887 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2018), 16-17484, Mickles v. Country Club Inc.
|Citation:||887 F.3d 1270, 27 Fla.L.Weekly Fed. C 811|
|Opinion Judge:||BLACK, Circuit Judge:|
|Party Name:||Andrea MICKLES, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Counter Defendant, Lauren Houston, Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellant, v. COUNTRY CLUB INC., d.b.a. Goldrush Showbar, Defendant-Counter Claimant-Appellee. Shana Mcallister, April Lemon, Plaintiffs-Appellants, Joy Richardson, Plaintiff,|
|Attorney:||Jamisen A. Etzel, Gary F. Lynch, Carlson Lynch Sweet & Kilpela, LLP, PITTSBURGH, PA, Anthony C. Lake, Gillen Withers & Lake, LLC, ATLANTA, GA, Thomas A. Withers, Gillen Withers & Lake, LLC, SAVANNAH, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellant. Dean Richard Fuchs, Stephen Whitfield Brown, Schulten Ward Turner & ...|
|Judge Panel:||Before WILSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges, and SCHLESINGER, District Judge.|
|Case Date:||April 18, 2018|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit|
As a matter of first impression, the Eleventh Circuit held that it was sufficient for an opt-in plaintiff to file a written consent pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 216(b), to confer party-plaintiff status. In this case, appellants were parties to the litigation upon filing consents and, absent a dismissal from the case, remained parties in the litigation. The court... (see full summary)
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-01189-SCJ
Jamisen A. Etzel, Gary F. Lynch, Carlson Lynch Sweet & Kilpela, LLP, PITTSBURGH, PA, Anthony C. Lake, Gillen Withers & Lake, LLC, ATLANTA, GA, Thomas A. Withers, Gillen Withers & Lake, LLC, SAVANNAH, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Dean Richard Fuchs, Stephen Whitfield Brown, Schulten Ward Turner & Weiss, LLP, ATLANTA, GA, for Defendant-Appellee.
William Grant Cromwell, Wasson Sours & Harris, ATLANTA, GA, Edwin J. Kilpela, Carlson Lynch Sweet & Kilpela, LLP, PITTSBURGH, PA, Benjamin J. Sweet, Del Sole Cavanaugh Stroyd, PITTSBURGH, PA, for Service.
Before WILSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges, and SCHLESINGER,[*] District Judge.
BLACK, Circuit Judge:
This case presents an issue of first impression regarding the status of opt-in plaintiffs in collective actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)— specifically, whether an opt-in plaintiff is required to do anything beyond filing a written consent to become a party plaintiff. See Hipp v. Liberty Natl Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1216 (11th Cir. 2001) (observing that a " plaintiff must affirmatively opt into a § 216(b) action by filing [her] written consent with the court in order to be considered a class member and be bound by the outcome of the action" ). We conclude that filing a written consent pursuant to § 216(b) is sufficient to confer party-plaintiff status.
In April 2014, Andrea Mickles1 filed a complaint against Country Club Inc., alleging she was proceeding on behalf of herself and all other similarly-situated employees in a collective action lawsuit under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Mickles alleged Country Club had improperly classified her and other employees as independent contractors and, as a result, failed to compensate
them at the minimum wage and for overtime work. Country Club answered the complaint and filed counterclaims against Mickles— and any plaintiff who joined the action— for money had and received, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract.
Other employees then opted into the litigation by filing consents to become party plaintiffs. On June 11, 2014, Lauren Houston filed a " Consent to Become a Party Plaintiff" with the court, stating she consented to sue as a plaintiff in the FLSA action. On August 26, 2014, Shana McAllister and April Lemon filed their " Consent[s] to Become ... Party Plaintiff[s]," also consenting to sue as plaintiffs in the FLSA action.2
Discovery began on August 22, 2014. Mickles and Country Club agreed that, per Northern District of Georgia Local Rule 7.1(A)(2), except as specifically provided, all " motions must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS after the beginning of discovery unless the filing party has obtained prior permission of the court to file later." The district court adopted this deadline in its Scheduling Order. All motions (absent a few exceptions) were required to be filed by September 22, 2014.3
Country Club took the depositions of Houston, McAllister, and Lemon during the discovery period. The district court twice extended the discovery period, which ultimately ended on April 6, 2015. On May 14, 2015, more than a month after the close of discovery, Mickles filed a motion for conditional certification of a collective action. She moved to certify the collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), citing the procedure outlined by this Court in Hipp . 252 F.3d at 1218.
On January 6, 2016, the district court denied the motion for conditional certification (conditional certification order) based on untimeliness, as the motion was filed " nearly eight months" past the deadline set by the local rules, and Mickles did not have " prior permission of the court" to file the motion after the deadline. The district court noted that the burden on a plaintiff seeking conditional certification is minimal, and Mickles was " well aware that there were other plaintiffs who were similarly situated and wished to opt-in before the deadline for filing the motion for conditional certification." The district court also rejected Mickles argument that granting the motion for conditional certification would serve the interests of judicial economy, " as it would allow other potential plaintiffs to join this action, rather than forcing the plaintiffs to file separate actions." The court stated " [i]t is, indeed, unfortunate that needless costs may result as a consequence of Plaintiffs failure to file her Motion in a timely manner," but noted costs would also result if discovery were reopened. The district court decided " the best course of action is to enforce the deadline, and thus to deny Plaintiffs motion as untimely." The court concluded, " [f]or the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Motion for Conditional Collective Action Certification ... is DENIED." The conditional certification order made no mention of dismissing Houston, McAllister, and Lemon from the litigation.
On October 6, 2016, Country Club filed a motion for clarification of the district
courts conditional certification order, inquiring about which individual plaintiffs remained parties in the action. Mickles, Houston, McAllister, and Lemon each believed they were party plaintiffs in the action because the district court never dismissed their claims. Country Club believed Houston, McAllister, and Lemon never formally became party plaintiffs, and that they effectively fell out of the case when the motion for conditional certification was denied, leaving only Mickles as a party plaintiff. Mickles, Houston, McAllister, and Lemon responded, agreeing that clarification was necessary, but they disagreed that the denial of the motion for conditional certification caused Houston, McAllister, and Lemon to be automatically dismissed from the case. On October 17, 2016, the district court granted the motion for clarification (clarification order), stating that Houston, McAllister, and Lemon were never adjudicated to be similarly situated to Mickles, and, therefore, were never properly added as party plaintiffs to the collective action.
On October 31, 2016, Country Club notified the district court that it had reached a settlement with Mickles. Mickles and Country Club filed a motion to approve the settlement, which resolved both the substantive claims and the counterclaims. On December 5, 2016, the district court approved the settlement. Houston, McAllister, and Lemon filed a notice of appeal, specifying that they were appealing the district courts (1) conditional certification order, (2) clarification order, and (3) order approving the settlement.
As an initial matter, we must determine whether Houston, McAllister, and Lemon (collectively, Appellants) have appellate standing. We issued a jurisdictional question to the parties, asking them to address: (1) whether Appellants were considered parties such that they had a right to appeal; and (2) if so, whether their appeal was timely as to the orders that foreclosed their rights to participate in the litigation. We hold we have jurisdiction to entertain Appellants appeal, as they (1) are parties to the litigation, and (2) timely appealed the final judgment in the case.4
1. Whether Appellants were parties to the litigation
The standing question is intertwined with the primary merits issue in this case, specifically: whether the district court erred in...
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