Meridian Eng'g Co. v. United States
Decision Date | 20 March 2018 |
Docket Number | 2017-1584 |
Citation | 885 F.3d 1351 |
Parties | MERIDIAN ENGINEERING COMPANY, Plaintiff–Appellant v. UNITED STATES, Defendant–Appellee |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit |
Maria L. Panichelli, Cohen Seglias Pallas Greenhall & Furman PC, Philadelphia, PA, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by Michael H. Payne.
Eric Laufgraben, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by Chad A. Readler, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Allison Kidd–Miller; John Francis Bazan, Sr., United States Army Corps of Engineers, Los Angeles, CA.
Before Prost, Chief Judge, Reyna and Wallach, Circuit Judges.
Meridian Engineering Company ("Meridian") appeals two final decisions of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims determining, inter alia, that (1) Meridian did not meet standards of proof to show that the United States ("Government") breached certain contractual obligations and its duty of good faith and fair dealing in a dispute under the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 601 – 613 (2006) ("CDA") related to the construction of a flood control project in Nogales, Arizona, see Meridian Eng'g Co. v. United States (Meridian I) , 122 Fed.Cl. 381, 384, 400 n.25, 426 (2015) ; J.A. 3000–53 (Second Amended Complaint), and (2) Meridian was owed certain monies for equitable adjustment and interest on the payments running from the date Meridian submitted its claim, January 7, 2014, see Meridian Eng'g Co. v. United States (Meridian II) , 130 Fed.Cl. 147, 172 (2016). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (2012). We affirm-in-part, vacate-in-part, reverse-in-part, and remand.
In 2007, Meridian entered into a contract with the Government to construct flood control structures, referred to as the Chula Vista Project. Meridian I , 122 Fed.Cl. at 385–86. The Project contemplated construction of several concrete channels, relocation of a sewer line, and dewatering and water diversion. See J.A. 1044–627 (Contract). After commencing the Project, Meridian encountered a series of problems relating primarily to what it deemed "subsurface organic/unsuitable material," specifically, "a layer of dripping saturated dark clay material under which a clean layer of sand is producing water" that had "the potential for serious structural damage." J.A. 1810; see Meridian I , 122 Fed.Cl. at 388 (describing "softer-than-anticipated soils"), 390–92 (describing modifications pursuant to discovery of "saturated soils"). Meridian notified the Government about these problems, and the Government issued several Contract modifications in response. See Meridian I , 122 Fed.Cl. at 388–90 ( ). Eventually, the Government directed Meridian to suspend work on the Project in January 2009 following a series of structural failures, see J.A. 3127–28, and, while minor work continued, the Government ultimately terminated the Project following a September 2009 final inspection of the Project site, see Meridian I , 122 Fed.Cl. at 394–96.
Following the parties' disagreements over payment owed to Meridian, Meridian filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and a violation of the CDA. See J.A. 127, 3000–53. The Government conceded liability for costs relating to three counts of Meridian's Second Amended Complaint (Counts VII–IX), which were the subject of a separate damages trial. See J.A. 3032–36 (Count VII (Suspension of Work), Count VIII (Channel Fill), Count IX (Interim Protection) ). See generally Meridian II , 130 Fed.Cl. 147. Because the Government now concedes the only issue with respect to Meridian II ,2 the remainder of this opinion addresses determinations from Meridian I .
We review the Court of Federal Claims' legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States , 457 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006), aff'd 552 U.S. 130, 128 S.Ct. 750, 169 L.Ed.2d 591 (2008). "A finding may be held clearly erroneous when the appellate court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. United States , 422 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ( ).
Meridian asserts that the Court of Federal Claims erred when it "reasoned that only Meridian's breach of contract and breach of good faith and fair dealing claims presented a viable cause of action," because "Meridian's CDA claims should have been analyzed under the framework contemplated by the CDA, and not under the rubric of a ‘breach’ claim." Appellant's Br. 23, 24 (capitalization modified). However, Meridian does not explain the alternate CDA framework to which it refers, nor does it state how analysis under a different hypothetical framework would result in a finding in its favor. See id. at 22–25 ( ).
"The[ ] requirements of the CDA are jurisdictional prerequisites to any appeal." M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United States , 609 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); see K–Con Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. United States , 778 F.3d 1000, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ( ). Pursuant to the CDA, a party must submit a "valid claim," which is defined by regulation as a demand seeking "as a matter of right, the payment of money in a sum certain, the adjustment or interpretation of contract terms, or other relief arising under or relating to the contract." M. Maropakis , 609 F.3d at 1327 (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 33.2013 ). Thus, the CDA itself does not provide a cause of action to which money damages may accrue; it is the claim asserted pursuant to the CDA that is the source of potential damages and review by the trier of fact. See Northrop Grumman Computing Sys., Inc. v. United States , 709 F.3d 1107, 1112 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ( ). Therefore, the Court of Federal Claims did not err in finding it had jurisdiction under the CDA to evaluate Meridian's breach of contract claims.
The Court of Federal Claims found that Meridian did not offer sufficient evidence to satisfy its Type I differing site condition ("DSC") claim alleging that in the channel and sewer line areas of the project the unexpected conditions of "soupy" soil caused delays and imposed unanticipated costs.4 Meridian I , 122 Fed.Cl. at 403 ; see id. at 408–09. Meridian posits several errors in the Court of Federal Claims' analysis.5 See Appellant's Br. 27–40. After articulating the applicable legal standard, we address each argument in turn.
"A Type I [DSC claim] arises when the conditions encountered differ from what was indicated in the contract documents." Renda Marine, Inc. v. United States , 509 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ; see FAR 52.236-2(a)–(b) () .6 To prevail on a Type I DSC claim, a contractor must prove that: (1) "a reasonable contractor reading the contract documents as a whole would interpret them as making a representation as to the site conditions"; (2) "the actual site conditions were not reasonably foreseeable to the contractor, with the information available to the particular contractor outside the contract documents" (i.e., reasonable foreseeability); (3) "the particular contractor in fact relied on the contract representation"; and (4) "the conditions differed materially from those represented and ... the contractor suffered damages as a result." Int'l Tech. Corp. v. Winter , 523 F.3d 1341, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2008). "Determining whether a contract contained indications of a particular site condition is a matter of contract interpretation" that we review de novo. Id. at 1350 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Court of Federal Claims found in relevant part that Meridian's interpretation of the Contract was not reasonable, and that the existence of subsurface saturated soil conditions was "reasonably foreseeable." Meridian I , 122 Fed.Cl. at 409 ; see id. at 408–09. Specifically, the Court of Federal Claims first found that the specification stated that "[w]ater in varying quantities may be flowing in natural washes throughout the length of the project," and "[t]he work site may be inundated because of [water] runoff," id. (quoting J.A. 1629, 1630), such that "a reasonable contractor would interpret the Specification as representing water as a site condition," id at 409. As for the second element of reasonable foreseeability, the Court of Federal Claims found that the original drawings in the Contract showed saturated soil and that the worksite was located on a floodplain, and a reasonable contractor would have conducted a site visit which...
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