Guzman v. Brown Cnty.
| Decision Date | 07 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 16-3599,16-3599 |
| Citation | 884 F.3d 633 |
| Parties | Caroline GUZMAN, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. BROWN COUNTY, Defendant–Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Janet L. Heins, Attorney, Heins Employment Law Practice, LLC, Mequon, WI, for Plaintiff–Appellant.
Mary E. Nelson, Attorney, Crivello Carlson, S.C., Milwaukee, WI, for Defendant–Appellee.
Before Wood, Chief Judge, Sykes, Circuit Judge, and Coleman, District Judge.*
Caroline Guzman, a former 911 dispatcher for Brown County, claims that Brown County interfered with her efforts to take leave under the Family Medical Leave Act, discriminated against her because she was disabled, refused to accommodate her disability, and retaliated against her for exercising her rights under the Family Medical Leave Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted summary judgment in Brown County’s favor. We affirm.
Guzman was employed as a Telecommunication Operator at the Brown County Public Safety Communications Department 911 Call Center from 2002 until 2013. The 911 Call Center is responsible for answering all emergency and most non-emergency calls for the 9 police departments, 18 fire departments, and 2 EMS agencies operating in Brown County and dispatching those calls to the appropriate entities.
The call center operates around the clock, with nine to twelve telecommunication operators assigned to each shift. Guzman previously worked on the third shift under communications supervisor Thomas Smith, but in 2012 she moved to the day shift, where she was supervised by communications supervisor David Panure. At the time of her termination in 2013, the call center was overseen by interim director of public safety Cullen Peltier. Since 2011, Brown County has had a third-party vendor manage disability, FMLA, and unpaid leave requests. Employees interested in these programs directly contact the third-party vendor, and do not need permission or approval from a supervisor.
Guzman was diagnosed with sleep apnea
in February 2006, and was issued a CPAP machine to treat that condition. In 2008, Guzman had gastric bypass surgery, which resulted in substantial weight loss. Following the surgery, Guzman stopped using her CPAP machine, which she threw away in 2014. Guzman was not re-diagnosed with sleep apnea following her gastric bypass surgery and does not recall if she ever provided Brown County with documentation concerning her 2006 sleep apnea diagnosis.1
Public Safety Communications Center employees’ conduct is governed by a policy manual, which requires that employees report to work when scheduled and be ready to relieve their counterpart at the scheduled start of their shift. Brown County employs a progressive discipline system, which escalates from verbal warnings to written warnings (also known as performance reports), suspension, and ultimately termination.
During her employment, Guzman was subject to a number of disciplinary actions. She received five verbal or written warnings concerning her use of vacation time or casual time between 2004 and 2013. She also received three verbal or written warnings for failure to timely complete mandatory proficiency tests, as well as one verbal warning for failure to report to work on a date that she mistakenly believed that she was not scheduled to work. In November 2012, Guzman was questioned by the Brown County Sheriff’s Department regarding potential professional misconduct, but was cleared of the allegations following a hearing. Guzman took FMLA leaves unrelated to her sleep apnea
in 2007, 2008, 2010, and 2011, and several of these disciplinary actions took place shortly after her return from those leaves.
Guzman was disciplined for being late to work in September 2011, June 2012, August 2012, and December 2012. On February 9, 2013, Guzman failed to report at the start of her shift. Her supervisor, Panure, called her repeatedly and, when the calls went unanswered, requested that the Sheriff’s department dispatch a deputy to check on Guzman. The deputy made contact with Guzman, who subsequently arrived at work. On February 25, 2013, Guzman attended a meeting to address her February 9, 2013, tardiness. At that meeting, Guzman was given a three-day suspension and warned that if she was late again she could be fired. Guzman attributed her tardiness on February 9 to having slept through her alarms and made no mention of sleep apnea
. Guzman’s suspension was to be served on March 4, March 11, and March 12, 2013.
