Eustice v. Tex. A&M Univ., CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:15-CV-03180
| Decision Date | 30 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:15-CV-03180 |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER EUSTICE, Plaintiff, v. TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY, et al, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Pending in the above-referenced cause is Defendants Texas A&M University ("TAMU") and TAMU President Michael K. Young's ("Young") Motion to Dismiss. Doc. 8. Defendants file their motion pursuant to Federal Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Having considered the motion, response, and relevant law, the Court concludes that Defendants' motion should be granted for the reasons outlined below.
In 2012, Plaintiff Christopher Eustice ("Eustice") began his college education at TAMU. Doc. 1 ¶ 6. Eustice experienced academic success during his first year, but in the fall of 2013, one of his professors, Dr. Yong-Joe Kim ("Kim"), accused him of cheating on an exam and gave him a failing grade. Id. ¶¶ 7-9. Eustice appealed the professor's decision, but alleges that he was denied a hearing appeal of any kind. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. Eustice further contends that despite his repeated attempts to obtain redress from TAMU administrators and the director of the Aggie Honor System Office ("AHSO"), his requests were denied, causing the failing grade to permanently remain on his transcript. Id. ¶¶ 14-15.
A year later, Eustice again ran afoul of the Aggie Code of Honor when he turned in a lab report four days late. Id. ¶ 16. Eustice alleges that he "accidentally turned in the wrong report"— a mistake he later corrected. Id. However, because his professor, Dr. Maggard ("Maggard"), believed the report had been plagiarized from another student's work, Eustice originally received a grade of zero on the report. Id. ¶ 17. Maggard later reversed his decision and granted Eustice a letter-grade reduction instead. Id. ¶ 18. Nevertheless, Maggard submitted an allegation of plagiarism to the AHSO in regard to the incident. Id. ¶ 19.
In the fall of 2014, the AHSO conducted an investigation into Maggard's allegations, and the Honor Council held a separation hearing at which they determined that Eustice should be expelled. Id. ¶¶ 20, 23. Eustice contends that he was led to believe that (1) he had no role in the hearing, (2) he could not bring evidence or witnesses, and (3) Maggard's teaching assistant would be in attendance on his behalf—all of which were untrue and prejudiced him in the Council's outcome. Id. ¶¶ 21-23.
Eustice appealed the expulsion decision to the Honor Appeals Board, which ultimately amended the sanction to receiving an F for Maggard's course and a suspension from TAMU for two years. Id. ¶¶ 24, 30. Unmollified by the Appeals Board's decision, Eustice attempted to speak with the Dean of Student Life, but his request was denied. Id. ¶ 31. When Eustice responded by refusing to leave the waiting room, he was removed from the office by TAMU police officers. Id. ¶ 32. According to Eustice, a few days later he and his family were forcibly removed from his dorm, allegedly in retaliation for Eustice's actions in challenging his suspension. Id. ¶ 33.
Eustice also alleges that he has "Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder," ("ADHD") and was refused requested testing accommodations for this disability. Id. ¶ 43. He argues that TAMU was aware of his disability, but he makes no further allegations with regard to his ADHD or how it affected his suspension decision. See Doc. 1.
On October 29, 2015, Eustice filed suit against TAMU and Young alleging a Section 1983 violation of his due-process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count I); violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("RA"), 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12150, (Count II); and damage to reputation (Count III). Doc. 1. He seeks injunctive relief, reimbursement for additional tuition, costs, and fees at LSU,1 damages for the ADA violations, "lifetime economic damages caused by the necessity to transfer to an institution of lesser prestige," damages for the damage to his reputation, more than $1,000,000 for the constitutional violations, punitive damages, and attorney's fees. Id. ¶ 57. Defendants responded with the instant Motion to Dismiss. Doc. 8.
Motions filed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a party to challenge the subject-matter jurisdiction of the district court to hear a case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, possessing only those powers conferred by the Constitution and Congress. Halmekangas v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 603 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 2010); see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Accordingly, ensuring that a federal court has proper jurisdiction "is fundamental and necessary before touching the substantive claims of a lawsuit." Arena v. Graybar Elec. Co., Inc., 669 F.3d 214, 223 (5th Cir. 2012). If the court lacks either the statutory or constitutional authority to adjudicate a claim, then the claim shall be dismissed. Krim v. pcOrder.com, Inc., 402 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The requirement that jurisdiction be established as athreshold matter "spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States" and is "inflexible and without exception." Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884). As a result, "[w]hen a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits." Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (citing Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)).
"In examining a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the district court is empowered to consider matters of fact which may be in dispute." Id. (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981)). "Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Id. (citing Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996)).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows the court to dismiss a claim that fails "to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint, and must view the allegations as a whole in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Scanlan v. Tex. A&M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003). Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 mandates only that a pleading contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," this standard demands more than unadorned accusations, "labels and conclusions," "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," or "naked assertion[s]" devoid of "further factual enhancement." Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Thus, to survive amotion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570.
Facial plausibility is satisfied when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Although "the plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,'" there must be "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Thus, "where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'shown'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to "draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 664-65.
Defendants begin their assault on Eustice's Original Complaint by asserting that neither TAMU nor Young in his official capacity are "persons" subject to liability under Section 1983. Doc. 8 at 16-17. Eustice does not respond to this argument. See Doc. 13.
"To state a section 1983 claim, 'a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.'" James v. Tex. Collin Cnty., 535 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 874 (5thCir. 2000)). Neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" subject to suit under Section 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). As a state-funded state institution of higher education, TAMU is an arm of the state and, therefore, immune from suit. Kimmel v. Tex. A&M Univ., 267 F. Supp. 2d 646, 652-53 (S.D. Tex. 2002), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, Scanlan, 343 F.3d 533. Accordingly, Eustice's Section 1983 claims against TAMU must be dismissed.
Notwithstanding sovereign immunity, state officials in their official capacities are "persons" when sued for injunctive relief. Will, 491 U.S. at 71 & n.10 (citations omitted). However, even when the state official is the named defendant, a...
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