Matter of Pritchard & Baird, Inc.
Decision Date | 01 October 1981 |
Docket Number | Bankruptcy No. B-75-3202. |
Citation | 16 BR 16 |
Parties | In the Matter of PRITCHARD & BAIRD, INC., et al, Debtor(s). CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S OF LONDON, et als, Plaintiffs, v. The TRUSTEES IN BANKRUPTCY OF PRITCHARD & BAIRD, INC., et al, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of New Jersey |
Sills, Beck, Cummis, Radin & Tischman by Thomas J. Demski, Newark, N.J., for Fortress Re., Inc.
Pellettieri, Rabstein & Altman by Richard M. Altman, Princeton, N.J., for Horace Mann Ins. Co.
Shanley & Fisher by A. Dennis Terrell, Newark, N.J., for Capitol Indem. Corp.
Francis & Berry by Hugh P. Francis, Morristown, N.J., for the trustees in bankruptcy.
Riker, Danzig, Scherer & Hyland by James S. Rothschild, Newark, N.J., for Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, et als.
Defendants Fortress Re., Inc., Capitol Indemnity Corporation and Horace Mann Insurance Company have filed a joint motion seeking an order of recusal by the Court.
The motion is brought on at the direction of the Court as counsel for the moving parties had, at earlier hearings in this matter, expressed some concern that the Court's extensive knowledge of the business affairs and alleged frauds of the Pritchard family might affect the Court's judgment in the matter, presently pending before it, which concerns the recission of certain errors and omissions policies covering the Pritchard & Baird reinsurance intermediaries.
The Pritchard & Baird companies filed a petition for arrangement under Chapter XI of the old Bankruptcy Act in December 1975 and were eventually adjudicated bankrupts on January 28, 1976. Chapter XI petitions were also filed on behalf of Charles H. Pritchard, Jr. and William Pritchard. Both individuals were also adjudicated bankrupts. During the course of preserving and administering the various estates, the respective trustees in bankruptcy and the debtors became involved in extensive litigation before the Court. Numerous appeals were taken from the decisions rendered by this Court and, in every instance, they were sustained.
The present action does not involve the Pritchards individually, but is an action wherein Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, et als, seek recission of certain errors and omissions policies issued to the bankrupt Pritchard & Baird reinsurance brokerage companies. The plaintiffs therein contend that said policies were procured through the fraud of certain officers, directors, employee and agents of the insured corporations and, but for such fraud and concealment, the policies would not have been issued.
It has been suggested that 28 U.S.C. § 144, which deals with bias or prejudice of a district court applies here. In Ginger v. Cohn, 255 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1958), it was held that 28 U.S.C. § 144 does not apply to a referee in bankruptcy. See also Millslagle v. Olson, 128 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1942), holding that 28 U.S.C. § 144 is inapplicable to the circuit court of appeals, and Tjosevig v. United States, 255 F. 5 (9th Cir. 1919), wherein it was decided that 28 U.S.C. § 144 is inapplicable to a territorial court.
The relevant statutory enactment is 28 U.S.C. § 455, Disqualification of justice, judge, magistrate or referee in bankruptcy, as amended December 5, 1974. Pub.L. 93-512, § 1, 88 Stat. 1609. The 1978 amendment omitting references to referees in bankruptcy is inapplicable herein. See Pub.L. 95-598, §§ 214, 402(c), 403(a), 92 Stat. 2661, 2682, 2683.
28 U.S.C. § 455 pertinently provides as follows:
The balance of the operative portion of 28 U.S.C. § 455 concerns narrow factual situations, not relevant here.
In this event, the test for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455 is the same as under 28 U.S.C. § 144, see Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 290 (3rd Cir. 1980) cert. den. 450 U.S. 999, 101 S.Ct. 1704, 68 L.Ed.2d 200 (1981). There, the court stated that only extrajudicial conduct required disqualification. The court cited the leading case of United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 580-583, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 1708-1710, 16 L.Ed.2d 778, where it was stated that:
"the alleged bias and prejudice, to be disqualifying, must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case." Id. p. 583, 86 S.Ct. p. 1710.
Since the movants clearly state in their brief that "No suggestion is made that the Court is biased or prejudiced against any of the litigants", no further consideration of the criteria is necessary. The second criteria for recusal based upon a judge's personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts is also inapplicable here. The facts learned by a judge in his judicial capacity cannot be the basis for disqualification, United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1976) cert. den. 430 U.S. 931, 97 S.Ct. 1551, 51 L.Ed.2d 775 (1977); United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1976) cert. den. 429 U.S. 998, 97 S.Ct. 523, ...
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