Dragna v. A&Z Transp., Inc.
| Decision Date | 19 February 2015 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION 12-449-SDD-RLB |
| Parties | LARRY S. DRAGNA, ET AL. v. A&Z TRANSPORTATION, INC., GREAT WEST CASUALTY COMPANY AND ROBEL ABDLL |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana |
This lawsuit arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on November 2, 2011 in Gonzales, Louisiana, involving a motor vehicle driven by the Plaintiff, Larry Dragna (Dragna), and a tractor trailer driven by Abdi Roble (Roble)1, a truck driver employed by A&Z Transportation, Inc. (A&Z).2 At the time of the accident, Roble was en route to collect a load from BASF pursuant to KLLM Logistics' and A&Z's Broker-Carrier Agreement.3 Roble was cited for failure to yield while making a left turn.4 Dragna was not cited with any traffic violations.5 The overarching issue before the Court is whether KLLM bears any liability for the collision.
Plaintiff Dragna filed suit for damages in state court against Roble and A&Z Transportation, and their insurer, Great West Casualty Company (Great West), onbehalf of himself, his wife, and their minor child. On July 27, 2012, Great West timely removed invoking the Court's diversity jurisdiction.6 Plaintiffs amended their complaint to name KLLM Transportation, LLC, among others, as additional Defendants.7 Plaintiffs have since resolved their negligence claims against Roble and A&Z however, their claims against KLLM Transport Services, LLC d/b/a KLLM Logistics Services remain.8
Notably, KLLM Transport Services ("KLLM")9 has two operating divisions relevant to this suit—KLLM Transport and KLLM Logistics Services.10 KLLM Transport is a federally authorized motor carrier11 which had a Motor Transportation Contract with BASF Chemical to haul commercial freight,12 and KLLM Logistics is a federally authorized motor carrier Broker13 which had a Broker-Carrier Transportation Agreement with A&Z Transportation.14 Prior to the accident, BASF had notified KLLM Transport of a load it needed collected from its Geismar, Louisiana facility; however, KLLM Transportwas unable to accommodate this BASF transportation assignment.15 Therefore, KLLM Transport referred the available BASF load assignment to KLLM Logistics to broker the load with another DOT-authorized carrier.16 On November 1, 2011, KLLM Logistics selected A&Z to transport the BASF load.17 The vehicular accident giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims occurred the next day while A&Z's driver was en route to pick up the freight at BASF.
Plaintiffs specifically contend that KLLM remains liable on three grounds: joint venture liability as A&Z's partner; vicariously liable for A&Z's driver's fault; and directly liable for negligently hiring A&Z. Plaintiffs' liability claims against KLLM are the subject of three motions for partial summary judgment18 pending before the Court which seek disposition of the following theories of liability:
1. Whether KLLM Transportation, LLC. d/b/a KLLM Logistics ("KLLM") has vicarious liability for the fault of A&Z Transport driver Abdi Roble;
2. Whether KLLM and A&Z Transportation, Inc. were joint venturers at the time of the subject motor vehicle accident resulting in KLLM's liability for the fault of driver Abdi Roble; and
3. Whether KLLM was negligent in hiring A&Z Transportation, Inc. as a motor carrier.
In sum, KLLM argues that the uncontested facts do not support Plaintiffs' liability claims and, therefore, they must be dismissed. In contrast, Plaintiffs argue that theevidence undisputedly supports their liability claim against KLLM, under one or more of the above theories, entitling Plaintiffs to a judgment as a matter of law.
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."19 "When assessing whether a dispute to any material fact exists, we consider all of the evidence in the record but refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence."20 "A party moving for summary judgment 'must 'demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,' but need not negate the elements of the nonmovant's case.'"21 If the moving party satisfies its burden, "the non-moving party must show that summary judgment is inappropriate by setting 'forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue concerning every essential component of its case.'"22 However, the non-moving party's "burden is not satisfied with some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence."23
Notably, "[a] genuine issue of material fact exists, 'if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'"24 All reasonable factual inferences must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party.25 Nevertheless, 26 "Conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts, however, will not prevent the award of summary judgment; 'the plaintiff [can]not rest on his allegations ... to get to a jury without any "significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint."'"27 Ultimately "[t]he substantive law dictates which facts are material."28
Plaintiffs have alleged that KLLM Logistics is vicariously liable for the negligent acts of A&Z Transportation, and its driver Roble, and rely on Louisiana jurisprudence governing the employer-employee relationship to support their contention. However,after reviewing the record, the Court finds that there is an absence of facts to support Plaintiffs' claim.
Section 9 of the Broker-Carrier Transportation Agreement expressly provides that A&Z "shall be an independent for-hire contract carrier and shall not be or acts as an agent or employee of Broker [KLLM]."30 Hence, based on the express terms of the parties' Agreement, the Court finds that KLLM Logistics' relationship with A&Z Transportation is governed by the law of independent contractors.31
Under Louisiana law, a principal, such as KLLM Logistics, is not liable for the negligent acts of an independent contractor "unless (1) the liability arises from ultrahazardous activities performed by the contractor on behalf of the principal or (2) the principal retains operational control over the contractor's acts or expressly or impliedly authorizes those acts."32 As for the first exception, the following activities have been categorized in Louisiana as ultrahazardous as a matter of law: (1) storage of toxic gas; (2) crop dusting; (3) pile driving; and (4) blasting with explosives.33 While this is not anexhaustive list, it is clear from the allegations and evidence in this case that neither A&Z Transportation nor Roble were engaged in an ultrahazardous activity at the time of the accident; therefore, the Court finds that the first exception is inapplicable.
As for the second exception, the Court's analysis begins with an examination of the parties' contract due the general presumption that "the relationship between the principal and independent contractor is in large measure determined by the terms of the contract itself."34 Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit instructs courts to look beyond the terms of the contract to determine whether a principal's actions and practices amount to operational control.35
"Operational control exists only if the principal has direct supervision over the step-by-step process of accomplishing the work such that the contractor is not entirely free to do the work in his own way."36 The Fifth Circuit, relying on the Restatement of Torts, has described the operational control test as follows:
In order for a principal to be liable for the actions of an independent contractor, the principal must have retained at least some degree of control over the manner in which the work was done. It is not enough that [a principal] has merely a general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which need not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe alterations and deviations. Such a general right is usually reserved to the employer, but it does not mean that the contractor is controlled as to his methods of work, or as to operative detail. There mustbe a retention of a right of supervision that the contractor is not entirely free to do the work in his own way.37
As for the first step, the parties do not dispute that the Agreement is devoid of any contractual language expressly reserving KLLM Logistics' right to control A&Z's performance.38 Therefore, the question is whether there is record evidence that KLLM Logistics exercised operational control over A&Z.
After reviewing the record, the Court finds that there is a dearth of evidence showing that KLLM Logistics lacked any control over A&Z's performance. Rather, the uncontested evidence shows that KLLM Logistics did not employ, discipline, fire, pay, or compensate A&Z Transportation's drivers, and it was not involved in training, qualifying, or instructing A&Z's drivers on how to perform their jobs or operate their vehicles.39 Rather than address these points head on, Plaintiffs argue that KLLM's requirements that A&Z Transportation and its drivers make check in calls or calls in the event of an emergency, or be subjected to penalties or fines, amounts to operational control.40 Afterconsidering federal jurisprudence involving broker carrier agreements from our sister circuit courts, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' position lacks merit.41
In Jones v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.,42 the district court for West Virginia concluded that the broker had not exercised "significant control" over its carrier's...
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