77 Hawai'i 329, State v. Chen

• Citation: 77 Hawaii 329,884 P.2d 392
• Decision Date: 25 October 1994
• Docket Number: No. 16374,16374
• Parties: 77 Hawai'i 329 STATE of Hawai'i, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lian-Wen CHEN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Hawai'i

Page 392

884 P.2d 392

77 Hawai'i 329

STATE of Hawai'i, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lian-Wen CHEN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16374.

Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai'i.

Oct. 25, 1994.

Order Granting in Part and

Denying in Part Reconsideration and

Modifying Opinion in Part Nov. 10, 1994.

Certiorari Denied Nov. 28, 1994.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The trial court was without authority to waive the time requirements set forth in Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 29(c), and, therefore, was without jurisdiction to entertain a defendant's untimely motion for judgment of acquittal.

2. It has been held that where a defendant had previously moved for judgment of acquittal at the end of the government's case and presented evidence on his or her own behalf but failed to renew the motion at the close of all the evidence, the grounds raised in the motion may still be considered on appeal to avoid manifest injustice or plain error.

3. Since the ineffective assistance of counsel here was so obvious from the record, a HRPP Rule 40 proceeding would serve no purpose except to delay the inevitable and expend resources unnecessarily.

4. Under the Hawai'i Penal Code, Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) Title 37 (1985), conduct is the cause of a result when it is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred.

5. Criminal liability under HRS § 291C-12(a) (1985) does not require proof that the driver of a vehicle caused the injury or death of a person, but only that the accident the driver was involved in resulted in injury to or death of any person.

6. Ordinary meanings are attached to terms not given a statutory definition. Resort to legal or other well accepted dictionaries is one way to determine the ordinary meanings of certain terms.

7. Under HRS § 291C-12(a), a driver is "involved in an accident" when his or her vehicle is affected or implicated in the accident.

8. The purpose of statutes like HRS § 291C-12(a) which requires drivers involved in an accident to stop at the scene of the accident, is to protect those injured and to facilitate a determination of civil and criminal liability.

9. In connection with the words "involved in an accident" under HRS § 291C-12(a), any future cases requiring interpretation of this language must necessarily depend upon the particular facts of the case in light of the purpose behind the statute.

10. Issues going to reasonable doubt are generally matters for the fact finder to determine.

11. If there is substantial evidence which supports the fact finder's conclusion, affirmance is required; conversely, the absence of such substantial evidence requires reversal of the conviction.

Daphne E. Barbee, on the briefs, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant.

Doraine F. Meyer, Deputy Pros. Atty., City and County of Honolulu, on the brief, Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellee.

Daphne E. Barbee, on the motion for reconsideration, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant.

Before BURNS, C.J., and HEEN and ACOBA, JJ.

ACOBA, Judge.

On July 23, 1991, Defendant-Appellant Lian-Wen Chen (Defendant) was charged in Count I of the subject indictment with failing to stop at the scene of an accident in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291C-12(a) (1985), and in Count II with negligent homicide in the third degree in violation of HRS § 707-704 (Supp.1992) ¹; all violations were alleged to have taken place on December 20, 1989. Jury trial began on June 22, 1992. Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's case. The circuit court denied the motion, and Defendant introduced evidence in his defense. On June 26, 1992, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as to Count I and not guilty as to Count II, and was discharged.

On July 9, 1992, Defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal as to Count I (motion). The State filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion on July 16, 1992, and the court orally denied the motion on July 24, 1992. The written order denying the motion was filed on August 10, 1992. On July 31, 1992, Defendant was sentenced to probation for five years with special conditions consisting of a $500 fine and 100 hours of community service.

Defendant appeals his conviction under Count I.

We affirm.

Preliminarily, it is evident that Defendant failed to file his motion within the time required under the rules. In pertinent part, Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 29(c) states that a motion for judgment of acquittal, after the jury has been discharged, "may be made or renewed within 10 days after the jury is discharged or within such further time as the court may fix during the 10-day period." Including Saturdays and Sundays, ² the motion was filed thirteen days after the jury returned its verdict, making the motion untimely under HRPP Rule 29(c). The record does not indicate that the trial court fixed any additional time during the ten-day period within which Defendant could file the motion.

The State did not raise the motion's untimely filing in the circuit court. Nor did the circuit court address the motion's untimeliness in its oral or written orders. On appeal, the State again did not object to the untimely filing of the motion.

