Devries by DeBlaay v. Fairfax County School Bd., 88-3644

Citation882 F.2d 876
Decision Date16 August 1989
Docket NumberNo. 88-3644,88-3644
Parties55 Ed. Law Rep. 442 Michael DEVRIES, by his parent and next friend Marjorie Ann DeBLAAY; Marjorie A. DeBlaay, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The FAIRFAX COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD; Robert Spillane, individually and in his capacity as Superintendent of Fairfax County Public Schools, Defendants-Appellees, and Fairfax County Board of Education Members, individually and in their capacity as a member of the Fairfax County School Board; Leary School Incorporated; Albert D. Leary, Jr., individually and in his capacity as Executive Director of Leary School; John Davis, individually and in his capacity as the Virginia Superintendent of Public Instruction, Virginia Department of Education, Defendants.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

Frank J. Laski (Judith A. Gran, Lisa M. Rau, Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia, Chuck Rust-Tierney, Hirschkop, Dimuro & Mook, on brief), for plaintiffs-appellants.

Thomas J. Cawley (Grady K. Carlson, John F. Cafferky, Hunton & Williams, on brief), for defendants-appellees.

Before PHILLIPS and SPROUSE, Circuit Judges, and MICHAEL, United States District Judge for the Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

SPROUSE, Circuit Judge:

Michael DeVries, a seventeen-year-old autistic student, through his mother, * appeals from the district court's judgment upholding the Fairfax County School Board's determination that a county vocational center located thirteen miles from his home rather than a public high school closer to his home is the "appropriate" and "least restrictive" educational environment for DeVries. We affirm.

The parties do not dispute that, because of his disability, Michael requires considerable special treatment to enable him to function in any educational environment. DeVries and the Board disagree, however, over the proper application of the Education of the Handicapped Act with respect to Michael's particular needs. DeVries insists that the Act mandates that he be "mainstreamed" by placing him in Annandale High School, a large general education school serving approximately 2,300 students with very few handicapped students. The Board contends, on the other hand, that Michael can only receive the statutorily required "appropriate public education" at the South County Vocational Center in West Potomac High School.

A state, in order to receive benefits under the Education of the Handicapped Act must demonstrate that all handicapped children in its educational programs have "the right to a free appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1412(1). The state must place a handicapped child in "the least restrictive environment." 34 C.F.R. Sec. 300.552(d). The Act requires that such education be tailored to the needs of an individual handicapped child by means of an "individualized education program" ("IEP"), which must be prepared at meetings between school representatives and the child's parents. 20 U.S.C. Secs. 1401(a)(19), 1414(a)(5). Parents of handicapped children who are not satisfied with their child's IEP have a right to "an impartial due process hearing" before a hearing officer and a right to an appeal to the state educational agency. "Any party aggrieved" by the result of the administrative determinations can seek review in a state court or a federal district court. Id. at Sec. 1415(b)(2), (e)(2).

Starting in the summer of 1986, Fairfax County public school officials began developing an IEP for Michael. The initial IEP provided for his continued attendance at Leary School, a private day school for handicapped children in Fairfax County that he been attending since September 1985. Michael's mother, Ms. DeBlaay, given the opportunity to participate in developing his IEP, insisted to no avail that he be educated at Annandale High School, the public school close to his home. In the fall of 1986, a local hearing officer conducted administrative hearings to resolve the controversy between Ms. DeBlaay and the Board. The hearing officer ruled in favor of the school system's proposed IEP, finding that Annandale High School was not appropriate for Michael. Ms. DeBlaay appealed the decision to a state review officer who affirmed the hearing officer's decision in early 1987. DeVries then filed a complaint in district court that the court ultimately dismissed because, in the interim, another IEP had been developed to place Michael at the South County Vocational Center. See DeVries v. Fairfax County School Bd., 674 F.Supp. 1219 (E.D.Va.1987). The second IEP was also administratively contested by Ms. DeBlaay and affirmed by a local hearing officer and a state reviewing officer. This court subsequently remanded the case to the district court to consider the new IEP. See DeVries v. Spillane, 853 F.2d 264 (4th Cir.1988). In the meantime, DeVries filed another action in district court contesting the second IEP. The district court consolidated the cases, received the record from the administrative hearings, and, after considering the evidence de novo, found that Michael was properly placed at the South County Vocational Center. DeVries appeals.

A party's complaint under the Education for the Handicapped Act is subject to a two-step inquiry to determine: (1) whether a state has complied with the Act's procedural requirements; and (2) whether "the individualized educational program developed through the Act's procedures [is] reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits." Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3051, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). The Supreme Court, while recognizing the importance of independent judicial review, admonished that "courts lack the 'specialized knowledge and experience' necessary to resolve 'persistent and difficult questions of educational policy' " and that, "once a court determines that the requirements of the Act have been met, questions of methodology are for resolution by the States." Id. at 208, 102 S.Ct. at 3052 (citations omitted).

