Dallas County v. Sweitzer

• Citation: 881 S.W.2d 757
• Decision Date: 31 May 1994
• Docket Number: No. 05-93-00056-CV,05-93-00056-CV
• Parties: DALLAS COUNTY and the Dallas County District Clerk, Appellants, v. Averill SWEITZER and Walter Kowalski, Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas

Page 757

881 S.W.2d 757

DALLAS COUNTY and the Dallas County District Clerk, Appellants, v. Averill SWEITZER and Walter Kowalski, Appellees.

No. 05-93-00056-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas Dallas.

May 31, 1994.

Rehearing Denied July 11, 1994.

Henry J. Voegtle, Dallas, for appellants.

Timothy E. Kelley, Dallas, Christa Brown, Austin, for appellees.

Before McGARRY, C.J., and BAKER and OVARD, JJ.

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

BAKER, Justice.

We deny both appellant and appellee's motions for rehearing. We withdraw our opinion and judgment of February 14, 1994. The following is now the court's opinion.

Dallas County and the Dallas County District Clerk (collectively the County) appeal the trial court's judgment imposing penalties and enjoining collection of certain fees. Sweitzer ¹ and Kowalski (collectively Sweitzer) sued the County alleging it overcharged and collected fees at filing not authorized by law. Sweitzer alleged section 51.321 of the Government Code ² entitled him to four-fold penalties.

The trial court granted Sweitzer partial summary judgment finding the County improperly collected certain fees. After a bench trial, the trial court entered an interlocutory judgment enjoining collection of the fees. Based on a Master's report, the trial court entered judgment awarding Sweitzer $2,275,568 in penalties under section 51.321.

The County raises three points of error that are dispositive of this appeal. The County contends the trial court erred: (1) in finding the County improperly collected the fees; (2) in imposing penalties under section 51.321; and (3) in granting Sweitzer injunctive relief. We sustain the County's points of error complaining about the trial court: (1) imposing penalties under section 51.321; (2) finding the County improperly collected the law library fee, $2 of clerk fee, and ADR fee; and (3) enjoining collection of the law library, $2 of clerk fee, and ADR fee. We reverse the trial court's penalty award. We modify and affirm as modified the trial court's injunction.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Sweitzer claimed section 51.321 entitled him to four-fold penalties on six different fees charged in cases Sweitzer filed since 1979. Sweitzer claimed the County could not collect the fees at filing or before the County performed the services. Sweitzer complained about $2 of the clerk fee, the sheriff fee, the court reporter fee, the appellate fee, the law library fee, and the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) fee.

The trial court granted Sweitzer partial summary judgment. The trial court held the County unlawfully collected the court reporter and appellate fees, and $2 of the clerk fee at filing. Sweitzer, in a later pleading, complained of the County's collection of two more fees: the law library and ADR fees. Sweitzer also claimed the County's collection of the fees at filing violated article I, section 13 of the Texas Constitution.

After a bench trial, the trial court found section 51.321 entitled Sweitzer to penalties for the following illegal fees charged by the County as a cost deposit since August 21, 1986:

1. Excessive Clerk Fee of $2;

2. Sheriff Fee of $23 from August 21, 1986 to January 21, 1988, when it became $30;

3. Court Reporter Fee of $3 from August 21, 1986 until September 1, 1989 when the fee became $15;

4. Appellate Fee of $5 from October 1, 1987 to September 28, 1989.

The trial court found that Sweitzer could recover for the following illegal fees collected by the District Clerk for cost deposits since January 1, 1988:

1. Law Library Fee of $10 from January 1, 1988 until January 1, 1992, when the fee changed to $15;

2. Mediation Fee of $8 from January 1, 1988 to date.

The trial court enjoined the County from collecting as a cost deposit: (1) a clerk fee of more than $46; (2) a court reporter fee of $15; (3) a sheriff fee of $30; (4) a law library fee of $15; and (5) an ADR fee of $8.

The trial court directed a Master to determine the fees the County collected at filing in suits Sweitzer filed. The trial court quadrupled the fees charged and awarded Sweitzer penalties of $2,275,568 under section 51.321. The trial court did not award any actual damages for the amounts improperly charged. The trial court awarded pre-judgment interest at six percent and post-judgment interest at ten percent.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

A. Parties' Contentions

Sweitzer contends the County did not perfect an appeal of the penalty award because the notice of appeal does not refer to it. The County responds that its notice of appeal is not a notice of limitation of appeal because it filed the notice of appeal after the deadline for a notice of limitation of appeal. See TEX.R.APP.P. 40(a)(4).

