Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, s. 16-2119-cv (L)

CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)
Citation882 F.3d 314
Docket NumberAugust Term 2016,16-2098-cv (CON),16-2134-cv (CON),Nos. 16-2119-cv (L),s. 16-2119-cv (L)
Parties LINDE, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellees, v. ARAB BANK, PLC, Defendant–Appellant.
Decision Date09 February 2018

882 F.3d 314

LINDE, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellees,
v.
ARAB BANK, PLC, Defendant–Appellant.
1

Nos. 16-2119-cv (L)
16-2098-cv (CON)
16-2134-cv (CON)
August Term 2016

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued May 16, 2017
Decided February 9, 2018


Paul D. Clement, Kirkland & Ellis, LLP, Washington, D.C. (Michael H. McGinley, Nicholas T. Matich, Kirkland & Ellis, Washington, D.C.; Jonathan D. Siegfried, Kevin Walsh, Douglas W. Mateyaschuk, DLA Piper LLP, New York, New York, on the brief), for Defendant–Appellant Arab Bank, PLC.

Peter Raven–Hansen, Osen LLC, Hackensack, New Jersey (Gary M. Osen, Ari Ungar, Aaron Schlanger, Osen LLC, Hackensack, New Jersey; Shawn Naunton, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, New York, New York, on the brief), for Plaintiffs–Appellees Chana Freedman, Eugene Goldstein, Lorraine Goldstein, Michael Goldstein, Richard Goldstein, and Barbara Goldstein–Ingardia.

Michael E. Elsner, John M. Eubanks, Motley Rice LLC, Mount Pleasant, South Carolina, for Plaintiffs–Appellees Ayelet Attias, Yossef Cohen, Yehuda Eliyahu, and Raheli Laham.

James P. Bonner, Stone Bonner & Rocco LLP, New York, New York; John M. Eubanks, Motley Rice LLC, Mount Pleasant, South Carolina; Noel J. Nudelman, Heideman Nudelman & Kalik PC, Washington, D.C.; Lee S. Shalov, McLaughlin & Stern, LLP, New York, New York; Mark S. Werbner, Sayles Werbner, Dallas, Texas, for Plaintiffs–Appellees Philip Litle, Elishua Litle, Hannah Litle, Heidi Litle, Josiah Litle, and Noah Litle.

Neal Kumar Katyal, Jessica L. Ellsworth, Mary Helen Wimberly, Hogan Lovells US LLP, Washington D.C., for Amicus Curiae The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

Steven T. Cottreau, David D. DiBari, Jeffrey J. Golimowski, Clifford Chance US LLP, Washington D.C., for Amicus Curiae The Institute of International Bankers.

Before: Raggi and Carney, Circuit Judges, and Kaplan, District Judge.2

Reena Raggi, Circuit Judge

The sixteen named plaintiffs on this consolidated appeal are victims, or the relatives of victims, of three terrorist attacks perpetrated in Israel by Hamas between March 2002 and June 2003. Together with hundreds of other alleged victims and the surviving relatives of victims of alleged Hamas attacks, the named plaintiffs commenced actions in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New

882 F.3d 318

York to recover compensatory damages from Arab Bank, PLC ("Arab Bank" or "bank") under that provision of the Antiterrorism Act of 1990 ("ATA") affording a civil remedy. See Pub. L. No. 1-1-519, § 132, 104 Stat. 2240 (1990) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) ). Plaintiffs charged the bank with facilitating the attacks at issue by knowingly providing financial services to Hamas, Hamas-controlled charities, and the Saudi Committee for the Support of the Intifada Al–Quds ("Saudi Committee"), an entity that made payments to the families of Hamas suicide bombers. Following trial, at which the jury found Arab Bank liable for injuries resulting from twenty-four terrorist attacks, including the three here at issue, the district court (Brian M. Cogan, Judge ) substantially denied Arab Bank's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 and 59. See Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC , 97 F.Supp.3d 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).3 Rather than proceed to a scheduled bellwether trial on damages, however, the parties stipulated to the entry of a total damages award of $100,000,000, which the district court certified as final pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). At the same time, the parties entered into a confidential settlement agreement providing for the bellwether plaintiffs to be paid various total monetary amounts depending on whether the certified judgment was affirmed, reversed, or vacated on direct appeal. The parties agreed to forgo retrial in the event of vacatur and remand, as well as any further challenges to the judgment in any event.4

On this appeal, Arab Bank argues that it was wrongfully denied judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial because (1) the district court failed correctly to instruct the jury on the ATA's "act of international terrorism" element as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) ; (2) the bank was unfairly prejudiced by discovery sanctions that affected the presentation of evidence at trial; and (3) the trial evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to permit a jury finding that the bank's provision of financial services was either a proximate or but-for cause of the plaintiffs' injuries, the latter standard of which Arab Bank insists is in fact required to prove an ATA claim.