On March 8, 2013, Guzman was again late for work. Panure informed Peltier, who decided to terminate Guzman’s employment. When she arrived at work, Guzman asked Panure if it would be helpful for her to have a doctor’s note regarding her absence, and was informed that it would be. Although she might have mentioned her sleep apnea
to Panure during that conversation, it is undisputed that he did not convey that information to Peltier.
That evening, Guzman called her psychiatrist, Dr. Stamm, to obtain a note excusing her tardiness. In light of Guzman’s medical history, Dr. Stamm felt that it was likely that Guzman was suffering from recurrent sleep apnea
, and accordingly wrote a note stating that Guzman "most probably" had sleep apnea, and that she needed to be retested and treated for that condition.
On March 15, 2013, Panure, Smith, and Peltier met with Guzman, and informed her that she was being terminated. Guzman, in turn, provided the March 8, 2013, note written by Dr. Stamm. The parties dispute whether Guzman provided the note before or after she was informed of her termination. They also dispute whether Guzman requested FMLA leave during or after that meeting. Notwithstanding Guzman’s note or verbal requests, her employment was terminated on that date.
In an unrelated series of events relevant to Guzman’s claims in this case, a replevin judgment was entered against Guzman in Brown County’s small claims court in favor of Lebakkens Inc. on October 11, 2012. A writ of replevin was simultaneously issued, directing the Brown County Sheriff’s Department to deliver furniture in Guzman’s possession to Lebakkens. Guzman was served with the writ of replevin on November 14, 2012. After several months, Lebakkens filed an ex parte application for a warrant to permit the Brown County Sheriff’s Department to use reasonable and necessary force to enter Guzman’s residence in order to secure the return of the items, which was granted on April 4, 2013. Guzman testified that both the issuance of such a warrant and its execution by nine deputies was abnormal. She also testified that a Lebakkens employee had informed her that it had sought the warrant based upon a sheriff deputy’s representation that Guzman would not voluntarily return the furniture in question.
On February 25, 2015, Guzman filed the complaint in this action, alleging Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) interference and FMLA retaliation in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. , disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq. , and discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq. Following the close of discovery, Brown County moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. This appeal followed.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in Guzman’s favor. Petties v. Carter , 836 F.3d 722, 727 (7th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Guzman first contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on her FMLA interference claim. The FMLA entitles eligible employees suffering from serious health conditions to twelve workweeks of leave during each twelve-month period. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). The FMLA also makes it unlawful for an employer to interfere with an employee’s attempt to exercise FMLA rights or to retaliate against employees who exercise their FMLA rights. 29 U.S.C. § 2615. In order to prevail on a FMLA interference claim, an employee must establish that (1) she was eligible for the FMLA’s protections, (2) her employer was covered by the FMLA, (3) she was entitled to leave under the FMLA, (4) she provided sufficient notice of her intent to take leave, and (5) her employer denied her FMLA benefits to which she was entitled. Burnett v. LFW Inc. , 472 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 2006).
It is undisputed that Guzman was eligible for FMLA protection and that Brown County was subject to the FMLA. Guzman contends that she was also entitled to leave under the FMLA. An employee is entitled to FMLA leave if (1) she is afflicted with a "serious health condition" and (2) that condition renders her unable to perform the functions of her job. Id. at 477–78. Guzman asserts, without citation to supporting legal authority, that sleep apnea
is a chronic condition meeting the definition of "serious health condition" under the FMLA regulations. The FMLA defines a serious health condition as "an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves—(A) inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility; or (B) continuing treatment by a health care provider." 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11). Here, it is not altogether clear that Guzman suffered from sleep apnea in 2013. Although Guzman had been diagnosed with sleep apnea seven years prior, she had not been diagnosed since that time,2 sought no further treatment for that condition, and had reported that she no longer suffered from the symptoms of sleep apnea. Even if Guzman did suffer from sleep apnea, moreover, she has offered no evidence that she received inpatient care for that...
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