Roberts v. LEHIGH & NEW ENGLAND RAILWAY COMPANY

• Court: United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Pennsylvania)
• Citation: 211 F. Supp. 379
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 31715.
• Parties: William C. ROBERTS and John Strunk, Individually and on behalf of others adversely affected, v. LEHIGH & NEW ENGLAND RAILWAY COMPANY and Lodge 713, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen; Lodge 734, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen; Lodge 619, Order of Railway Conductors & Brakemen.
• Decision Date: 07 December 1962

211 F. Supp. 379

William C. ROBERTS

and

John Strunk, Individually and on behalf of others adversely affected, v. LEHIGH & NEW ENGLAND RAILWAY COMPANY and Lodge 713, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen; Lodge 734, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen; Lodge 619, Order of Railway Conductors & Brakemen.

Civ. A. No. 31715.

United States District Court E. D. Pennsylvania.

December 7, 1962.

Lawrence J. Richette, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiffs.

Miles W. Kirkpatrick, E. Jackson Bonney, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant Lehigh & N. E. Ry. Co.

Robert W. Sayre, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants Lodge 713, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen and Lodge 619, Order of Railway Conductors & Brakemen.

Cornelius C. O'Brien, Jr., Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant Lodge 734, Brotherhood of RR. Trainmen.

CLARY, Chief Judge.

This case is before the Court on motions by all four defendants to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint.

Plaintiffs, who bring this action on behalf of themselves and others adversely affected, are former employees of defendant, Lehigh & New England Railway Company, and its predecessor, Lehigh & New England Railroad Company, and former members of the three defendant Brotherhoods: Lodge 713, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen; Lodge 734, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen; and Lodge 619, Order of Railway Conductors & Brakemen.

Plaintiffs' complaint arises out of the termination of their employment and their removal from the seniority rosters of the Lehigh Railway on June 30, 1962 pursuant to collective bargaining agreements between the Railway and the Brotherhoods providing for mandatory retirement at age 65. Earlier, in April 1960, what was then the Lehigh Railroad merged with the defendant, Lehigh Railway, resulting in a decrease in the necessary work force. In January of 1962, the Brotherhood Locals and the Railway entered into the mandatory retirement agreements.

Plaintiffs allege that under a prior collective bargaining contract, the 1936 Washington Job Protection Agreement entered into by numerous unions and rail carriers, including the defendant Brotherhoods and the defendant Railway's predecessor, the Railway has a duty to grant severance pay to employees whose jobs are abolished as a result of that merger. It is asserted that the retirement agreements are a deliberate attempt by the Railway, joined in by the Brotherhoods, to avoid the necessity of these severance payments. It is further alleged that the retirement agreements amount to unauthorized alterations of the Washington Job Protection Agreement. Finally, plaintiffs charge that the manner in which the Brotherhoods entered the agreements, the grievance procedures under the agreements, and the provisions for compulsory retirement at age 65, amount to discrimination.

All defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint and have asserted in their briefs and arguments that the complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted, that it does not properly allege a class action and that the Court lacks jurisdiction.

The crux of the jurisdictional objection is that Congress has granted to the National Railroad Adjustment Board all power over disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of collective bargaining agreements. In pertinent part, the Railway Labor Act provides:

"The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions * * * shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief operating officer of the carrier designated to handle such disputes; but, failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board with a full statement of the facts and all supporting data bearing upon the disputes." 45 U.S.C.A. § 153 First (h) Fourth division, (i).

While the statute might appear to be phrased permissively, the Supreme Court, in Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U.S. 239, 70 S.Ct. 577, 94 L.Ed. 795 (1950), has determined that this section grants the Board exclusive primary jurisdiction over disputes between employees and carriers as to the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements. The Court feels that this is just such a dispute.

Plaintiffs have asserted a myriad of charges of discrimination and illegal action against both the Brotherhoods and the Railway, the solutions of which, in all instances, require initial determination of the substantive meaning of the involved contracts. Plaintiffs lay claim to certain rights under the Washington Job Protection Agreement, and assert that the defendants, by entering into the retirement agreements, have discriminatorily denied these rights without justification. Thus, this claim depends essentially upon the meaning of the various agreements, and more important, the effect of each upon the others. This is precisely the style of interpretive functions with which the Board has been charged.

The instant case differs from Felter v. Southern Pacific Co., 359 U.S. 326, 79 S.Ct. 847, 3 L.Ed.2d 854 (1959) in which the validity of a dues checkoff agreement was properly decided by a District Court and not by the Board. In that case, there was no question of interpretation but only one of validity. The Court stated...