Chicago River & Indiana R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Rail. T.

Decision Date05 March 1956
Docket NumberNo. 11474.,11474.
Citation229 F.2d 926
PartiesThe CHICAGO RIVER AND INDIANA RAILROAD COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN et al., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

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Walter J. Cummings, Jr., Marvin A. Jersild, Chicago, Ill., Kenneth F. Burgess, Wayne M. Hoffman, William K. Bachelder, Chicago, Ill., Sidley, Austin, Burgess & Smith, Chicago, Ill., of counsel, for appellants.

Edward B. Henslee, William C. Wines, Martin K. Henslee, John J. Naughton, Chicago, Ill., for appellees.

Before FINNEGAN, LINDLEY and SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judges.

SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judge.

By amended complaint the Chicago River and Indiana Railroad Company1 and 27 other railroads prayed for an injunction to restrain the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen2 from calling a threatened strike against the River Road. Trainmen's counsel state that the purpose of said strike is to settle 21 grievances and claims through collective bargaining rather than by an award of the National Railroad Adjustment Board.3 The district court granted a restraining order which was later dissolved when the court decided that the Norris-LaGuardia act was applicable and, therefore, it lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief sought. It dismissed the cause. The court subsequently granted an injunction pending the determination of this appeal, which was taken from the judgment of dismissal.

The grievances of the employees involved are 19 claims for additional compensation, 1 claim for reinstatement to a higher position, and 1 claim for reinstatement to the employ of the River Road. Each of these claims was presented to the railroad superintendent who handles such cases. Each was appealed to the highest railroad officer designated to handle claims under § 3, First (i) of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 153, First (i), and was denied by him.

The amended complaint charges that this strike would halt the operations of all trains into and out of the Chicago Stockyards, force the River Road to lay off 1,100 employees, who would lose in excess of $12,000 a day in wages, cost the company thousands of dollars a day, and require the embargo of all shipments into and out of the Stockyards, causing irreparable damage to the 27 railroads (the other plaintiffs) and the 600 industries served. The Trainmen's answer alleges that they do not have sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of these charges and, therefore, they deny the same. The amended complaint was dismissed without the taking of evidence.

The amended complaint and the answer show that the River Road, on July 15, 1954, submitted to the Board the claims in dispute and the Board has not yet rendered a decision on any of them.

The first contested issue herein, as stated by the Trainmen, is: "Does the Railway Labor Act prohibit a union from striking over claims and grievances, matters which are within the jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjustment Board?" Plaintiffs say that it is mandatory under the Railway Labor Act that minor disputes4 be adjusted instead of being made the subject of a strike. They contend that such command must be enforced, even though the act itself does not provide enforcement machinery, and that an injunction is appropriate to this end. The Trainmen contend that the Railway Labor Act does not prohibit a union from striking over claims and grievances though such matters are within the jurisdiction of the Board. Their answer avers that the effect of the strike, if successful, would be settlement of said disputes through collective bargaining instead of by award of the Board.

1(a). The Railway Labor Act of 1926, as amended in 1934,5 expressly states its purposes,6 the first of which is "To avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein;" and the fifth of which is "to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of grievances * * *."

The difference between disputes over grievances and disputes concerning the making of collective agreements is traditional in railway labor affairs. It has assumed large importance in the Railway Labor Act of 1934, substantively and procedurally. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, at page 722, 65 S.Ct. 1282, at page 1289, 89 L.Ed. 1886. As to disputes over grievances, the act contemplates the existence of a collective agreement already concluded or, at any rate, a situation in which no effort is made to bring about a formal change in terms or to create a new one. Such a dispute relates either to the meaning or proper application of a particular provision with reference to a specific situation or to an omitted case. So-called minor disputes, involving grievances, the 1934 act sets apart from major disputes and provides for them very different treatment. The court said, 325 U.S. 724, 65 S.Ct. 1290:

