Guam Sasaki Corp. v. Diana's Inc.
| Decision Date | 02 August 1989 |
| Docket Number | 88-2611,Nos. 88-1889,s. 88-1889 |
| Citation | 881 F.2d 713 |
| Parties | GUAM SASAKI CORPORATION, d/b/a Julale Shopping Center, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. DIANA'S INC., Defendant/Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
David A. Mair, Mair, Mair, Hogan & Spade, Agana, Guam, for defendant-appellant.
Katherine A. Maraman, Agana, Guam, for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Guam (Appellate Division).
Before O'SCANNLAIN and TROTT, Circuit Judges, and KAY, * District Judge.
JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the District of Guam over this case derives from 48 U.S.C. Sec. 1424-3(a). Our jurisdiction over this appeal is grounded on 48 U.S.C. Sec. 1424-3(c).
Appellee Guam Sasaki Corporation filed a four-count complaint against Diana's Inc. in the Guam Superior Court in 1985. All counts of the complaint related to Guam Sasaki's role as Diana's landlord. Count I sought damages for breach of a covenant to leave the premises in good condition. Count II claimed damages for accrued rentals, charges and fees. Count III asked for compensation for reasonable value of the use of the premises. Count IV requested issuance of a warrant for removal of appellant from the premises. Diana's promptly filed an answer and counterclaim. A motion to dismiss Count IV was granted. Subsequently, the court granted Diana's motion for partial summary judgment, effectively disposing of Counts I and II. Approximately one year after the complaint had been filed, the parties stipulated to summary judgment on Count III provided Guam Sasaki was allowed to file an amended complaint. A judgment on Counts I, II, and III was entered on February 26, 1986, and a stipulation dismissing the counterclaim was entered the following day. No claims remained.
Guam Sasaki filed an amended complaint on March 4, 1986, after which Diana's filed an answer and counterclaim. Diana's then moved to dismiss the amended complaint On February 26, 1987, Guam Sasaki filed a motion in the superior court asking that court to request a remand from the Appellate Division and to vacate the stipulated judgment disposing of Counts I, II, and III, arguing for the first time that the stipulated judgment was not sufficient to allow it to file an amended complaint. Diana's then moved the Appellate Division to stay the first district court appeal, stating by affidavit that "in the event that this Court should deny appellee's motion for an order of remand, or in the event that jurisdiction over this appeal should be returned to this Court following such a remand, appellant's counsel will petition the Court to set a new briefing calendar." The Appellate Division stayed the briefing requirements for the first appeal pending determination of the motion for remand.
arguing that it was inappropriate because there was no complaint left to amend. Guam Sasaki responded that the stipulation provided sufficient legal basis for filing the amended complaint, and the superior court agreed, denying Diana's motion to dismiss on December 12, 1986. Diana's appealed that ruling to the district court's appellate division ("Appellate Division") on December 24 ("first district court appeal").
The matter was remanded to the superior court, and on July 13, 1987, that court granted Guam Sasaki's motion to vacate the stipulated judgment. Diana's appealed the order to the Appellate Division ("second district court appeal"). In the course of filing its later appeal, Diana's neglected to file a separate order for transcripts from the court reporter for inclusion in the record to be sent to the Appellate Division. The parties agreed among themselves that resolution of the first district court appeal should await resolution of the second district court appeal. However, neither party so moved in the Appellate Division and Diana's failed to submit a new briefing schedule to that court.
On September 8, 1987, Guam Sasaki filed motions to dismiss both district court appeals, arguing that Diana's failed to prosecute the first and improperly filed the second. The Appellate Division agreed and dismissed both appeals. Diana's timely appeals the dismissal of these appeals.
Diana's argues that the Appellate Division improperly dismissed the first district court appeal for failure to follow a court order issued pursuant to Rule 15(d)(1) of the Local Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Diana's also argues that the Appellate Division improperly dismissed the second appeal for failure to comply with filing requirements in Rule 8 of the Local Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Citing Guam v. Yang, 1 both parties argue in their briefs before this court that we should review the district court's interpretation of its rules of appellate procedure de novo. Yang, however, determined only the standard of review for the Appellate Division's treatment of local Guam law, not the Appellate Division's interpretations and applications of its own local rules.
