William N. Feinstein & Company v. United States
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit) |
Citation | 209 F. Supp. 613 |
Parties | WILLIAM N. FEINSTEIN & COMPANY, Inc., et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES and the Interstate Commerce Commission, Defendants, and The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company et al., Interveners. |
Decision Date | 04 October 1962 |
209 F. Supp. 613
WILLIAM N. FEINSTEIN & COMPANY, Inc., et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED STATES and the Interstate Commerce Commission, Defendants,
and
The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company et al., Interveners.
United States District Court S. D. New York.
October 4, 1962.
A. C. Armstrong, Baltimore, Md., Richard E. Costello, J. Edgard McDonald, New York City, Edward A. Kaier, Philadelphia, Pa., for Railroad Interveners; Edward F. Butler, New York City, of counsel.
Bernstein, Weiss, Tomson Hammer & Parter, New York City, for Complainant Petitioner; William J. Angello, Jr., New York City, of counsel.
RYAN, Chief Justice.
William N. Feinstein & Co., Inc.,1 files this suit to review, set aside and annul a
The background and essential facts of this suit are not in dispute. Substantially, all carload shipments of fresh fruits and vegetables shipped to New York City from the south and west during the period in issue in the proceedings in 313 ICC 783 were delivered to the pier stations3 of the terminal carriers serving New York, the interveners herein. These perishable shipments were moved by rail to the Jersey side of the Hudson River where the freight cars were placed on barges, floated across the river and then either switched to the carriers' team tracks in Manhattan or docked, as the great majority were, at the carriers' pier stations. The New York Central Railroad was and is the only terminal carrier serving New York which has direct rail lines to its 33rd Street team tracks in Manhattan. It, however, delivered many carloads of fresh fruits and vegetables, including the onion shipments in issue, to its terminal Pier 17. When the car floats were docked at the appropriate piers, their contents were unloaded by the carriers and placed in designated areas on the pier floors. The consignees were not permitted themselves to unload their produce and access was first given them after unloading. The carriers provided the pier stations with special sale and auction facilities, whereby much of the produce was immediately disposed of by the consignees.
No charge for unloading perishable produce at these pier stations in addition to the line haul rate had ever been assessed by the terminal carriers serving New York until 1947 when, for the first time, these carriers filed schedules to become effective June 1, 1947 which provided for a separate charge for unloading fruits and vegetables consigned to their New York pier stations. No charge was sought for unloading commodities other than fruits and vegetables at these same pier stations during the entire period in issue in the proceedings in 313 ICC 783.
Numerous shippers, shipping organizations, State Commissions, the Port of Authority of New York and other interests protested against this charge on the ground that the pier unloading performed by the carriers was an integral part of the transportation service and necessarily included in the line haul rate. Following these protests, the Commission suspended the operation of the proposed charges (49 U.S.C.A. § 15(7)) and ordered an investigation to determine their lawfulness (Investigation and Suspension Docket No. 5500). After a hearing before an examiner and oral argument and
Suit was then filed by the Florida Citrus Commission in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida to set aside the Commission's decision in 286 ICC 119 and the orders entered pursuant thereto. The three-Judge Court upheld the Commission and on August 31, 1953 dismissed the suit (Florida Citrus Commission v. United States, D.C., 114 F.Supp. 420). On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States on June 7, 1954 vacated the judgment of the Florida District Court and remanded the matter to the Commission for appropriate findings, concluding that the Commission in 286 ICC 119 had not adequately explained its departure from prior norms and had not sufficiently spelled out the legal basis of its decision (Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 347 U.S. 645, 74 S.Ct. 826, 98 L.Ed. 1015). The Court at page 653, 74 S.Ct. at page 831, stated:
"We do not know whether the Commission has disregarded its own findings that the unloading here is a prerequisite to delivery of the goods; or whether, in order to meet an unusual situation, the Commission has modified the normal doctrine that delivery is the responsibility of the carrier * * * or whether the Commission * * * has here deemed irrelevant the prevailing rule of its prior cases that a service necessarily encompassed by the line-haul rate cannot be separately restated without examining the sufficiency of the line-haul rate to cover it."
Upon supplemental hearings and further review of the record in compliance with the mandate of the Supreme Court, the Commission on June 28, 1956 (Unloading Fruits and Vegetables at New York and Philadelphia, 298 ICC 637) found that the charges in issue were not shown to be just and reasonable and ordered the schedule of charges to be cancelled as of August 16, 1956. Upon application of the carriers, however, the cancellation date was extended to October 16, 1956. In reaching its ultimate finding of unlawfulness in 298 ICC 637, the Commission concluded that the applicable tariffs provided that the line haul rate applied to and included delivery and that delivery at the pier stations was not effected until the contents were unloaded by the carriers and placed on the pier floor, that team track delivery was not a valid option to pier delivery and that,
Following the determination of the Commission in 298 ICC 637, plaintiff's assignor on December 3, 1956 filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (49 U.S.C.A. §§ 8 and 9) against the New York Central Railroad to recover as damages the charges it had paid the latter for the unloading of onions consigned to the Central's Pier 17, New York City. Plaintiff alleged that the assessment of the unloading charge was unlawful pursuant to the determination of the United States Supreme Court in Secretary of...
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William N. Feinstein & Co. v. United States, 262
...on the merits an action seeking review of a decision of the Interstate Commerce Commission. William N. Feinstein & Co. v. United States, 209 F.Supp. 613 (S.D. N.Y.1962). The Commission's decision found that certain charges exacted from plaintiff's assignor by the New York Central Railroad f......
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Wichita Board of Trade v. United States, Civ. A. No. W-4730.
...to explain its departure from prior norms and its legal basis for doing so. See also William N. Feinstein & Company v. United States, 209 F.Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y.1962); National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. United States, 321 F.Supp. 500 (S.D.N. Y.1970). The same reasoning appli......
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Livingston v. McLeod
...of this kind be held "forthwith". Ibid, p. 626; see, generally, Ewing v. Mytinger and Casselberry, supra, at p. 600, 70 S.Ct. at p. 873. 209 F. Supp. 613 Nor can I say, on the basis of the facts as recited above, which are not in dispute, that the Regional Director was unwarranted in findin......
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William N. Feinstein & Co. v. United States, 262
...on the merits an action seeking review of a decision of the Interstate Commerce Commission. William N. Feinstein & Co. v. United States, 209 F.Supp. 613 (S.D. N.Y.1962). The Commission's decision found that certain charges exacted from plaintiff's assignor by the New York Central Railroad f......
-
Wichita Board of Trade v. United States, Civ. A. No. W-4730.
...to explain its departure from prior norms and its legal basis for doing so. See also William N. Feinstein & Company v. United States, 209 F.Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y.1962); National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. United States, 321 F.Supp. 500 (S.D.N. Y.1970). The same reasoning appli......
-
Livingston v. McLeod
...of this kind be held "forthwith". Ibid, p. 626; see, generally, Ewing v. Mytinger and Casselberry, supra, at p. 600, 70 S.Ct. at p. 873. 209 F. Supp. 613 Nor can I say, on the basis of the facts as recited above, which are not in dispute, that the Regional Director was unwarranted in findin......