Anderson v. Colorado

Decision Date24 August 2012
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 10–cv–01005–RBJ–KMT.
Citation887 F.Supp.2d 1133
PartiesTroy ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. State of COLORADO, Department of Corrections, Susan Jones, in her official capacity as warden of the Colorado State Penitentiary, and Aristedes W. Zavaras, in his official capacity as the Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Colorado

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Amy Farr Robertson, Timothy Patrick Fox, Fox & Robertson, P.C., Brittany L. Glidden, Laura Lee Rovner, University of Denver–Sturm College Of Law, Denver, CO, for Plaintiff.

Christopher Wayne Alber, Jacquelynn Nichole Rich Fredericks, Colorado Attorney General's Office, Denver, CO, for Defendants.

Final Order and Judgment

R. BROOKE JACKSON, District Judge.

This case was tried to the Court between April 30 and May 8, 2012. The Court left the record open through May 25, 2012 so that the parties could address a new regulation, scheduled to be issued by the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC) shortly after the trial, that potentially would address some of the plaintiff's concerns. The Court now issues its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order of judgment.

FACTS

Troy Anderson has been an inmate in the CDOC all but three years since 1991. While serving his first sentence, he was placed in “administrative segregation” because, in his words, he became “very disruptive.” Administrative segregation is the most restrictive custody level imposed within the CDOC. It is not punitive segregation. Rather, it is reserved for inmates who are considered to be threats to prison employees, other inmates, or prison security. In 1993 the CDOC opened the Colorado State Penitentiary (“CSP”) in Canon City, Colorado. The CSP is Colorado's highest security “supermax” facility. Until recently, all inmates there were in administrative segregation. Mr. Anderson remained at the CSP until his release from prison in 1997.

In 2000 he was returned to prison, this time on an 83–year sentence with a parole eligibility date of June 5, 2041. Because he presently is 42 years of age, there is a good chance that he will spend the rest of his life in prison. Mr. Anderson was again assigned to the CSP and placed in administrative segregation, this time because his crimes included two shoot outs with police during escape attempts. He has remained in administrative segregation at the CSP since he returned.

In administrative segregation at the CSP, each offender is housed in a single cell approximately 90 square feet in size. Defendants' Exhibit 10 (diagram). The cell contains a metal bed, desk, toilet and three shelves. There is small vertical glass window that admits light but which, because of its placement in relation to the bed, desk and shelving, is difficult to access to look out. A light in the cell is left on 24 hours a day. The inmates' daily existence is one of extreme isolation. They remain in their cells at least 23 hours a day. The cells were designed in a manner that discourages and largely restricts vocal communication between cells. According to inmate David Bueno, he can hear other people yelling and screaming but not conversations. All meals are passed through a slot in the cell door to the inmate. The inmates have little human contact except with prison staff and limited opportunities for visitors, depending on the inmate's level of privileges as will be discussed later.

In theory the inmate is removed from his cell for about one to one and one-quarter hours five times each week. On these occasions the inmate is taken to an approximately 90 square foot, oddly shaped interior “recreation” room. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 348 (photographs). This room is empty except for a chin-up bar. It has two vertical “windows,” approximately five feet by six inches in size, which are not glassed but instead are covered with metal grates. The grates have holes approximately the size of a quarter that open to the outside. The inmate can see through the holes, can sometimes feel a breeze, and can sometimes feel the warmth of the sun. This is his only exposure of any kind to fresh air. After approximately 60 minutes in this room, the inmate is permitted to shower and then is returned to his cell. According to Mr. Anderson and other inmates who testified, in practice the number of opportunities to go to this “exercise” room is sometimes fewer because of lockdowns or other reasons, and missed times are not made up.

With the exception of approximately one month in 2001 when Mr. Anderson was taken to another CDOC facility for a mental health evaluation, and then his transportto and from the courthouse for his trial in this case, he has not been out of doors in 12 years. He has not, therefore, had any opportunity for outdoor exercise. Unless the inmate is able to earn his way out of administrative segregation, his stay in administrative segregation can be indefinite. At the present time there are nine offenders, including Mr. Anderson, who have been in administrative segregation at the CSP for more than 10 years.

