General Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers U. v. Blue Cab Co.

Decision Date30 November 1965
Docket NumberNo. 15144.,15144.
PartiesGENERAL TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS AND HELPERS UNION, LOCAL NO. 782 OF MAYWOOD AND VICINITY, OF the INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BLUE CAB COMPANY, Inc., Defendant-Appellant. GENERAL TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS AND HELPERS UNION, LOCAL NO, 782, etc., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VILLAGE CAB COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant. GENERAL TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS AND HELPERS UNION, LOCAL NO. 782, etc., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BLUE CAB COMPANY, Inc., Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Ronald E. Stackler, Chicago, Ill., for appellant.

I. Harvey Levinson, Chicago, Ill., for appellee.

Before HASTINGS, Chief Judge, and CASTLE and KILEY, Circuit Judges.

CASTLE, Circuit Judge.

The defendants-appellants, Blue Cab Company, Inc., and Village Cab Company, Inc., prosecute this appeal from a summary judgment ordering the defendant, Blue Cab, to arbitrate its discharge of an employee and vacation pay claims of certain other employees, and ordering the defendant, Village Cab, to arbitrate vacation pay claims of certain employees.

In three separate actions filed in the District Court, invoking jurisdiction pursuant to 29 U.S.C.A. § 185, the plaintiff-appellee, Union,1 sought to compel arbitration of the respective disputes pursuant to the grievance and compulsory arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreements between the Union and the defendants. The defendant, Blue Cab, filed a motion to dismiss the action concerning the employee discharge, the action first filed, asserting lack of jurisdiction because it was not engaged in an industry affecting interstate commerce. This phase of the initial action culminated in the court's denial of the motion based upon its findings and conclusions that, among other things, Charles Ugaste and John Ugaste, brothers, operated as a multiple employer both Blue Cab and Village Cab, together with several other business enterprises, from the same address. When the subsequent actions involving the vacation pay claims were filed, and the jurisdictional defense was again asserted, all three actions were consolidated on plaintiff's motion, and then proceeded to final disposition2 on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment submitted on depositions, and affidavits and counter-affidavits, under the provisions of Rule 56 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28 U.S.C.A.).

The main contested issues presented by the defendants' appeal are (1) whether the existence of genuine issues of material fact precluded disposition of each of the actions by summary judgment; and (2) whether as a matter of law the discharge dispute and the vacation pay claims were matters committed to the compulsory arbitration procedures of the collective bargaining agreements involved.

The defendants additionally assert that the District Court erred in consolidating the three actions. Although defendants concede the consolidation "by itself is of no great moment to the defendants", they urge that the District Court's disposition of the matter demonstrates that it failed to give separate attention to the issue of the arbitrability of the vacation pay claims but treated the question of arbitrability of each of the three cases as identical. We perceive no merit to the contentions of the defendants in this connection. The record discloses that in their pertinent provisions the collective bargaining agreements with both Blue Cab and Village Cab were essentially the same. The common questions of law and fact presented by the jurisdictional defense raised in each action warranted their consolidation under the provisions of Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28 U.S.C.A.). In addition, the issue of the arbitrability of the vacation pay claims was common to each of the two actions involving such claims. Moreover, the defendants did not oppose the plaintiff's motion for consolidation. They made no objection to the consolidation until five days after it was ordered. Under the circumstances the initial consolidation involved no abuse of discretion. And, the record reveals nothing which subsequently occurred which required a separation of the actions for consideration and disposition in order to avoid prejudice to the defendants. The judgment order the court entered discloses it found that no genuine issue as to any material fact existed. And, contrary to the defendants' contention, the court recognized that two different types of claims were presented and specifically treated and disposed of both. The defendants were entitled to no greater elaboration. The making of additional specific findings and separate conclusions on a motion for summary judgment is ill advised since it would carry an unwarranted implication that a fact question was presented. A R Inc. v. Electro-Voice, Incorporated, 7 Cir., 311 F.2d 508, 513.

We turn to consideration of the issues heretofore stated as the main contested issues.

The collective bargaining agreements contained a provision that "no driver shall be discharged for being involved in an accident unless he is an accident hazard". Each agreement contained a provision that to be entitled to vacation pay an employee with less than ten years of continuous service must work at least 250 days, and an employee with more than ten years of continuous service must work at least 225 days, immediately preceding the claimed vacation.

Both the collective bargaining agreement with Blue Cab and...

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16 cases
  • Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Company. v. Statemen Ins. Co., 1169A223
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • October 27, 1971
    ...(1968), 250 Ind. 491, 499, 237 N.E.2d 242, 246, 14 Ind.Dec. 420.4 Rule TR 52(A).5 General Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Union, Local No. 782 v. Blue Cab Company, Inc. (CA 7 1965), 353 F.2d 687, 689.6 The wording of Indiana's Trial Rule 52(A) and the federal Rule 52(a) are so essentially i......
  • Bohack Corp. v. TRUCK DRIVERS LOCAL U. NO. 807, ETC.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • April 21, 1977
    ...and other claims of the employees are matters involving interpretation of the contract. See General Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers v. Blue Cab Co., 353 F.2d 687, 690 (7th Cir. 1965). The fact that working conditions or shop practices are not directly at issue does not mean the special expe......
  • Garrison v. Blakeney
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • July 11, 1978
    ...for facts to be found, the matter is not properly one for summary judgment. As was said in General Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Union v. Blue Cab Co., 353 F.2d 687, 689 (7th Cir. 1965): "The making of additional specific findings and separate conclusions on a motion for summary judgmen......
  • Associated Milk Dealers, Inc. v. Milk Drivers U., Local 753
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • February 6, 1970
    ...Local 483, International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Shell Oil Co., 369 F.2d 526, 528 (7th Cir.1966); General Teamsters, Local 782 v. Blue Cab Co., 353 F.2d 687, 690 (7th Cir.1965). Here the district court should have considered parol evidence in order to determine the extent of the cont......
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