McDaniel v. Gulf & South American Steamship Co.

• Decision Date: 21 December 1955
• Docket Number: No. 15306.,15306.
• Citation: 1956 AMC 105,228 F.2d 189
• Parties: Louis McDANIEL, Libellant, Appellant, v. GULF and SOUTH AMERICAN STEAMSHIP COMPANY, Inc., Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

1956 AMC 105, 228 F.2d 189 (1955)

Louis McDANIEL, Libellant, Appellant, v. GULF and SOUTH AMERICAN STEAMSHIP COMPANY, Inc., Appellee.

No. 15306.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

December 21, 1955.

Arthur J. Mandell, Houston, Tex., Mandell & Wright, Houston, Tex., for appellant.

M. L. Cook, Houston, Tex., Royston & Rayzor, Houston, Tex., Terriberry, Young, Rault & Carroll, New Orleans, La., of counsel, for appellee.

Before TUTTLE, CAMERON and JONES, Circuit Judges.

CAMERON, Circuit Judge.

On the ground of laches set forth in exceptions filed by the respondent-appellee, the appellant's amended libel was dismissed by the District Court. The question for our determination on this appeal is whether laches was so apparent on the face of that libel as to justify dismissal of the suit on exceptions without a hearing on the merits.

The libellant-appellant averred that, on February 13, 1949, he sustained injuries while he was an employee of the Texas Star Stevedoring Company and engaged in loading or unloading the SS Gulf Merchant, a vessel owned and operated by appellee. He asserted that five 100 pound pallets, being carried by one of the ship's winches, fell upon him as the result of specified negligence of appellee and while he was performing his appointed duties in one of the ship's holds, striking appellant and inflicting on him extensive injuries. These included a skull fracture with severe brain-concussion and fractures of the hip, the femur and the ankle. The libel was not filed until July 15, 1953, and appellant recognized the disposition of District Courts, sitting in admiralty and determining whether laches had barred recovery, to adopt by analogy state statutes of limitation governing actions at law for damages (here, the Texas Two-Year Statute, Vernon's Ann. Civ.St.Tex. art. 5526). He claimed, however, that his failure to bring the suit more promptly was excusable, being due to circumstances beyond his control occasioned by the disabling injuries affecting his mind and impairing his faculties generally and resulting from appellee's negligence.

Appellant further averred in his libel that, as the result of his injuries, he remained continuously in a hospital for five months during the initial two weeks of which he was unconscious; that by reason of the skull fracture, he suffered hemorrhages in the membranes covering his brain with organic brain changes and cerebral contusions which left permanent damage to his brain producing defective memory, emotional instability, incapacity to reason coherently including a total inability to recall or relate any of the facts or circumstances surrounding his injuries. There had been a series of operations through the years and appellant had been under the care and treatment of neurologists and psychiatrists, but he had nevertheless "been unable and still is unable to manage his affairs", and his mental condition had throughout been such "that he could not have exercised any greater diligence than he did to seek redress in this case"; and that appellant "did exercise as much diligence as he was capable of", and that the "condition which prevented him from acting sooner than he did was caused and brought on by the negligence of the respondent * * *".

The libel further asserted that "no prejudice to the respondent has ensued from the mere passage of time", and that he should not be barred from recovery "where no prejudice to the respondent has ensued as in this instance under the facts and circumstances in this case * * *."

In its opinion sustaining appellee's exceptions and dismissing the suit without a hearing, the District Court found from certain medical reports attached as exhibits to the libel that appellant had commenced light work in a garage about December, 1950, from which fact it concluded that he was physically and mentally able to bring his suit on that date and thereafter. The Court found that, even if this was not so, the medical reports of March 16th and May 13th, 1953 indicated that appellant was able to work and was actually working, from which the conclusion was reached that appellant was certainly able to file his libel from two to four months before it was actually filed. The exhibits to which the Court below referred were largely copies of letters written by various physicians to an insurance company in connection with a claim which had been made by appellant under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq. The decision of the Court below is based upon those letters with but scant mention being made of the averments of the libel itself.

We are unable to agree with the conclusion reached by the Court below. In considering whether the exceptions would warrant dismissal, it was the duty of the Court to accept as true the well pleaded averments of the libel, cf. Art Metal Construction Co. v. Lehigh Structural Steel Co., 3 Cir., 1940, 116 F.2d 57, and Taylor v. Crain, 3 Cir., 1952, 195 F. 2d 163. Under those averments, as outlined above and as supplemented by the statements exhibited with it, we think it was error for the Court below to dismiss the libel without hearing the case on the merits. It may be that appellant can supplement the expert testimony by that of lay witnesses so as to establish the truth of what has been averred in the libel. Under those averments laches would not bar a recovery by appellant for the serious injuries sustained by him.

Courts of admiralty which act upon principles of equity¹ are not bound by the applicable statutory limitations governing the bringing of actions at law in local courts to make a mechanical application of such statutes but, by analogy, they will generally be guided by such statutory periods.² The lapse or non-lapse of the statutory period of limitations is not, of itself, decisive, but is only one of various factors to be taken into consideration by the court. No arbitrary or fixed period of time will be established as an inflexible rule, but the delay which will defeat such a suit must, in every case, depend on the peculiar equitable circumstances of that case. Even though the statutory period of limitations has elapsed, a claim will not be held to be barred by laches where there has been no inexcusable delay in seeking a remedy and no prejudice to the respondent has ensued from the mere passage of time. An inexcusable delay causing prejudice to the other party must be found to exist in order to establish laches as a valid defense.³

The existence of laches is a question of fact to be decided by the court after weighing the equities as they appear from the facts of each case.⁴ The facts to be considered here are those appearing from the averments of the libel as supplemented but not limited by the statements exhibited therewith. The holding of this Court in United States v. Alex Dussel Iron Works, 5 Cir., 1929, 31 F.2d 535, 537, is...