Mr. Anderson does not request that he be removed from administrative segregation at this time. Like many prisoners in Colorado and elsewhere, Mr. Anderson suffers from mental illness. He does not believe that his mental illness has been properly treated, and he fears that until it is, he might be a danger to himself or others. Several CDOC employees likewise expressed the opinion that, at this time, he remains too much of a security risk to progress out of administrative segregation. Rather, Mr. Anderson and the team of lawyers representing him have tackled certain policies and procedures at the CSP that they contend have adversely affected his mental health and that have prevented him from taking advantage of the opportunities that the CSP provides to progress out of administrative segregation.

Mr. Anderson sued the CDOC; Susan Jones, the Warden of the CSP when the suit was filed; and Aristedes W. Zavaras, then the Executive Director of the CDOC. Ms. Jones and Mr. Zavaras are named in their official capacities, and because neither of those individuals presently holds those positions, the suit more properly is against the present holders of those positions. In any event, suits against prison officials in their official capacities are in substance suits against the CDOC.

The Complaint initially asserted six claims for relief. Claims One through Four named the two prison officials in their official capacities. Claims Five and Six named all defendants. The second claim has since been dismissed. The remaining claims, by claim number, assert (1) a due process violation arising from the use of an unfair system to evaluate Mr. Anderson's behavior for purposes of earning privileges and ultimately progressing out of administrative segregation; (3) cruel and unusual punishment in the form of inadequate mental health treatment; (4) cruel and unusual punishment by denial of any opportunity for outdoor exercise; (5) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., by denying him access to certain programs and benefits because of his mental health issues; and (6) violation of the section 504 of the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978 (Rehabilitation Act), 29 U.S.C. § 794, for the same reason.

Instead of treating these claims in that order, however, I will organize the remainder of this opinion around the three central targets of the Complaint; (1) denial of access to the out of doors and outdoor exercise; (2) mental health treatment; and (3) barriers to progression out of administrative segregation.

CONCLUSIONSI. OUTDOOR ACCESS AND EXERCISE.

Mr. Anderson contends that denial of any opportunity to be outside and to have outdoor exercise during the 12 years he has been held in administrative segregation constitutes cruel and unusual punishment contrary to the Eighth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. I agree.

The Eighth Amendment does not mandate comfortable prisons, but it does forbid inhumane conditions. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). If (1) treatmentof an inmate is, objectively, a “sufficiently serious” deprivation of rights, and (2) prison officials have, subjectively, a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” the Eighth Amendment has been violated. Id. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (internal citations omitted).

A. Was the deprivation “Sufficiently Serious”?

A prison condition is sufficiently serious if it denies the inmate “the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). This Court concludes that denial of any opportunity to be outdoors and to engage in some form of outdoor exercise for a period of 12 years is a serious deprivation of a human need, according to the evidence in this case and according to any reasonable concept of what constitute the civilized measure of life's necessities.

Plaintiff's medical expert Raymond Patterson, M.D., a psychiatrist who has spent much of his impressive career in and around prisons, and who frequently serves as a consultant and expert on prison conditions, testified that every prison he has visited except the CSP provides some opportunity for outdoor exercise, even to death row inmates. It is important, he believes, to a person's mental health. He is not alone. Eight clinical employees of the CDOC testified during this trial: Paula Frantz, M.D., a family and emergency medicine specialist who serves as the Chief Medical Officer for the CDOC; Darren Lish, M.D., the current Chief of Psychiatry for the CDOCV; Joan Koprivnikar, M.D., one of Mr. Anderson's former treating psychiatrists and the CDOC; and five psychologists, Drs. James Michaud (CDOC's current Mental Health Administrator); Peggy Steel, Vicky Tuakoi, Jill Lampela and Erin Lenocker....

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