Devries does not contest the Board's compliance with the Act's procedural requirements but complains that the IEP does not provide the appropriate public education he is entitled to receive. He contends that the district court, in upholding the Board's proposed IEP, failed to consider the mainstreaming requirements of the Act. Simply stated, DeVries argues that the evidence shows that he would be better educated at Annandale High School and that, even if that were not so, the Board did not sustain its burden of proving that he could not receive the statutorily mandated "appropriate" education at Annandale.

Although we empathize with DeVries' desire to be placed in a public high school with his sister and other nonhandicapped children, we cannot agree that the facts demonstrate that he would receive an "appropriate public education" at that institution. We are persuaded that the district court fully considered the Act's mainstreaming requirements but correctly concluded that Michael could not be satisfactorily educated in regular classes even with the use of supplementary aids and services.

Mainstreaming of handicapped children into regular school programs where they might have opportunities to study and to socialize with nonhandicapped children is not only a laudable goal but is also a requirement of the Act. Specifically, the Act mandates that states establish

procedures to assure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children ... are educated with children who are not handicapped, and that special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of handicapped children from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the handicap is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily....

20 U.S.C. Sec. 1412(5)(B).

The Act's language obviously indicates a strong congressional preference for mainstreaming. Mainstreaming, however, is not appropriate for every handicapped child. As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:

The proper inquiry is whether a proposed placement is appropriate under the Act. In some cases, a placement which may be considered better for academic reasons may not be appropriate because of the failure to provide for mainstreaming. The perception that a segregated institution is academically superior for a handicapped child may reflect no more than a basic disagreement with the mainstreaming concept. Such a disagreement is not, of course, any basis for not following the Act's mandate. In a case where the segregated facility is considered superior, the court should determine whether the services which make that placement superior could be feasibly provided in a...

To continue reading

Request your trial
54 cases
  • D.B v. Bedford County Sch. Bd.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia
    • 23 Abril 2010
    ...(4th Cir.1997) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B), and Rowley, 458 U.S. at 181 n. 4, 102 S.Ct. 3034); see also DeVries v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876, 879 (4th Cir.1989) (mainstreaming is not required where (1) the disabled child would not receive an educational benefit from mainstrea......
  • P. ex rel. Mr. P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
    • 28 Septiembre 2007
    ...inappropriate under the Act." See also A.W. v. Northwest R-1 School Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir.1987); DeVries v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876, 879 (4th Cir.1989) (adopting the Roncker test). In addition, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a four-factor balancing test that examine......
  • URBAN BY URBAN v. JEFFERSON COUNTY SCH. DIST. R-1, Civ. A. No. 93-S-908.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Colorado
    • 3 Diciembre 1994
    ...that, in appropriate circumstances, disabled children may be placed in segregated programs. Id., citing DeVries v. Fairfax County School Board, 882 F.2d 876, 880 (4th Cir.1989). These considerations surrounding whether and to what extent Gregory derives educational benefit from participatio......
  • Amos v. Maryland Dept. of Public Safety and Correctional Services
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • 22 Septiembre 1997
    ...the Fourth Circuit, have indeed applied the statutes to such mandatory and "involuntary" programs. See, e.g., DeVries v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876, 880 (4th Cir.1989) (applying section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to public schools); Galloway v. Superior Court of the District o......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
3 books & journal articles
  • The mainstreaming requirement of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act in the context of autistic spectrum disorders.
    • United States
    • Fordham Urban Law Journal Vol. 35 No. 5, October 2008
    • 1 Octubre 2008
    ...a teacher to benefit a disabled student would impact the ability to educate other students in the district). (96.) Id. at 163. (97.) 882 F.2d 876, 878-79 (4th Cir. (98.) 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989). (99.) Id. at 1039. (100.) Id. (101.) Id. (102.) Id. (103.) See id. at 1040. (104.) See id.......
  • Education Equity During COVID-19: Analyzing In-Person Priority Policies for Students with Disabilities.
    • United States
    • Stanford Law Review Vol. 74 No. 1, January 2022
    • 1 Enero 2022
    ...See N.W. ex rel. A.W. v. Nw. R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir. 1987); DeBlaay ex rel. Devries v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876, 878-79 (4th Cir. (182.) Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063. (183.) 874 F.2d 1036, 1046, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989). The Second, Third, Tenth, and Eleventh Circui......
  • The disability integration presumption: thirty years later.
    • United States
    • University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 154 No. 4, April 2006
    • 1 Abril 2006
    ...(88) Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989). (89) DeBlaay ex rel. DeVries v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876, 879 (4th Cir. 1989); N.W. ex rel. A.W.v. Nw. R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir. 1987). (90) There is little consistency among the circ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT