Jones v. C & D Techs., Inc.
Decision Date | 25 March 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 1:11–cv–01431–JMS–DKL.,1:11–cv–01431–JMS–DKL. |
Citation | 8 F.Supp.3d 1054 |
Parties | Joshua D. JONES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. C & D TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Caitlin M. Miller, Robert Peter Kondras, Jr., Robert Peter Kondras, Jr., Hunt Hassler Lorenz & Kondras LLP, Terre Haute, IN, for Plaintiff.
Martha Moorehead Lemert, Faegre Baker Daniels LLP, Fort Wayne, IN, Tareen Zafrullah, Faegre Baker Daniels LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant.
Presently pending before the Court are: (1) Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, [Filing No. 260 ]; and (2) Defendant C & D Technologies, Inc.'s (“C & D”) Second Cross–Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, [Filing No. 262 ]. The Court held a hearing on the cross motions on March 12, 2014.
A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and, instead, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). As the current version of Rule 56 makes clear, whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely disputed, the party must support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the record, including depositions, documents, or affidavits.Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party can also support a fact by showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute or that the adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(B). Affidavits or declarations must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on matters stated. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4). Failure to properly support a fact in opposition to a movant's factual assertion can result in the movant's fact being considered undisputed, and potentially in the grant of summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court need only consider disputed facts that are material to the decision. A disputed fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Hampton v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.3d 709, 713 (7th Cir.2009). In other words, while there may be facts that are in dispute, summary judgment is appropriate if those facts are not outcome determinative. Harper v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 521, 525 (7th Cir.2005). Fact disputes that are irrelevant to the legal question will not be considered. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
On summary judgment, a party must show the Court what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events. Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir.2003). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if no reasonable fact-finder could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 875 (7th Cir.2009). The Court views the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Darst v. Interstate Brands Corp., 512 F.3d 903, 907 (7th Cir.2008). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-finder. O'Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir.2011). The Court need only consider the cited materials, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3), and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has “repeatedly assured the district courts that they are not required to scour every inch of the record for evidence that is potentially relevant to the summary judgment motion before them,” Johnson, 325 F.3d at 898. Any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue for trial is resolved against the moving party. Ponsetti v. GE Pension Plan, 614 F.3d 684, 691 (7th Cir.2010). On cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court construes facts and draws inferences “in favor of the party against whom the motion under consideration is made.” Keck Garrett & Associates, Inc. v. Nextel Communications, Inc., 517 F.3d 476, 483 (7th Cir.2008) (quoting In re United Air Lines, Inc., 453 F.3d 463, 468 (7th Cir.2006) ).
The Court finds the following to be the undisputed facts, supported by admissible evidence in the record.2
C & D's Attica facility manufactures industrial batteries. [Filing No. 24, at ECF p. 3. ] The manufacturing process at the Attica plant requires C & D's employees to work with toxic materials, particularly lead. [Filing No. 24, at ECF p. 3; Filing No. 78, at ECF p. 3. ] Due to these toxic materials, both C & D and governmental regulations require that C & D employees change into and out of safety clothes and shower. [Filing No. 78, at ECF p. 3. ]
C & D employees perform many duties during a typical work day, which are depicted in the following diagram:
[See Filing No. 78, at ECF pp. 3–4. ]
C & D's hourly manufacturing employees at the Attica facility have long been represented by the International Union of Electrical Workers, and Communication Workers of America IUE–CWA Local No. 84950 (the “Union”) as their exclusive collective bargaining representative. [Filing No. 78, at ECF p. 1. ] The 2007–2012 Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) entered into by C & D and the Union provides:
ARTICLE 18—Health and Safety
Simply put, based on the terms of the CBA, C & D compensates its employees for a 5–minute allowance for “Pre–Donning Activities,” and “Donning,” and a ten-minute allowance for “Doffing/Washing,” and “Post–Doffing Activities.”
C & D does not pay its employees based on time calculated from either the yellow time card punches or the white time card punches, both shown in the diagram above. [Filing No. 78, at ECF pp. 3–4. ] Rather, it pays based on the eight-hour scheduled shift. [Filing No. 78, at ECF p. 4. ] When the safety-related activities discussed above, such as walking from the locker room to the work area, vacuuming clothes, picking up or dropping off respirators or safety helmets, changing into and out of the C & D-issued safety clothing, and showering, occur during the employee's eight-hour shift, he or she is compensated for them. [Filing No. 78, at ECF p. 5. ] When those activities run outside of the eight-hour shift, the employee is not compensated for any time over and above eight hours. [Filing No. 78, at ECF p. 5. ] “Employees have never been paid based on the time between their yellow time card punches.” [Filing No. 78, at ECF p. 3. ]
The following diagram depicts the manner in which C & D represented (in a prior filing) that its employees were compensated during the relevant period:
“Pre–
“Beginning
“Ending
“Post–
Donning
Boundary
“Work
Boundary
“Doffing/
Doffing
Activities”
“Donning”
Activities”
Period”
Activities”
Washing”
Activities”
[––––––––––]
[–––––]
[––––––––––]
Paid for 5–Minute Allowance
Paid for 10–Minute Allowance
[–––––––––––––––––––––––––] Paid for Eight Hours Total
One of Plaintiffs' claims in this lawsuit is that C & D is violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“FLSA” ), by failing to pay employees minimum and overtime wages for “donning and doffing” of safety clothing and equipment and washing up that occurs outside of the eight-hour shift. [Filing No. 24, at ECF pp. 9–10. ] In their first Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs argued that C & D violated the FLSA by paying its employees for donning, doffing, washing up, and changing based on the 5–minute allowance for the beginning of the day and the 10–minute allowance for the end of the day. [Filing No. 89, at ECF pp. 18–20. ] The Court found that the CBA entered into between C & D and the Union “properly limited compensation for donning safety clothing at the beginning of a shift to a 5–minute allowance, and for showering at the end of a shift to a 10– minute allowance.” [Filing No. 116, at ECF p. 12. ] The Court also found that doffing safety clothing at the end of the day-while not specifically mentioned in the CBA—was...
To continue reading
Request your trial