EAST COAST COLLISION & RESTOR. v. Allyn

• Decision Date: 15 December 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-404-A,98-404-A
• Citation: 742 A.2d 273
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Parties: EAST COAST COLLISION & RESTORATION, INC. v. Robert ALLYN et al.

742 A.2d 273

EAST COAST COLLISION & RESTORATION, INC. v. Robert ALLYN et al.

No. 98-404-A

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

December 15, 1999.

Present WEISBERGER, C.J., LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

Michael Kiselica, Warwick, for plaintiff.

Raymond A. Lafazia, Providence, for defendant.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument on November 3, 1999, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear in order to show cause why the issues raised on appeal should not be summarily decided. Robert Allyn (Allyn) and Chester Vanderpyl, III (Vanderpyl) (collectively, owners), have appealed the trial justice's denial of their motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial. After hearing the arguments of counsel for the parties and after examining the memoranda submitted, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown. Therefore the issues raised by this appeal will be summarily decided.

In 1987, East Coast Collision and Restoration, Inc. (tenant) leased a building in Exeter, Rhode Island, from the owners, who had constructed the building to the tenant's specifications, to use as the site of the tenant's auto body repair business. Rather than hiring a general contractor to oversee construction of the building, the owners hired the necessary contractors for each phase of theconstruction. About eighteen months after the tenant occupied the building, the owners constructed an addition to the building, which the tenant occupied for the same purposes.

Electrical problems began after the tenant moved into the original building, including dimmed and flickering lights, tripped circuit breakers, and electrical shocks received from touching the steel railing of a garage door. There was also a fire in the main fuse panel. The tenant told Vanderpyl of the problems, and the fuse panel was repaired, but the other problems continued. The tenant was unaware of any actions that were taken to correct them. On February 11, 1990, a fire broke out, completely destroying the premises, including vehicles and equipment owned by the tenant.

On June 27, 1991, the tenant filed a complaint in Superior Court, alleging that the owners negligently maintained, repaired, and operated the premises and that this negligence resulted in the fire that caused damages to the tenant. At a jury trial held in January 1998, a number of experts testified about the cause of the fire. Deputy State Fire Marshal Gerald Leddy testified that a malfunction in the wiring most probably caused the short circuit that started the fire, although he was unable to identify what caused the malfunction. Another expert testifying on behalf of the tenant stated that he believed damaged insulation on a wire caused the fire and that the insulation was most likely damaged at the time of installation by either an electrician or a carpenter. The owners presented two witnesses who were unable to identify the cause of the fire.

At the close of evidence, the trial justice instructed the jury on several issues that are in dispute in this appeal. The jury was instructed that it should determine whether the owners were general contractors, and if they were, whether they constructed the building in a non-negligent fashion by requiring work to be done safely. The trial justice also instructed the jury on causation and additionally instructed that the lease could provide evidence that the owners had the duty to maintain the electricalsystem. The jury returned a verdict for the tenant, and judgment was entered on January 20, 1998. Pursuant to Rules 50(b) and 59 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, the owners filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law and a motion for a new trial. The trial justice denied both motions, and the owners have appealed.

In support of their motion for judgment as a matter of law, the owners asserted that as landlords they could not be held liable for a failure to repair or maintain the premises because the law does not impose such a duty on lessors of nonresidential property absent a covenant to the contrary. They further argued that as landlords they were not liable for damages resulting from a hidden defect. We agree with both arguments. On appeal, the owners also argued that there was no legal basis under which they could be held liable as general contractors.

Before we review the substance of the owners' arguments, we must deal with the tenant's claim that the issue of general contractor liability is not properly before us because the owners did not preserve their objection at trial. It is true that this Court has stated that "[g]eneral objections to instructions, without specific grounds, are not a sufficient basis for review by this court." Dyson v. City of Pawtucket, 670 A.2d 233, 237 (R.I.1996). However, we have also held that this rule will not be interpreted rigidly in order to overlook trial errors. Id. In Dyson, we determined that if a request was made to charge differently, and objection was made to the failure to charge in accord with the request, that would be sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. Id. In the case at bar, the owners did request alternative instructions on the issues of general contractor and landlord liability. Thus, the issue is properly before us.

When deciding a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the trial court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and gives to that party the benefit of all reasonableinferences that properly may be drawn from the evidence, without weighing the evidence or assessing the credibility of the trial witnesses. Morrocco v. Piccardi, 674 A.2d 380, 382 (R.I. 1996). When the Supreme Court reviews the trial justice's decision on the motion, it is bound by the same rules and applies the same analysis as does the trial justice. Id.

We must first consider whether the owners could be held liable as general contractors. The general rule is that one who employs an independent contractor is not liable for the negligent acts of that contractor. Focus Investment Associates, Inc. v. American Title Insurance Co., 797 F. Supp. 109, 112 (D.R.I.1992),aff'd. in part, vacated in part, 992 F.2d 1231 (1st Cir.1993); Ballet Fabrics, Inc. v. Four Dee Realty Co., 112 R.I. 612, 621, 314 A.2d 1, 6 (1974). In the present case, it is undisputed that the workers who constructed the building were independent contractors. Thus, under the general rule the owners are not liable for any negligent acts of an electrician or carpenter that caused the defect that started the...