The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i recently addressed the timeliness of a motion for judgment of acquittal in State v. Reed, 77 Hawai'i 72, 881 P.2d 1218 (1994). In Reed, the defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal and a motion for a new trial more than two months after the jury delivered its verdict. Nevertheless, the trial court heard and denied the motions. Id. at 83, 881 P.2d at 1229. The court found that the "[trial] court was without authority to waive the time requirements set forth in HRPP [Rule] 29(c) ... and, therefore, was without jurisdiction to entertain [defendant's] motions for ... judgment of acquittal." Id. The court thus held that "the trial court's rulings denying [defendant's] motions for new trial and judgment of acquittal are null and void." Id. Because Defendant, here, failed to file his motion within the requisite time period, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear it. Accordingly, the circuit court's order denying the motion must be vacated.

Defendant's failure to timely file his motion would ordinarily preclude us, on appeal, from considering the grounds raised in his motion. It has been held, however, that where the defendant had previously moved for judgment of acquittal at the end of the government's case and presented evidence on his or her behalf but failed to renew the motion at the close of all the evidence, the grounds raised in the motion may still be considered on appeal to avoid manifest injustice or plain error. United States v. Alvarado, 982 F.2d 659 (1st Cir.1992) (clear and gross injustice); United States v. Teague, 956 F.2d 1427 (7th Cir.1992) (manifest miscarriage of justice); United States v. Williams, 940 F.2d 176 (6th Cir.1991) (manifest miscarriage of justice); United States v. Pennyman, 889 F.2d 104 (6th Cir.1989) (plain error); United States v. Tapia, 761 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir.1985) (miscarriage of justice). Analogously, Defendant, here, had moved at the close of the State's case for a judgment of acquittal, but his failure to timely file a new motion or to renew the prior motion as to Count I at the end of the case made the subject motion a nullity.

Additionally, the failure to file a motion for judgment of acquittal within the time allowed has not precluded a court from reviewing the case on appeal to avoid manifest injustice. ³ Teague at 1433. Indeed, "[t]he cases ... are ... many in which convictions have been reversed though a motion [for judgment of acquittal] was not made, or was not properly renewed, in the trial court." 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 469 at 674 (1982). "And quite frequently courts will review the evidence while saying they are not obliged to do so." Id. Also, while acknowledging a defendant's failure to file or renew a motion for judgment of acquittal, courts have examined the sufficiency of the evidence although ultimately affirming the convictions. E.g., United States v. Chu, 5 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir.1993); Alvarado; United States v. Pruneda-Gonzalez, 953 F.2d 190 (5th Cir.1992); United States v. Sherod, 960 F.2d 1075 (D.C.Cir.1992); United States v. Richard, 943 F.2d 115 (1st Cir.1991); Pennyman; United States v. Hernandez, 876 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.1989); United States v. Landers, 484 F.2d 93 (5th Cir.1973). We believe it appropriate, in this particular case, to determine whether plain error exists, although the motion was not timely made.

Moreover, our consideration of Defendant's motion on appeal would obviate a foreseeable petition under HRPP Rule 40 ⁴ and any subsequent ineffective assistance of counsel claim arising from defense counsel's failure to file a timely motion for judgment of acquittal. Since "the ineffective assistance of counsel [here was] ... so obvious from the record[,] ... a [HRPP] Rule 40 proceeding would serve no purpose except to delay the inevitable and expend resources unnecessarily." State v. Silva, 75 Haw. 419, 438-39, 864 P.2d 583, 592 (1993).

We turn, then, to an examination of the evidence adduced at trial. The following facts were stipulated to by the parties:

That on or about December 20, 1989 ... [Defendant] was the driver of a Fort [sic] Mustang [automobile and] ... said Ford Mustang was involved in a collision with ... a Cadillac Sedan de Ville taxi ... driven by Khoe Van Nguyen.... That as a result of being struck by the Cadillac Sedan de Ville taxi driven by Khoe Van Nguyen, [the pedestrian] received serious injuries which were the proximate cause of her death.... ⁵

Barbara Kumuhone (Kumuhone), a witness called by the State, first noticed Defendant near the Aloha Tower (in Honolulu, on the island of O'ahu) because he "wasn't paying attention to his driving ... [and] was doing a lot of talking to passengers he had [sic]."...