rudolph A. Karlo, David Meixelsberger and William S. Cunningham (“Plaintiffs”) and against Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC (“PGW” or “Defendant”). The Plaintiffs' claims arise from a March 2009 reduction in force (“RIF”). (Docket No. 54 at ¶ 103). This RIF resulted in the termination of each of the named Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs claim that the RIF was conducted in a manner giving rise to an inference of age discrimination.
Their Amended Complaint (Docket No. 54) raises three counts. Count I claims disparate treatment under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. ( Id. at 36–37). Count II alleges disparate impact. ( Id. at 38–39). Finally, Count III claims retaliation under the ADEA. ( Id. at 39–41).
PGW is a limited liability corporation whose business was owned by PPG Industries, Inc. (“PPG”) until late 2008. (Docket No. 54 at ¶ 8; Docket No. 73 at ¶ 8). PGW admits that, since its formation, it has been an “employer” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 623. (Docket No. 73 at ¶ 9). Each of the plaintiffs is over fifty years old. (Docket No. 54 at ¶¶ 1–7; Docket No. 73 at ¶¶ 1–7). They claim that they are all former employees of PGW and that they were previously long-time PPG employees. ( Id. at ¶ 10). PGW responds that all of the plaintiffs were employees at certain times, but at other times, several of the plaintiffs were employed by another company and worked with PGW through a contract with that company. (Docket No. 73 at ¶ 10). The Plaintiffs have all filed charges of employment discrimination based on age against PGW with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and alleged more than 60 days have elapsed without the Plaintiffs receiving a Dismissal or Notice of Rights. (Docket No. 54 at ¶¶ 17–18)
Karlo began working for PPG on October 9, 1978. ( Id. at ¶ 24). McLure began working at PPG in 1974. ( Id. at ¶ 32). Cunningham began his career with PPG in April 1996. ( Id. at ¶ 41). Marietti was hired in 1984. ( Id. at ¶ 47). Meixelsberger was hired in 1987. ( Id. at ¶ 54). Thompson was brought in as a part-time employee in 1971, his position was terminated in 1972, and he was rehired on a permanent basis in 1972. ( Id. at ¶¶ 60–61). Csukas started with PPG in 1973. ( Id. at ¶ 76).
PGW was formed on October 1, 2008, when the auto glass businesses of PPG Industries, Inc. were spun off to create a new company. (Docket No. 104–1 at ¶ 3). One of PGW's core businesses is the production of automotive glass, such as windshields, rear windows and side windows to car manufacturers as an original equipment manufacturer (“OEM”). ( Id. at ¶ 5).
Around the time PGW was formed, General Motors, Ford and Chrysler appeared before Congress to request bailout funds. (Docket No. 104–2). Due to the downturn in the economy, PGW took drastic steps to “combat rapidly deteriorating sales”, including the closure of two Canadian facilities and one Michigan facility. (Docket No. 106 at 4; see generally Docket No. 104–3). Between 2008 and 2009, North American vehicle production took a precipitous dive. (Docket No. 104–4 at 1 ()). Several of the named plaintiffs acknowledge the downturn in the economy. ( See Docket No. 106 at 6 ()). PGW maintains that the economic downturn led to an initial RIF in late 2008. (Docket No. 104–3 at 2).
Tony Hartmann, PGW's Vice President of Human Resources, departed from the company in late 2008. (Docket No. 106 at 7). Kevin Cooney was brought in to replace him on an interim basis. ( Id.). Cooney worked on a reorganization plan in which each business unit director in the company identified the work that needed to be done and the personnel that were necessary to perform that work. ( Id. (citing Docket No. 104–12 at 47)).
The First Amended Complaint alleges that all of the Representative Plaintiffs were terminated over a two-day period in March 2009. (Docket No. 54 at ¶ 103). Mr. Csukas was terminated by Dave King, a PGW supervisor at the Evansville, Indiana facility. ( Id. at ¶¶ 104–107; Docket No. 73 at ¶¶ 104–107 ()). On March 31, 2009, Mr. Thompson was informed of his termination by the Creighton Plant Manager, Craig Barnett, and Human Resources Manager, Myrtle Smith. (Docket No. 54 at ¶ 111; 73 at ¶ 111 ()). Also on that date, the remainder of the named Plaintiffs—Messrs. Karlo, McLure, Cunningham, Marietti and Meixelsberger—were terminated by Gary Cannon, Director of Manufacturing at the Harmarville, Pennsylvania facility. (Docket No. 54 at ¶¶ 120–121; 73 at ¶¶ 120–121).
