Page v. Cox & Cox, Inc.
Decision Date | 05 March 2004 |
Citation | 892 So.2d 413 |
Parties | Donald PAGE v. COX & COX, INC. |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
Allen K. Mitchell, Dothan, for appellant.
William L. Lee III and William W. Nichols of Lee & McInish, P.C., Dothan, for appellee.
Alabama Supreme Court 1030900.
On December 18, 2001, Donald Page ("the employee") filed an action in the Houston Circuit Court against his employer, Cox & Cox, Inc. ("the employer"), seeking workers' compensation benefits for an injury to his knee. The employee alleged that he had suffered the knee injury as a result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment when he fell from a ladder on or about October 19, 2000. The employer answered the complaint and subsequently filed a summary-judgment motion. The motion stated in part:
The summary-judgment motion filed by the employer was accompanied by a photocopy of a letter dated January 13, 2001, from a claims-management company to Dr. Granger, the employee's treating physician. The letter states that "[a]n MRI was obtained on 5-21-01 of [the employee's] right knee, which shows an oblique tear of the posterior and central aspect of the medial meniscus." Among other things, the letter then asks Dr. Granger to make a notation on the letter in response to the following question: "In your opinion, do you feel this tear is a direct result of [the employee's] injury of 10-19-00?" The letter inquires only as to the cause of the "tear"; it does not ask Dr. Granger whether any symptoms or difficulties experienced by the employee since the accident on October 19, 2000, could be attributed to the October 2000 accident or whether that accident could have aggravated or exacerbated a preexisting injury, i.e., the tear. In response, Dr. Granger indicated that the tear was not a direct result of the employee's October 19, 2000, accident.1
The employee filed a response to the employer's summary-judgment motion, along with his affidavit in support thereof, asserting that his preexisting knee injury had not prevented him from performing his job with the employer in a normal manner between 1996 and the date he fell off the ladder. The response stated, in part:
The employee's affidavit stated:
(Emphasis added.)
On August 26, 2002, the trial court entered an order on the case action summary sheet that stated: "Summary judgment is due to be granted, however, case continued and reset to September 25, 2002." The record indicates that the trial court apparently continued the hearing on the summary-judgment motion to allow the employee the opportunity to submit evidence on the issue of medical causation. On September 23, 2002, the employee filed a motion styled as a "Motion to Amend, Alter or Vacate Order on Defendant's Summary Judgment Motion"; attached to that motion was an unsigned facsimile copy of a letter from Dr. Granger, dated September 18, 2002, in which Dr. Granger opined that the injury the employee suffered as a result of his falling off the ladder while working for the employer had aggravated and exacerbated a preexisting problem.
At the September 25, 2002, summary-judgment hearing, the employer filed a motion to strike Dr. Granger's September 18 letter because, it claimed, the letter was neither authenticated nor certified; the trial court granted the motion to strike and refused to consider the letter. Also on that same date, but after the summary-judgment hearing had been completed, the employee filed an "amended" motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, and he attached to that motion what the employee refers to as a "certified"2 copy of Dr. Granger's September 18, 2002, letter. Thereafter, on October 9, 2002, the employee filed a motion to supplement his amended motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment; attached to that motion was the purported certified copy of Dr. Granger's September 18 letter and an affidavit executed by Dr. Granger, dated October 8, 2002, in which Dr. Granger stated that the injuries sustained by the employee when he fell off a ladder while working for the employee had aggravated and exacerbated a preexisting problem. The employee subsequently filed a motion asking the trial court to set his pending postjudgment motion for a final hearing; the matter was scheduled for a hearing on December 18, 2002.
At the hearing on December 18, the trial court stated:
On that same date, the trial court entered the following order on the case action summary sheet:
The employee appealed. This court remanded the cause to the trial court on May 20, 2003, for the trial court to enter an order in compliance with § 25-5-88, Ala.Code 1975. The trial court subsequently entered, on May 28, 2003, an order complying with § 25-5-88.
The employee contends that the trial court erred in entering the summary judgment in favor of the employer because, he argues, the evidence as to...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Equity Group—ala. Div. D/B/A Keystone Foods v. Harris
...... establish medical causation by showing that the accident caused or was a contributing cause of the injury.’ ” Page v. Cox & Cox, Inc., 892 So.2d 413, 417 (Ala.Civ.App.2004) (quoting Pair v. Jack's Family Rests., Inc., 765 So.2d 678, 681 (Ala.Civ.App.2000)). It appears that Keystone Food......
-
Lee v. LKQ Birmingham, Inc. (Ex parte LKQ Birmingham, Inc.)
...summary judgment.” ’ ” Cascaden v. Winn–Dixie Montgomery, LLC, 81 So.3d 1273, 1276 (Ala.Civ.App.2011) (quoting Page v. Cox & Cox, Inc., 892 So.2d 413, 417 (Ala.Civ.App.2004), quoting in turn Rich v. Warren Mfg., Inc., 634 So.2d 1015, 1017 (Ala.Civ.App.1994), citing in turn Burks v. Pickwick......
-
Bell v. Sea Coast Disposal, Inc. (Ex parte Sea Coast Disposal, Inc.)
...establish medical causation by showing that the accident caused or was a contributing cause of the injury." ’ Page v. Cox & Cox, Inc., 892 So. 2d 413, 417 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) (quoting Pair v. Jack's Family Rests., Inc., 765 So. 2d 678, 681 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) ).... ‘[T]he factfinder is ......
-
Cascaden v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, LLC
...does exist in order to withstand the motion for summary judgment. Burks, 607 So.2d 187; Clay, 601 So.2d 919.’ ”Page v. Cox & Cox, Inc., 892 So.2d 413, 417 (Ala.Civ.App.2004) (quoting Rich v. Warren Mfg., Inc., 634 So.2d 1015, 1016–17 (Ala.Civ.App.1994)). Cascaden contends that Winn–Dixie di......