Superior Auto Body & Tow, Inc. v. Yeager

• Decision Date: 02 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. DA 13–0859.,DA 13–0859.
• Citation: 353 P.3d 507 (Table),379 Mont. 536
• Parties: SUPERIOR AUTO BODY AND TOW, INC., Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Michael YEAGER, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

379 Mont. 536
353 P.3d 507 (Table)

SUPERIOR AUTO BODY AND TOW, INC., Plaintiff and Appellee
v.
Michael YEAGER, Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 13–0859.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs March 18, 2015.
Decided June 2, 2015.

For Appellant: Michael Yeager (self-represented); Great Falls, Montana.

For Appellee: Mark F. Higgins, Andrew T. Newcomer, Ugrin, Alexander, Zadick & Higgins, P.C.; Great Falls, Montana.

For Amicus Curiae Montana Tow Truck Association, LTD: John M. Semmens, Jackson, Murdo & Grant, P.C.; Helena, Montana.

Opinion

Justice JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by unpublished opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶ 2 Michael Yeager appeals the judgment of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, which ordered the Cascade County Sheriff to sell Yeager's 2003 Aston Martin Vanquish to satisfy a $9,766 debt owed by Yeager to Superior Auto Body (Superior) for storage of the car. We affirm.

¶ 3 On February 12, 2009, Yeager brought his totaled 2003 Aston Martin Vanquish to Superior with the intent of having Superior repair it. The car was delivered near closing time. In order to unload the car, Superior had to rent a front end-loader and keep four or five employees past closing. Superior incurred $750 in expenses unloading the car. The car was placed in Superior's heated garage.

¶ 4 Throughout 2009, Yeager stopped by Superior every few months, and advised that he was looking for parts for the car. In May 2009, Superior told Yeager that it had a list of parts needed to restore the car but Yeager would have to pay up front if he wanted Superior to order the parts. Superior repeatedly advised Yeager that it needed to begin working on the project soon, or Superior would charge him storage fees. Eventually, Yeager stopped coming into the shop. Superior called Yeager and sent him certified letters, but could not get in contact with him. On July 6, 2012, Superior sent Yeager a bill for storage fees by certified mail which came back undelivered.

¶ 5 In January 2013, Superior began remodeling its shop, and Yeager's car was moved outside to complete the remodeling. Superior covered the car with foam, blankets, and a tarp to protect it from possible hail damage. Yeager came back into the shop in April 2013, and he was advised that he needed to authorize repairs or remove the car and pay storage fees. On August 13, 2013, Superior sent Yeager a second bill, at Yeager's request, which itemized $14,366 worth of storage fees and labor expenses. Yeager testified that he sent Superior $350, the amount he believed the initial unloading of the car was worth, but he paid no other portion of the bill.

¶ 6 On September 25, 2013, Superior filed a lien enforcement action in the District Court, asking that the car be sold at a sheriff's sale to satisfy the debt owed to Superior pursuant to § 71–3–1201, MCA. A show-cause hearing was held on October 29, 2013, and continued until November 26, 2013. At the conclusion of the November 26, 2013 hearing, the District Court ruled that Yeager owed Superior $9,766 in storage fees and labor expenses. Yeager was allowed one week to satisfy the debt and remove the vehicle from Superior's property to prevent the sale. Yeager paid Superior $9,766 and reclaimed the car. Superior filed a satisfaction of judgment on January 2, 2014. Yeager appeals.

¶ 7 We review a district court's conclusions of law to determine whether they are correct. We review a district court's findings of fact to determine whether they are clearly erroneous. A finding of fact may be clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial evidence in the record, if the district court misapprehended the evidence, or when our review of the record leaves this Court with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. State v. Pound, 2014 MT 143, ¶ 18, 375 Mont. 241, 326 P.3d 422.

¶ 8 Montana's agister's lien statute, § 71–3–1201(2)(a), MCA, provides in pertinent part:

A person who, while lawfully in possession of an article of personal property, renders any service to the owner or lawful claimant of the article by labor or skill employed for the ... storage of the article or tows or stores the article as directed under authority of law has a special lien on the article.

Section 71–3–1201(2)(a), MCA (emphasis added). The statute specifically addresses expenses for towing and storage: “If the service is towing or storage, the lien is for the reasonable cost of the towing or storage.” Section 71–3–1201(2)(a), MCA. The statute expressly applies to motor vehicles. Section 71–3–1201(2)(b), MCA.

¶ 9 A contract,...