Piper v. Meade & Assocs., Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 October 2017
• Docket Number: Case No. RWT 17–cv–863
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
• Parties: Melinda PIPER, Plaintiff, v. MEADE & ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendant.

282 F.Supp.3d 905

Melinda PIPER, Plaintiff,

v.MEADE & ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendant.

Case No. RWT 17–cv–863

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

Signed October 10, 2017

Aryeh E. Stein, Meridian Law LLC, Baltimore, MD, for Plaintiff.

Bradley Todd Canter, Ronald S Canter, The Law Offices of Ronald S Canter LLC, Rockville, MD, Chris Murphy, pro hac vice, Murphy Law Office LLC, Westerville, OH, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROGER W. TITUS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1. The Consequences of Lessons Not Learned

This is a case that could aptly be described as the tale of "the horse that was led to water, but would not drink." Our respected State colleague, the late Chief Judge Richard Gilbert of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, aptly noted that procedural rules are "the lawyer's compass and serve to help him steer through the narrows of pleading, pass the rocks of default, around the shoals of limitation and safely into the harbor of judgment. It is a reckless sailor, indeed, who puts to sea without a compass and it is a reckless lawyer who fails to familiarize himself with" the applicable procedural rules before filing and trying a case. Colonial Carpets, Inc. v. Carpet Fair, Inc. , 36 Md.App. 583, 584, 374 A.2d 419, 420–21 (1977). He went on to lament that, notwithstanding the importuning of appellate courts that the

rules of procedure are not to be considered as mere guides or Heloise's helpful hints to the practice of law, but rather precise rubrics that are to be read and followed, admonitions go unheeded by some practitioners. When that occurs, we are left to wonder whether we are engaged in an endless struggle, just as waves beat upon the shore, fall back and then repeat over and over ad infinitum.

Id. at 584–85, 374 A.2d at 421.

In the federal court system, the basic requirements for a complaint are contained in Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which states that a "pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction...; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought...."

These basic requirements of Rule 8(a) were clarified by the decisions of the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). In order to satisfy these minimum pleading requirements, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.

Although it is true that Courts must accept "all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true," Albright v. Oliver , 510 U.S. 266, 268, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994), and Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co. , 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir. 1999), courts are not required to use a divining rod to supply missing, essential facts when testing the sufficiency of a complaint. Courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Papasan v. Allain , 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986), and Rule 8"requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556 n.3, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ). Therefore "...[a court] must determine whether it is plausible that the factual allegations in the complaint are ‘enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’ " Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, Va. , 579 F.3d 380, 386 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

A plaintiff must meet the Twombly – Iqbal pleading standard for all elements of a cause of action, including jurisdiction and standing. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ("The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing [the elements of standing]."). Because the standing elements

are not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case, each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e. , with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of litigation.

Id. At the pleading stage, although "general factual allegations of injury resulting from defendant's conduct may suffice," id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, it is the court's task to evaluate whether the pleadings "allege[ ] facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that [the plaintiff] has standing to sue," John v. Whole Foods Market Grp., Inc. , 858 F.3d 732, 736 (2d Cir. 2017)(quoting Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC , 822 F.3d 47, 56–57 (2d Cir. 2016).

For many years, Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has provided that courts "should freely give leave (to amend a pleading) when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However, until this rule was amended in 2009, approval of the court was required in order to amend a pleading once a responsive pleading is filed. This changed, however, when Rule 15 was amended to its present form in 2009 so as to allow a pleader an opportunity to recover from a "whoops" moment when a complaint is challenged for its sufficiency by the opposing party. Under the revised Rule 15, a party has the absolute right, without leave of court , to

amend its pleading once as a matter of course within: (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.

Thus, when a pleader may have overlooked some of the basic requirements of pleading a cause of action or asserting jurisdiction in federal court, Rule 15 provides an absolute second chance, and an opportunity to convert a failing grade in to a passing one. In this case, the Court is faced with a horse that was led to water and refused to drink, and there are inevitable consequences that flow therefrom.

2. Procedural Background

The reluctant horse in this drama is the Plaintiff, Melinda Piper ("Piper"), a Maryland resident who brought a bare-bones, single-count Complaint against the Defendant, Meade & Associates, Inc. ("Meade"), an Ohio-based debt collector, for damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief, arising from Meade's alleged violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012). ECF No. 1.

In her Complaint, Piper claims that, on an unknown date, Meade began attempting to collect an alleged consumer debt owed by her ("Alleged Debt"). Id. ¶ 8. The Alleged Debt was owned by Harris Teeter and was allegedly incurred for personal purposes, but Piper did not identify what those purposes were in her Complaint. See id. ¶ 10. At an unknown time, Meade reported the Alleged Debt on Piper's credit report. Id. ¶ 12. On September 22, 2016, Piper wrote a letter to Meade to dispute the Alleged Debt. Id. ¶ 13. On December 11, 2016, Piper again examined her credit report and found that Meade had re-reported the credit account after it received Piper's dispute letter, but failed to list the account as "disputed by consumer" as required by the FDCPA. Id. ¶ 14. Piper alleges in her Complaint, without further detail, that "[a]s a result of Defendant's deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged." Id. ¶ 15.

Meade filed a Motion to Dismiss Piper's Complaint on the grounds that (1) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and, in the alternative, (2) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) Piper failed to state a claim for relief under the FDCPA. ECF No. 9. Piper filed a timely Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss asserting that (1) Piper's injury was the "impact" the Alleged Debt had on her credit report, and (2) the Alleged Debt was for personal or household purposes because it was owned by Harris Teeter, a grocery store chain. ECF No. 12 at 4, 14. Neither of these factual allegations was included in the original Complaint, nor was any amended complaint filed. See ECF No. 1. Meade filed a timely Reply to Piper's Opposition. ECF No. 13. The Court held a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss on September 6, 2017.

Meade's Motion put Piper squarely on notice of the deficiencies in her pleading. Moreover, an almost identical complaint filed by Piper's attorney was also dismissed on grounds of insufficient pleading, about a month before the filing of Meade's 12(b) Motion in this case, see Coleman v. Charlottesville Bureau of Credits, Inc. , No. 3:17CV147-HEH, 2017 WL 1381666 (E.D. Va. Apr. 17, 2017). These facts make Piper's failure to take advantage of the opportunity Rule 15 gave her to amend her Complaint inexplicable. Instead of amending her Complaint, Piper included additional factual allegations in her Opposition, which the Court simply cannot consider in its evaluation of the sufficiency of her pleadings. Zachair, Ltd. v. Driggs , 965 F.Supp. 741, 748 n.4 (D. Md. 1997), aff'd , 141 F.3d 1162 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that a plaintiff "is bound by the allegations contained in its complaint and cannot, through the use of motion briefs, amend the complaint").

3. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Article III of the United States Constitution limits the judicial power of the federal courts to "Cases" and "Controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; see Lujan , 504 U.S. at 559, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Accordingly, subject matter jurisdiction requires a justiciable case or...