Jones v. FIRE & CASUALTY INSURANCE CO. OF CONNECTICUT

• Decision Date: 05 April 1967
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 10982.
• Citation: 266 F. Supp. 91
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Ottis Mayo JONES v. The FIRE & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY OF CONNECTICUT et al.

266 F. Supp. 91

Ottis Mayo JONES v. The FIRE & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY OF CONNECTICUT et al.

Civ. No. 10982.

United States District Court D. Connecticut.

April 5, 1967.

Ottis Mayo Jones, pro se.

Joseph R. Cruciani, Asst. U. S. Atty., Charlotte, N. C., for defendants.

RULING ON MOTION FOR ORDER QUASHING INTERROGATORIES

BLUMENFELD, District Judge.

The plaintiff has addressed interrogatories under Rule 31, Fed.R.Civ.P., to the United States District Judge before whom his criminal case in North Carolina was tried to a jury. This motion to quash the interrogatories was entered on behalf of the judge by the United States Attorney for the Western District of North Carolina.¹ Although the questions for the most part are argumentative, repetitive and harassing (most of them seek matters easily found as a matter of public record, viz, numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 13), the motion to quash is granted on a broader ground.

To put the issues on this motion in perspective, it is worth recalling that when the plaintiff Jones first tried to sue Judge Warlick and two other federal officials, their motion for summary judgment was granted on the obvious and firmly entrenched ground that federal public officials are not subject to civil suit for acts performed by them in the course of their official duties. Jones v. Warlick, Civil No. 2006 (W.D.N.C.1965), aff'd, 364 F.2d 828 (4th Cir. 1966) (per curiam). See also Garfield v. Palmieri, 193 F.Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y.1961), aff'd, 297 F.2d 526 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 871, 82 S.Ct. 1139, 8 L.Ed.2d 275 (1962); Garfield v. Palmieri, 193 F. Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y.1960), aff'd, 290 F. 2d 821 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 827, 82 S.Ct. 46, 7 L.Ed.2d 30 (1961). Even where a suit rests on diversity jurisdiction, the issue of judicial immunity of federal judges is solely a question of federal law. Garfield v. Palmieri, supra, 193 F.Supp. 137; accord, Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 79 S.Ct. 1331, 3 L.Ed.2d 1454 (1959).

The rules protecting judges from civil suit are also significant where discovery of matters occurring in the course of a judge's conduct in the course of his official duties is sought from him for use in a suit to which he is not a party. The Supreme Court has pointed out that a privilege from suit "is not a badge or emolument of exalted office, but an expression of policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government." Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 572-573, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959). (For a detailed analysis of the history of judicial immunity see Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd, 275 U.S. 503, 48 S.Ct. 155, 72 L.Ed. 395 (1927) (per curiam).)

The above rationales are equally applicable to time-consuming interrogatories and depositions. For every satisfied litigant, a plethora of dissatisfied suitors springs vociferously to the fore. Not all the dissatisfaction is channeled in the same direction, of course. Some desire to impugn the judge, others the jury, and another group attacks the prosecutor. In this case, the suit is against a witness whose testimony was adverse to the plaintiff. In the plaintiff's attempt to build a case against the witness for allegedly testifying falsely, he seeks by indirection to obtain from the judge what is within the...