"The Act treats the two types of dispute alike in requiring negotiation as the first step toward settlement and therefore in contemplating voluntary action for both at this stage, in the sense that agreement is sought and cannot be compelled. To induce agreement, however, the duty to negotiate is imposed for both grievances and major disputes.
"Beyond the initial stages of negotiation and conference, however, the procedures diverge. `Major disputes\' go first to mediation under the auspices of the National Mediation Board; if that fails, then to acceptance or rejection of arbitration, cf. § 7; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R. Co., 321 U.S. 50, 64 S.Ct. 413, 88 L.Ed. 534; and finally to possible presidential intervention to secure adjustment. § 10. For their settlement the statutory scheme retains throughout the traditional voluntary processes of negotiation, mediation, voluntary arbitration, and conciliation. Every facility for bringing about agreement is provided and pressures for mobilizing public opinion are applied. The parties are required to submit to the successive procedures designed to induce agreement. § 5, First (b). But compulsions go only to insure that those procedures are exhausted before resort can be had to self-help. No authority is empowered to decide the dispute and no such power is intended, unless the parties themselves agree to arbitration.
"The course prescribed for the settlement of grievances is very different beyond the initial stage. Thereafter the Act does not leave the parties wholly free, at their own will, to agree or not to agree. On the contrary, one of the main purposes of the 1934 amendments was to provide a more effective process of settlement.
"Prior to 1934 the parties were free at all times to go to court to settle these disputes. * * * Several organizations took strike ballots and thus threatened to interrupt traffic, a factor which among others induced the Coordinator of Transportation to become the principal author and advocate of the amendments. The sponsor in the House insisted that Congress act upon them before adjournment for fear that if no action were taken a railroad crisis might take place. * * * the Adjustment Board was created and given power to decide them."

The court then said, 325 U.S. 727, 65 S. Ct. 1291:

"The procedure adopted is not one of mediation and conciliation only, like that provided for major disputes under the auspices of the Mediation Board. Another tribunal of very different character is established with `jurisdiction\' to determine grievances and make awards concerning them. Each party to the dispute may submit it for decision, whether or not the other is willing, provided he has himself discharged the initial duty of negotiation. § 3, First (i). Rights of notice, hearing, and participation or representation are given. § 3, First (j). In some instances judicial review and enforcement of awards are expressly provided or are contemplated. § 3, First (p); cf. § 3, First (m). When this is not done, the Act purports to make the Board\'s decisions `final and binding.\' § 3, First (m)."

The procedure prior to 1934 was in fact and effect nothing more than one for voluntary arbitration. No dispute could be settled unless submitted by agreement of all parties. The Board was created to remove the settlement of grievances from this stagnating process and bring them within a general and inclusive plan of decision. The aim was not to dispense with agreement. It was to add decision where agreement fails and thus to safeguard the public as well as private interests against the harmful effects of the preexisting scheme. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, supra, 325 U.S. 727, 65 S.Ct. 1292.

At a hearing before a senate committee on the bill for the 1934 amendments, the Railroad Brotherhoods' representative, Mr. Harrison, stated:

"`These railway labor organizations have always opposed compulsory determination of their controversies. We have lived a long time and got a lot of experience, and we know that these minor cases that develop out of contracts that we make freely, and * * * we are now ready to concede that we can risk having our grievances go to a board and get them determined, and that is a contribution that these organizations are willing to make\'". 325 U. S. 728, note 24, 65 S.Ct. 1292.

As to major disputes, the act requires the parties to submit to the successive procedures designed to induce agreement. § 5, First (b). But compulsions go only to insure that those procedures are exhausted before resort can be had to self-help. That means, that as to disputes over the formation of collective agreements or efforts to secure or change them, the issue not being whether an existing agreement controls the controversy, the act recognizes the right of employees to strike, but postpones such action until the successive procedures set up by the act have been exhausted. No authority is empowered to decide this dispute, unless the parties agree...

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10 cases
  • Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River Indiana Railroad Company
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • March 25, 1957
    ...applicable and that the court lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief requested. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. 229 F.2d 926. A permanent injunc- tion was accordingly entered by the District Court and affirmed by the Seventh Circuit. We granted certiorari in order to......
  • FLIGHT ENGINEERS'INTER. ASS'N v. American Airlines, Inc.
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    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
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    ...an injunction against a strike (reversed earlier by us, 229 F.2d 901), but substantially approved in a parallel case from the 7th Circuit, 229 F.2d 926, in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., 1957, 353 U.S. 30, 33, n. 3, 77 S.Ct. 635, 1 L.Ed.2d 4 The Airline ......
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    ...of Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 89 L.Ed. 1886 and Chicago River & Indiana Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 7 Cir., 229 F.2d 926. Plaintiff may, within ten days, lodge with the Court findings of fact and conclusions of law drawn......
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    ...Railway Labor Act issuance of the Injunction was right and proper. In this connection we refer to Chicago River & Indiana Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 7 Cir., 229 F.2d 926. Here the dispute was over 19 pay claims and 2 claims for reinstatement. The parties conceded the ......
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