A district court has discretion to adopt local rules that are necessary to conduct its business. Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 645, 107 S.Ct. 2607, 2610, 96 L.Ed.2d 557 (1987). We afford a high degree of deference to local rules and to district court decisions which are designed to delineate local practice and define the local rules. In Miranda v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 710 F.2d 516 (9th Cir.1983), we reaffirmed that "[d]istrict courts have broad discretion in interpreting and applying their local rules." Id. at 521 (citing Lance, Inc. v. Dewco Services, Inc., 422 F.2d 778, 783-84 (9th Cir.1970)); see also United States v. DeLuca, 692 F.2d 1277, 1281 (9th Cir.1982) () (citing United States v. Simmons, 476 F.2d 33, 35 (9th Cir.1973)).
Therefore, in reviewing rulings of the district court regarding local practice and local rules, the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion.
As we mention above, in the first district court appeal the Appellate Division stayed briefing requirements for Diana's only until it had ruled on Guam Sasaki's motion for remand. Even after the Appellate Division had granted the remand, however, Diana's failed to submit a new briefing schedule. Guam Sasaki therefore moved for dismissal of the first district court appeal on the grounds that Diana's violated Local Rule 15(d)(1) and its almost identically worded federal counterpart, Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and additionally, violated a court order issued pursuant thereto. Both rules state that if an appellant fails to file his brief "within the time provided by this Rule, or within the time as extended," an appellee may move for dismissal of the appeal (emphasis supplied).
Diana's argues that it violated neither rule since no briefing schedule was in effect. However, the portion highlighted above clearly provides that dismissal is appropriate if appellant fails to file within the time as extended by a court. It was not unreasonable for the Appellate Division to construe its stay as postponing for a specific period the deadline for Diana's to file a schedule and subsequent brief. The Appellate Division's order provided that the time for filing would be stayed only until resolution of the lower court proceedings and thus at that time a duty arose in the appellant to file a briefing schedule. Diana's cannot use its own failure to submit a briefing schedule as a shield from the very duty it is charged with breaching. One cannot avoid a timeliness requirement by simply refusing to submit the schedule by which timeliness is to be measured.
The Appellate Division need not rely solely on the aforementioned rules of procedure to support its dismissal, because the order was clear on its face in requiring action by Diana's after the lower court proceedings concluded. This Circuit has held that a district court may dismiss an action for failure of a party to obey an order of the court. "[O]ur court has recognized an inherent power of the trial court to dismiss in order to protect the integrity of its orders." Fendler v. Westgate-California Corp., 527 F.2d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir.1975) (citing O'Brien v. Sinatra, 315 F.2d 637 (9th Cir.1963)). Dismissal for failure to comply with an order is within the discretion of the trial judge. Fendler, 527 F.2d at 1170 (citing Von Poppenheim v. Portland Boxing & Wrestling Comm'n, 442 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1039, 92 S.Ct. 715, 30 L.Ed.2d 731 (1972)). In its opinion dismissing the appeal, the Appellate Division cited its February, 1988 order which "specifically stated that this matter is stayed 'pending determination by this Court of the motion of plaintiff-appellee ... for an order remanding the cause to the Superior Court of Guam.' " The order staying the appeal was unambiguously designed for one purpose only, completion of proceedings below. The Appellate Division found it clear that the Superior Court had completed action upon the motion of appellee. The Appellate Division appears to have acted properly to enforce its order and dismiss the appeal.
Diana's responds that the appeal was already stayed and that there was no need to move subsequent to conclusion of proceedings in the lower court for a further stay in order to await the outcome of the second appeal. This argument ignores the expressly conditional nature of the allowance made by the Appellate Division and appellant's own affidavit in which counsel swore to perform the very act now claimed to be...
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