B. Applicable Law

In cases not requiring security for costs, a party must file a written notice of appeal. TEX.R.APP.P. 40(a)(2). A notice of appeal is sufficient if it states the number and style of the case, the trial court, and that the appellant desires to appeal from the judgment. TEX.R.APP.P. 40(a)(2). No attempt to limit an appeal is effective unless all parties receive notice specifying the part of the judgment from which a party appeals. When a party files a motion for new trial, parties must receive the notice within seventy-five days after judgment. TEX.R.APP.P. 40(a)(4).

We give the Rules of Appellate Procedure liberal construction, particularly as they relate to filing a notice of appeal. See El Paso Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Montrose Partners, 754 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1988, writ denied) (op. on reh'g); State Dept. of Highways and Public Transportation v. Douglas, 577 S.W.2d 559 (Tex.Civ.App.--Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). A technical application of the rules should not defeat the right to appeal. Sanders v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 201 S.W.2d 234, 236 (Tex.Civ.App.--Galveston), rev'd on other grounds, 146 Tex. 169, 205 S.W.2d 43 (1947). Where doubt exists about a rule's meaning, we resolve the issue to sustain rather than to defeat the appeal. Sanders, 201 S.W.2d at 236.

C. Application of Law to Facts

The County's notice of appeal was not effective to limit the appeal. See TEX.R.APP.P. 40(a)(4). Applying a liberal construction, we find the County's notice of appeal perfects an appeal from the trial court's final judgment. Sanders, 201 S.W.2d at 236. We overrule Sweitzer's first reply point.

PENALTY AWARD

The County claims the trial court erred in assessing four-fold penalties on the fees the County collected at filing. The County acknowledges it charged the fees. However, the County contests the trial court's application of law to the undisputed facts. To determine whether the penalty award is proper we review the trial court's application of section 51.321 to the facts.

A. Applicable Law

1. Standard of Review

We review conclusions of law as a matter of law, not for sufficiency of the evidence. See First Nat'l Bank v. Kinabrew, 589 S.W.2d 137, 146 (Tex.Civ.App.--Tyler 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). We have the duty independently to evaluate conclusions of law. MJR Corp. v. B & B Vending Co., 760 S.W.2d 4, 10 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1988, writ denied). We review the legal conclusions drawn from the facts found to determine their correctness. Mercer v. Bludworth, 715 S.W.2d 693, 697 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), overruled on other grounds, 801 S.W.2d 890, 894 (Tex.1991).

When we review the trial court's factual determinations we may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. See Flores v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 777 S.W.2d 38, 41-42 (Tex.1989), modified on other grounds, 851 S.W.2d 193 (Tex.1993). However, we review the trial court's determination of the legal principles controlling its ruling with much less deference. A trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex.1992).

2. Statutory Construction

We construe a statute to give effect to legislative intent. Harris County Dist. Attorney's Office v. J.T.S., 807 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Tex.1991); McCulloch v. Fox & Jacobs, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). When the wording of a statute is ambiguous, we consult statutory construction rules. See Matrix, Inc. v. Provident Am. Ins. Co., 658 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1983, no writ).

We review an act as a whole. We do not give a statute a meaning that conflicts with other provisions if we can harmonize the provisions. Estate of Padilla v. Charter Oaks Fire Ins. Co., 843 S.W.2d 196, 198 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1992, writ denied). We do not interpret a statute in a manner that will lead to a foolish or absurd result when another alternative is available. Estate of Padilla, 843 S.W.2d at 199.

If the disputed statute is clear and unambiguous, extrinsic aids and rules of statutory construction are inappropriate. Cail v. Service Motors, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Tex.1983); McCulloch, 696 S.W.2d at 921. Words in statutes have their ordinary meaning unless the statute defines them or the words apply to a particular trade or subject matter or are a term of art. TEX.GOV'T CODE ANN. § 312.002 (Vernon 1988); Hopkins v. Spring Indep. Sch. Dist., 736 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex.1987); Estate of Padilla, 843 S.W.2d at 198.

B. Section 51.321

Section 51.321 of the Government Code states:

If a district clerk charges and receives a higher fee than is authorized under this subchapter or charges and receives a fee that is not authorized under this subchapter, the clerk is liable to the party charged for an amount equal to four times the amount unlawfully charged and received.

TEX.GOV'T CODE ANN. § 51.321 (Vernon 1988) (emphasis added). The subchapter referred to in section 51.321 is subchapter D of chapter 51 of the Government Code. Subchapter D concerns the fees charged for the services of district clerks.

Most of the statutes authorizing the fees Sweitzer complains about are not in subchapter D. See TEX.GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.2061 ...