BAKERY & CONFECTIONARY WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION OF AMERICA v. Great A. & P. Tea Co.
Decision Date | 11 May 1973 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 72-783. |
Citation | 357 F. Supp. 1322 |
Parties | BAKERY AND CONFECTIONARY WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION OF AMERICA, LOCAL UNION NO. 12B, affiliated with Bakery and Confectionary Workers International Union of America, Plaintiff, v. The GREAT ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC TEA COMPANY, INC., Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Frank P. G. Intrieri, Joseph J. Pass, Jr., Pittsburgh, Pa., for plaintiff.
Leonard L. Scheinholtz, Harley N. Trice, Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendant.
Plaintiff's Complaint, as amended, claims monetary damages for termination of employment of its members caused by the closing of defendant's bakery in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, during the term of a collective bargaining agreement between the parties.
The plaintiff originally sought an injunction to enjoin defendant from discontinuing its Pittsburgh bakery operation, which after notice and hearing, was denied. This amended Complaint followed.
The suit was brought in this Court under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185. The Court has jurisdiction.
Defendant now moves for Summary Judgment on the whole record.
The plaintiff claims that the discontinuance of operations and the termination of employment of its members was in violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the parties, executed May 3, 1970 effective from May 4, 1970 until May 5, 1973. The Pittsburgh bakery operation was terminated October 8, 1972 during the life of the Agreement.
The plaintiff alleges that the discontinuance violated a provision of Article V of the Agreement which provides:
"(a) Beginning February 28, 1965, all employees hired on or before December 31, 1962 are guaranteed that they will be scheduled to work five days (40) hours each week. . . ."
The plaintiff contends that this weekly guarantee language was intended to be a guarantee of employment until the expiration of the contract, and at the injunction hearing introduced testimony of the bargaining history to support that argument. We held that the only effect of the parol evidence produced, if it were to be considered at all, would be to compel the court to refuse the injunction because the right contended for by the plaintiff would not be clear and free from doubt.
We will consider the plaintiff's argument for admission of parol or extrinsic evidence later, but first we must consider the effect of the language in the contract.
It has been frequently decided that a collective bargaining agreement does not create an employer-employee relationship, nor does it guarantee continuation of such a relationship. Fraser v. Magic Chef-Food Giant Markets, Inc., 324 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1963); Hauser v. Farwell, Ozmun, Kirk & Co., 299 F.Supp. 387 (D. Minn.1969). It has been so held in this District in a similar case involving the closing down of a bakery plant during the term of a collective bargaining agreement. See American Bakery & Con. Wkrs. Int. U. v. Liberty Baking Co., 242 F.Supp. 238 (W.D.Pa.1965).
Frazer v. Magic Chef, supra, 324 F.2d p. 856.
There is no provision in the instant contract that limits the right of the defendant to discontinue the operation of its Pittsburgh bakery. Neither the Union Recognition Clause, Article I; nor the Wage Clause, Article III, reciting "for the duration of the agreement", nor the General Clause, Article XII(d) recital of "for the duration of the agreement"; nor the Termination Clause, Article XVIII can be read as having any such effect.
American Bakery & Conf. Workers v. Liberty Baking Co., supra, 242 F.Supp. p. 245.
Reading the Agreement as a whole, as we must to determine its meaning, we learn that there is no intention that Article V(a) be construed as a guarantee of employment for the duration of the agreement because Article VI, Seniority, contains lay-off provisions in Section (c) thereof which provides that when it becomes necessary to lay off employees due to a reduction in the working force, employees shall be laid off on a plant seniority basis; other provisions governing reduction of the working force are also contained.
However, the Agreement also contains one clear-cut provision that demonstrates that the parties contemplated and provided for the possibility that the defendant might cease operations entirely in the Pittsburgh bakery during the term of the Agreement.
A formula for calculating the severance pay is then set forth.
We cannot accept plaintiff Union's argument that severance pay would be applicable only upon the closing of the bakery upon the expiration of the agreement, and does not apply upon cessation of operations during the term of the agreement. At the termination of the Agreement the company would not be under any contractual obligation to pay severance pay which it is obligated to pay under the Agreement during its life.
We therefore come to the construction of the Contract itself. We find it clear and unambiguous. Nowhere does its terms provide a guarantee of employment during the life of the contract, and further, the prospect of closing down operations was contemplated by the parties and provided for.
Where the rights and liabilities of the parties are dependent upon a contract in writing, those rights and liabilities must be determined from the language of the Contract without reference to extrinsic or "parol" evidence.
This is a substantive rule of law in Pennsylvania in the interpretation of contracts, and not a procedural rule governing the admissibility of evidence. The instant contract was executed in Pennsylvania between Pennsylvania parties, and was to govern their working relationship in Pennsylvania.
With respect to the "parol evidence rule", the Court of Appeals for this Circuit has said:
Globe Motors, Inc. v. Studebaker-Packard Corporation, 328 F.2d 645, 649 (3rd Cir. 1964).
The parol evidence rule bars the admission of testimony as to bargaining history leading up to the execution of a collective bargaining agreement. Local 783, Allied Industrial Workers v. General Electric Co., 471 F.2d 751 (6th Cir. 1973).
Also in N. L. R. B. v. Gulf Atlantic Warehouse Co., 291 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1961) the Court said:
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