American Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Waukegan v. US
| Decision Date | 17 April 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 85 C 7614.,85 C 7614. |
| Citation | 1987 AMC 1782,636 F. Supp. 147 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
| Parties | The AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF WAUKEGAN, as Special Administrator of the estate of Daniel Janda, deceased, for the benefit of the Estate of Daniel Janda, Robin Janda, surviving spouse, and Heather Janda, Michelle Janda and Jonathan Janda, minor children and next of kin of Daniel Janda, deceased; and Robin Janda, individually, Plaintiffs, v. The UNITED STATES of America, Defendant. |
John J. Piccione/Patrick C. Keeley/David J. Boersma, Piccione, Keeley & Associates, Ltd., Wheaton, Ill., Philip J. Ryan, Waukegan, Ill., for plaintiffs.
Mary Rigdon, Asst. U.S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., for defendant.
Plaintiff American National Bank and Trust Company of Waukegan ("American"), acting as special administrator for decedent Daniel Janda, filed this wrongful death and survivor's suit against the United States for alleged negligent, wanton and willful conduct in failing to warn of an underwater hazard in navigable waters. The government has filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Because this Court finds that there is no federal subject matter jurisdiction over this action, the United States' 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is granted.1
American alleges that on September 3, 1983, decedent Janda was on a privately-owned pleasure boat on Petite Lake in Lake County, Illinois. When the boat was stopped somewhere in the "southeast middle" section of the lake, Janda dove into the water. Tragically, Janda was unaware that the depth of the water in this part of the lake was only two and a half to three feet and when he dove he struck his head on a submerged island and suffered serious and permanent injuries which rendered him a quadraplegic. On April 1, 1985, Janda died as a result of injuries incurred in this accident.
According to the complaint, the land mass on which Janda struck his head was at one time an island. However, American alleges that sometime before September 3, 1985, the United States Army Corps of Engineers issued permits for and/or authorized construction of the McHenry Dam on the Fox River, which runs into the "Chain O'Lakes" of which Petite Lake is a part. Construction of the dam caused the water level in Petite Lake to rise approximately six feet and cover the island on which Janda landed. American alleges that the government was aware that it had created this underwater hazard, yet neither the Corps of Engineers nor the United States Coast Guard warned lake users about the obstruction or tried to remove it, thus violating a common law duty of care or, in the alternative, violating the provisions of 14 U.S.C. § 86 (1982).2
American asserts federal subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of admiralty jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1982), and bases its action on the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1982), which establishes a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for admiralty suits against the United States government. Federal courts may maintain admiralty jurisdiction in tort actions only where the alleged wrong (1) occurs on navigable waters and (2) has a significant connection with "traditional maritime activity." Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268, 93 S.Ct. 493, 504, 34 L.Ed.2d 454 (1972); In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz Off the Coast of France, 699 F.2d 909, 912 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864, 104 S.Ct. 196, 78 L.Ed.2d 172 (1983). In the present case, the government argues that admiralty jurisdiction cannot be maintained because Petite Lake is not a "navigable water" within the meaning of the Executive Jet test and because the tragic events leading to Janda's death had no significant connection to traditional maritime activities. Because this Court finds that the factual circumstances alleged in this case bear no significant nexus to any traditional maritime activity, the question of whether Petite Lake is a "navigable water" need not be addressed.3
Ever since the Supreme Court's Executive Jet decision, federal courts have struggled to find a meaningful test for determining what constitutes a traditional maritime activity. This important concept is rooted in the fundamental purposes supporting the necessity for uniform admiralty laws and procedures. See Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 269-70, 93 S.Ct. at 505; Amoco Cadiz, 699 F.2d at 913. Questions of admiralty jurisdiction in tort cases arising from recreational activities on navigable waters have been debated repeatedly since the Supreme Court abandoned the mechanical "maritime locality" test and established the nexus requirement. Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 268, 93 S.Ct. at 504. Many of these cases have dealt with persons injured in water skiing accidents, although courts upholding admiralty jurisdiction in those cases have focused on the allegations of navigational error as the relevant nexus to maritime activity. See, e.g., Hogan v. Overman, 767 F.2d 1093, 1094 (4th Cir.1985); Medina v. Perez, 733 F.2d 170, 171 (1st Cir.1984), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 778, 83 L.Ed.2d 774 (1985).
In Executive Jet, the Supreme Court expressed disapproval of earlier federal cases allowing parties to assert admiralty jurisdiction in cases of injured water-skiers and swimmers, because these cases applied the strict rule requiring maritime locality without sufficiently addressing the connection of the torts to maritime activity. 409 U.S. at 255-56 & n. 5, 93 S.Ct. 498 & n. 5. However, this criticism may have turned in part on the distinction between commercial and private maritime activities since rejected by the court in Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674-75, 102 S.Ct. 2654, 2658, 73 L.Ed.2d 300 (1982). Nevertheless, the Court continues to recognize the difficulties in extending jurisdiction to cases where swimmers are injured by other swimmers or by submerged objects in shallow waters near shore, and no navigational error is involved in the injury. Id. at 674 n. 4; 102 S.Ct. at 2658 n. 4.
Still other courts have focused only on the activities undertaken by the plaintiff when injured. In Reed v. United States, 604 F.Supp. 1253, 1266 (N.D.Ind.1984), a case with facts very close to the present one, a federal district court held that a person who is injured when diving off of a boat into a shallow area in navigable waters is not engaged in or connected with a traditional maritime activity for the purposes of establishing admiralty jurisdiction.
The preferred course, in this Court's view, is to evaluate the entire scope of events involving both the defendant's behavior and the manner in which the plaintiff is injured in evaluating whether there is a connection with traditional maritime activity significant enough to establish admiralty jurisdiction. See National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. United States, 436 F.Supp. 1078, 1083 (M.D.Tenn.1977).
Applying these broad principles to the present case, the Court does not agree with American that the accident involved bears a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. Although the tort involved need not be linked to commercial maritime activities, Foremost, 457 U.S. at 674-75, 102 S.Ct. at 2658, it still must implicate the necessity for uniform governance of navigable waters. While this implication arises in cases where there has been an injury caused by navigational error, Hogan v. Overman, 767 F.2d 1093, 1094 (4th Cir.1985), it does not follow that all injuries incurred in any recreational activity in navigable waters have a significant maritime connection. Thus, while diving may be a traditional aquatic activity, it is not a traditional maritime activity.
American argues correctly in this Court's view, that in evaluating the connection to maritime activities courts must look not only to the way the injury occurred but also to the cause of...
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