A total of 105 salaried employees were terminated in the 2009 RIF. (Docket No. 106 at 6). In performing the RIF, upper management relied upon the individual directors of each unit to determine which employees must be retained and which might be terminated. ( Id. at 7; Docket No. 104–12 at 47, 71–72). The criteria used in the RIF revolved around the work that was done in each unit, and the “[e]ducation, background, breadth of experience, and so forth.” (Docket No. 104–12 at 72).
Plaintiffs' motion was filed on October 3, 2011. (Docket No. 88). The parties' initial briefs on the motion are filed at Docket Numbers 91, 106, 113 and 126. On November 10, 2011, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment concurrently with its response to the present motion. ( See Docket No. 101). Defendant's Appendix (Docket No. 104) is referenced both in the motion for summary judgment and in its filings pertaining to the currently-pending motion.
On December 19, 2011, the Court convened a motion hearing on Plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification, at which time the Court heard argument and then ordered the parties to file additional briefing on the issue of the Court's consideration of expert testimony at the conditional certification stage. (Docket Nos. 131–132). The parties then filed their supplemental briefs on January 4, 2012. (Docket Nos. 135, 136).
Shortly thereafter, on January 13, 2012, the parties filed a joint motion to stay the Court's consideration of the pending motion while the parties participated in mediation. (Docket No. 141). This motion was granted on January 17, 2012. (Docket No. 145). On February 3, 2012, the Court received a report from the mediator indicating that the case had not settled. (Docket No. 149). The parties then filed additional supplemental citations to authority. (Docket Nos. 154, 158). The Court held a second motion hearing on March 9, 2012 (Docket No. 161) and received the transcript of that hearing on April 23, 2012. (Docket No. 176).1
Through the pending motion, Plaintiffs seek conditional certification of their collective ADEA claim and court-facilitated notice of same. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), which is incorporated into the ADEA via Section 7(b) of that Act, potential plaintiffs must opt in to a collective action suit and affirmatively notify the court of their intentions to join the suit. Sperling v. Hoffman–La Roche Inc., 862 F.2d 439, 444 (3d Cir.1988) (“Sperling II ”), aff'd Hoffmann–La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170, 110 S.Ct. 482, 107 L.Ed.2d 480 (1989) (“Sperling ”). It is not sufficient simply to “opt-in” to a collective action under § 216(b). The representative plaintiffs must also show that the potential plaintiffs are “similarly situated” to the representative plaintiffs. See29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Sperling II, 862 F.2d at 444.
Courts typically follow a two-tiered analysis in determining whether a case may move forward as a collective action. The first phase, or “notice” phase, requires that a court “make[ ] a preliminary determination whether the employees enumerated in the complaint can be provisionally categorized as similarly situated to the named plaintiff.” Symczyk v. Genesis HealthCare Corp., 656 F.3d 189, 192 (3d Cir.2011). If the plaintiff carries this burden, the collective action is “conditionally certified” for purposes of notice and discovery. Id. The second phase is addressed after all putative class members have had an opportunity to opt in and further discovery has taken place. Mueller v. CBS, Inc., 201 F.R.D. 425, 428 (W.D.Pa.2001) (Ambrose, J.). At this stage, the court “reconsiders the class certification question using a ‘similarly situated’ standard, that is, by conducting a fact-specific review of each class member who has opted-in, taking into account factors such as employment setting,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC
...action to be comprised of employees terminated by the RIF who were at least fifty years old at the time. See Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC , 880 F.Supp.2d 629 (W.D. Pa. 2012). In addition to the named plaintiffs, eleven individuals opted in. Three voluntarily dismissed their claims a......
-
Fulghum v. Embarq Corp.
...individuals under 40 years of age), abrogated on other grounds,42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(B)(i). But see Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 880 F.Supp.2d 629, 637–40 (W.D.Pa.2012) (recognizing subgroup claims under the ADEA for disparate impact claims). 157.Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power ......
- Oates v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
-
Mfrs. & Traders Trust Co. v. Minuteman Spill Response, Inc.
...time in its reply brief. Although it is improper to introduce new legal arguments in a reply brief, see Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 880 F.Supp.2d 629, 641 (W.D.Pa.2012), the Court will briefly address the argument. The Princess Lida doctrine “applies when: (1) the litigation in bo......
-
Representing multiple plaintiffs
...inapplicable, while inding the Court’s general discussion somewhat instructive. For example, in Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 880 F. Supp.2d 629, 648 (W.D. Pa. 2012), the district court found that the “reasoning in Wal-Mart is instructive in collective action context” and granted co......