Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. United States
Decision Date | 17 February 1930 |
Docket Number | No. H-62.,H-62. |
Citation | 37 F.2d 977 |
Parties | FELT & TARRANT MFG. CO. v. UNITED STATES. |
Court | U.S. Claims Court |
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Thomas G. Haight, of Jersey City, N. J. (Robert H. Montgomery and J. Marvin Haynes, both of Washington, D. C., James O. Wynn., Jr., of New York City, and C. J. McGuire, of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for plaintiff.
Ralph C. Williamson, of Washington, D. C., and Herman J. Galloway, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Ottamar Hamele, of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for the United States.
Before BOOTH, Chief Justice, and WILLIAMS, LITTLETON, GRAHAM, and GREEN, Judges.
The history of this tax case follows in sequential order, viz.:
Plaintiff sues to recover $26,909.50 and interest, alleged as an overpayment of taxes due to a failure to allow a deduction from gross income for the year 1917 for exhaustion of patents acquired by the plaintiff and used by it in its business prior to March 1, 1913. The defendant concedes the amount and likewise admits that the single impediment to recovery is the sufficiency of the refund claim filed February 29, 1924. The various steps taken in the final determination of plaintiff's 1917 tax liability, as appears from the history of the case set forth above, discloses indisputably that the refund claim of February 29, 1924, was filed with the Commissioner within the statutory period of limitations and over a year prior to the final determination of the tax liability of the plaintiff for 1917.
The refund claim of February 29, 1924 — the important instrument involved herein — reads in part as follows:
The taxpayer requested an oral hearing and the right of appeal in the event of an adverse decision on the part of the unit, and before any formal rejection of the claim was made.
Section 210 of the Revenue Act of 1917 (40 Stat. 307) provides for special assessments, and it is to be noted that the refund claim makes no specific mention of a deduction from gross income on account of exhaustion of patents.
Section 1318 of the Revenue Act of 1921 (42 Stat. 227, 314 26 USCA § 156), upon this subject, provides as follows:
Article 1036, Treasury Regulations 62, prescribed as follows:
Section 1318 and the regulations cited undoubtedly require that all the facts relied upon for a refund should be set forth under oath. The courts have construed section 1318 and the regulations made in pursuance of the authority granted therein. The cases, which we need not review, in detail, are harmonious upon the point that the purpose and intent of the statute is to afford the Commissioner an opportunity to correct errors specified in the refund claim, and to enable the taxpayers to escape the necessity for needless and burdensome litigation. Tucker v. Alexander, 275 U. S. 228, 48 S. Ct. 45, 46, 72 L. Ed. 253; Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willcuts (C. C. A.) 15 F.(2d) 626, 49 A. L. R. 459; Feather River Lumber Co. v. United States, 66 Ct. Cl. 54; Jonesboro Grocer Co. v. United States, 66 Ct. Cl. 320; Phœnix Glass Co. v. United States, (D. C.) 34 F.(2d) 217, P-H Fed. Tax Service, 1929, sec. 834; National Candy Co. v. United States, 67 Ct. Cl. 74. In the case of Tucker v. Alexander, supra, the Supreme Court, in speaking of the statute and regulations, used this language:
The Alexander Case turned upon the question of waiver of the sufficiency of the refund claim. A similar contention is advanced by the plaintiff in this case. It is to be observed from the history of this case that the plaintiff did not in its original tax return claim a deduction from gross income for the year 1917 for depreciation or exhaustion of patents owned and used by it. This...
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