Landmark Sav. & Loan v. Rhoades
Decision Date | 20 November 1981 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 79-72799. |
Parties | LANDMARK SAVINGS & LOAN, Plaintiff, v. Loeb RHOADES, Hornblower & Co. and J. Gary Morgan, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
Walter L. Baumgardner, Jr., Birmingham, Mich., Robert A. Hudson, Hoops & Hudson, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff.
Kathleen Gallagher Lewis, Dickinson, Wright, McKean, Cudlip & Moon, Detroit, Mich., for defendants.
As authorized by the Court, the plaintiff has filed an amended complaint for damages for violation of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq.; the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq.; Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5 (1981); the 1970 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq.; and certain pendent state claims.
The essential differences between the original complaint and the amended complaint are as follows:
The defendants' motion to dismiss portions of the complaint and certain claims was taken under advisement on oral argument.
Although the amended complaint falls short of an exemplary complaint for fraud, churning, and unsuitability, it does sufficiently inform the defendants of the claims they are called upon to defend to escape dismissal.
The motion to dismiss the RICO count is more difficult of resolution.
In its RICO count the plaintiff incorporates the previous pleaded factual allegations by reference and then sets forth allegations as follows:
For the purposes of this opinion, the Court assumes that the allegations of the complaint, if rearranged in the traditional form of an indictment, and if supplemented by appropriate reference to specified mailings, would charge the defendants with violations of Sections 1962(a) and (d) of Title 18, United States Code.
It does not appear that an effort has even been made to charge that the plaintiff was injured in its business or property by reason of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). The Court draws this conclusion for the following reasons. The complaint does not distinguish between the defendants. A corporate defendant could only violate § 1962(c) by being a "person ... associated with an enterprise" with the individual defendant being the enterprise. The words "person" and "enterprise" are so broadly defined in the statute that this construction would be possible but would be strained. Furthermore, although the plaintiff borrows from the language of 1962(a) and (d), no attempt was made to borrow directly from the language of 1962(c).
The complaint by implication charges that the plaintiff was injured in its business or property by the acts which constitute the predicate acts of racketeering. It is the opinion of the Court, however, that something more or different than injury from predicate acts is required for a plaintiff to have standing to recover treble damages under the RICO statute.
The RICO statute provides that "any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 ... shall recover threefold the damages he sustains ... including an attorney fee." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). This language is similar to the treble damage provision contained in Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15. It is apparent that Congress has provided for treble damages in each Act as a means of effectuating the policy embodied in each Act.
In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 97 S.Ct. 690, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977), the Supreme Court discussed the type of injury required to maintain a civil antitrust action. The Court stated:
Id. at 489, 97 S.Ct. at 697. See Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp. et al., 643 F.2d 1229 (6th Cir. 1981).
The Court does not conclude that the RICO statute should be construed to require a competitive injury as that term is defined in antitrust cases. What is required for standing to bring a civil RICO damage action is an allegation that the plaintiff has suffered a "racketeering enterprise injury." Competitive injuries and racketeering enterprise injuries would frequently overlap, but they are not necessarily the same. A "racketeering enterprise injury" might occur, for example, if a civil RICO defendant's ability to harm the plaintiff is enhanced by the infusion of money from a pattern of racketeering activity into the enterprise. No such thing is alleged or even suggested here. At the most, the plaintiff's fraud claims are simply that the plaintiff suffered an injury by reason of fraud in which the mails happened to be used.
The construction given to the...
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