For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that instructional error as to the ATA's international terrorism element requires vacatur and remand. We are not persuaded by plaintiffs' argument that we can affirm in any event because any instructional error was rendered harmless by the jury's causation finding as well as by Congress's post-trial enactment of the Justice Against Terrorism Act ("JASTA"), Pub. L. No. 144-222, 130 Stat. 854 (Sept. 28, 2016), which extends ATA liability from those who themselves commit acts of international terrorism to those who aid and abet such acts by others, see 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2). Nor are we persuaded to reverse by Arab Bank's sufficiency challenge to the proof of causation because causation would not be in dispute if the bank is considered an aider and abettor of Hamas acts of terrorism, as plaintiffs can now maintain under JASTA. As Arab Bank concedes, our determination that instructional error warrants vacatur and remand makes it unnecessary for us to decide

882 F.3d 319

whether any of the bank's other challenges warrant such relief because the parties have entered into a settlement agreement that forgoes retrial on vacatur and remand in lieu of a specified total money payment to the bellwether plaintiffs.

Accordingly, based on instructional error, we VACATE the challenged judgment and REMAND this case to the district court for such further proceedings as are consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

I. Plaintiffs' ATA Claims

Plaintiffs sue for injuries sustained during three Hamas-associated attacks in Israel: (1) the March 2002 bombing of Café Moment, a coffee shop in downtown Jerusalem; (2) the March 2003 bombing of transit bus no. 37 in Haifa; and (3) the June 2003 machine-gun ambush of a family driving on Route 60 near Jerusalem. Plaintiffs allege that these attacks arose in the context of the "Second Intifada," a period of intensified violence by Palestinian terrorist groups in the aftermath of failed peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in September 2000. Among those carrying out such violence were suicide bombers supported by terrorist and fundamentalist groups, including the Islamic Resistance Movement, also known as Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya, or "Hamas," and its affiliates. For more than two decades, the United States has formally identified Hamas as a foreign terrorist organization. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(6) ; 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1), (d)(4) ; Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650 (Oct. 8, 1997).

The ATA affords a civil action for damages to United States nationals injured by acts of international terrorism. Specifically, it states that,

[a]ny national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney's fees.

18 U.S.C. § 2333(a).

The ATA defines "international terrorism" to mean,

activities that—

(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;

(B) appear to be intended—

(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;

(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or

(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and

(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.

Id. § 2331(1).

Initially, the ATA afforded civil relief only against the principals perpetrating acts of international terrorism. It provided no civil action against secondary actors who, while not committing international

882 F.3d 320

terrorist acts themselves, facilitated such acts by others. See Rothstein v. UBS AG , 708 F.3d 82, 97 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that ATA's "statutory silence on the subject of secondary liability means there is none"); accord In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001 , 714 F.3d 118, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2013). On September 28, 2016, however, Congress enacted JASTA, which expands ATA civil liability to reach "any person...

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1 firm's commentaries
  • Changing Anti-Terrorism Act Jurisprudence Increases Litigation Exposure
    • United States
    • Mondaq United States
    • July 19, 2022
    ...in contrast to other statutes requiring only "knowledge of the organization's connection to terrorism." Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 882 F.3d 314, 329-30 (2d Cir. 2018) (affirming jury verdict). Second, the Second Circuit held that merely alleging that a defendant helped its customer violate ap......
1 books & journal articles
  • HOW THE WAR ON TERROR IS TRANSFORMING PRIVATE U.S. LAW.
    • United States
    • Washington University Law Review Vol. 96 No. 3, December 2018
    • December 1, 2018
    ...underlying violations of Sections 2339A and 2339B, which constitute acts of "international terrorism"). But see Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 882 F.3d 314, 326 (2d Cir. 2018) [hereinafter Linde III (holding that material support does not "invariably equate to an act of international terrorism" a......

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