Noel v. AT&T Corp.
| Decision Date | 13 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:12-CV-1673 CAS,4:12-CV-1673 CAS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
| Parties | JACK NOEL, Plaintiff, v. AT&T CORP., et al., Defendants. |
This matter is before the Court on the motion for summary judgment filed by defendants AT&T Corp. ("AT&T") and SBC Internet Services, Inc.'s ("SBC") on the remaining claim of plaintiff Jack Noel for discriminatory discharge because of his disability, in violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), §§ 213.010, et seq., Missouri Revised Statutes (2000). Plaintiff opposes the motion and it is fully briefed. For the following reasons, the Court will grant the motion.
Plaintiff filed this action in June 2012 in the Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis, State of Missouri. Plaintiff's two-count Petition asserted claims for wrongful discharge as against public policy and in violation of the MHRA. Defendant AT&T (sued as "AT&T Corporation"), removed the case based on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), and filed a motion to dismiss. Plaintiff was granted leave to file a First Amended Complaint ("Complaint"), which changed defendant AT&T's name to "AT&T Corp.," added defendant SBC, and added a third count titled "Negligence Resulting in Injury."
The defendants filed an Answer to the Complaint and then a motion to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings. Construing the defendants' motion as one solely for judgment on the pleadings, the Court dismissed plaintiff's claims for discharge in violation of public policy in Count I and for negligence resulting in injury in Count III. See Mem. and Order of Mar. 27, 2013 (Doc. 35).
The en banc Eighth Circuit recently clarified the appropriate standard for consideration of motions for summary judgment, including those filed in employment discrimination cases, explaining as follows:
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and must identify those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. If the movant does so, the nonmovant must respond by submitting evidentiary materials that set out specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. On a motion for summary judgment, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a genuine dispute as to those facts. Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge. The nonmovant must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, and must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.
Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1043 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
"Although the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact rests on the movant, a nonmovant may not rest upon mere denials or allegations, but must insteadset forth specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial." Wingate v. Gage Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 34, 528 F.3d 1074, 1078-79 (8th Cir. 2008).
To show that disputed facts are material, "the party opposing summary judgment must cite to the relevant substantive law in identifying 'facts that might affect the outcome of the suit'" and then "categorize the factual disputes in relation to the legal elements" of his claim. Quinn v. St. Louis County, 653 F.3d 745, 751-52 (8th Cir. 2011). Thus, to survive a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must "explain the legal significance of [his] factual allegations beyond mere conclusory statements importing the appropriate terms of art" and provide a "meaningful legal analysis explaining how, under the applicable law, the disputed facts might prove [his] claim at trial." Id. at 752 (internal citations omitted).
Residential Funding Co., LLC v. Terrace Mortg. Co., 725 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir. 2013).
This Court's Local Rule 4.01(E) provides with respect to summary judgment motions:
A memorandum in support of a motion for summary judgment shall have attached a statement of uncontroverted material facts, set forth in a separately numbered paragraph for each fact, indicating whether each fact is established by the record, and, if so, the appropriate citations. Every memorandum in opposition shall include a statement of material facts as to which the party contends a genuine dispute exists. Those matters in dispute shall be set forth with specific references to portions of the record, where available, upon which the opposing party relies. The opposing party also shall note for all disputed facts the paragraph number from movant's listing of facts. All matters set forth in the statement of the movant shall be deemedadmitted for purposes of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party.
The "concision and specificity required" by rules such as Local Rule 4.01(E) "seek to aid the district court in passing upon a motion for summary judgment, reflecting the aphorism that it is the parties who know the case better than the judge." Libel v. Adventure Lands of America, Inc., 482 F.3d 1028, 1032 (8th Cir. 2007) (cited case omitted). This type of local rule Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).
With the foregoing standards in mind, the Court finds the following facts for purposes of summary judgment:
1. Up until June 10, 2010, plaintiff Jack Noel was employed by SBC (Plaintiff's Deposition ("Pl. Dep.") at 36; First Am. Compl. ¶ 5).
2. SBC is not a subsidiary of defendant AT&T Corp. (AT&T Corp.'s Corporation Interests Certificate (Doc. 4); SBC's Corporation Interests Certificate (Doc 5)).
3. In 2006, SBC started a new business venture building video headend offices ("VHOs") for AT&T U-verse television. VHOs are essentially television stations, and SBC built fifty-nine of them between 2006 and 2009 all around the United States (Pl. Dep. 45, 47, 54-56; Deposition of Chris Cooley ("Cooley Dep."), at 10-11).
4. VHOs receive programming from networks and then rebroadcast those programs to U-verse customers (Pl. Dep. 45, 54-56).
5. As part of this new venture, SBC created a first-level manager position called a Video Field Support Engineer ("VFSE") (Pl. Dep. 65; Cooley Dep. 11).
6. SBC hired four to six VFSEs around the country, including plaintiff, who was the only VFSE based in St. Louis (Pl. Dep. 46-47, 54; Cooley Dep. 9-10).
7. Chris Cooley managed the VFSEs remotely from San Antonio, Texas, and only met plaintiff face-to-face on one occasion (Cooley Dep. 11-12). Cooley is no longer employed by SBC (Cooley Dep. 4).
8. After a VHO was built but before it could open, a VFSE had to travel to the VHO and provide approximately four weeks of training to the employees on how to run, maintain, and monitor the VHO. Those employees could not start their work at the VHO without receiving the training (Pl. Dep. 45-46, 56-57, 66; Cooley Dep. 10, 19, 39-40).1
9. In addition to training, VFSEs had to do inventory and inspections at the VHOs (Pl. Dep. 54-55; Cooley Dep. 39-40).
10. VFSEs had to travel in order to do their job duties (Pl. Dep. 45-46, 56-57, 66-67; Cooley Dep. 19, 27-28).2
11. Plaintiff has diabetes, which he has had for many years (Pl. Dep. 67).
12. In April 2008, plaintiff apparently collapsed at an airport in Tulsa, Oklahoma, due to his diabetes (Pl. Dep. 74).
13. On April 18, 2008, Dr. M. Safwat Wahba, M.D., of Psych Care Consultants wrote a letter requesting that plaintiff "be reassigned to a position that requires little or no traveling" .
14. On July 14, 2008, Dr. Robert J. Saltman, M.D., of West County Medical Specialists wrote a letter stating he "recommended a position [for Plaintiff] which entails significantly less travel" (Pl. Dep. 143-45; Ex. B to First Am. Compl.).
15. Plaintiff's manager, Chris Cooley, told plaintiff he could look for another job within the company that required less travel (Pl. Dep. 79; Cooley Dep. 11, 27-30).3
16. Plaintiff told Cooley that he wanted to continue to work as a VFSE (Pl. Dep. 80; Cooley Dep. 29, 41-42, 65-70). Plaintiff also told Cooley on other occasions that he was interested in finding another job within the company. (Cooley Dep. 29, ll. 20-25; 30, ll. 1-13; 33 ll. 19-24; 41 ll. 1-6).
17. Plaintiff knew that as a VFSE, he had to travel (Pl. Dep. 80-81; Cooley Dep. 19, 27-28).4
18. There were no available jobs within the company that plaintiff wanted that required less travel, and during some periods of time freezes were in place that would have prevented plaintiff from transferring out of his position (Pl. Dep. 78-79, 82-84, 130-31).5
19. In August 2009, plaintiff was temporarily reassigned to a short-term...
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