State v. Chute, A15–2053.

• Decision Date: 21 November 2016
• Docket Number: No. A15–2053.,A15–2053.
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Quentin Todd CHUTE, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

887 N.W.2d 834

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,

v.Quentin Todd CHUTE, Appellant.

No. A15–2053.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Nov. 21, 2016.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, and John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, MN, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.

Considered and decided by CLEARY, Chief Judge; WORKE, Judge; and ROSS, Judge.

OPINION

CLEARY, Chief Judge.

Appellant Quentin Todd Chute challenges his conviction for receiving stolen property. Appellant argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless search of his property, by denying his motion to dismiss for violation of his speedy-trial right, and by holding that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

FACTS

On October 22, 2011, B.W.F. called the police to report that he located the camper that he had reported stolen in July 2011. An officer met B.W.F. near a residential property on County Road D in Maplewood. The property had two driveways. The first was at least partially asphalt and led to a garage, and the second was dirt and appeared to be used by cars carrying persons seeking a backdoor entrance to the house and garage. B.W.F. pointed out his camper to the officer from a location on County Road D at the end of the dirt driveway. The officer confirmed that the make and model of the camper matched those of the camper that B.W.F. had reported stolen.

The officer parked his squad in the dirt driveway and walked with B.W.F. down the driveway toward the camper. Before arriving at the camper, B.W.F. told the officer that he had repaired the front of the camper, leaving a unique set of bolts. These bolts were visible from the dirt driveway. At a spot on the driveway next to the camper, the officer could determine that its license plate was removed. The camper's vehicle identification number (VIN) was also removed. The officer called the camper's manufacturer to determine if the VIN was stamped in another location, learned that a partial VIN was stamped on the metal frame, and located the partial VIN, which matched the VIN of the camper stolen from B.W.F. The officer went into the camper and located an item of personal property belonging to B.W.F.

The officer heard a noise coming from the garage, walked to the garage door, and knocked. Appellant answered and identified himself as the property owner. When the officer asked appellant if he owned the camper, appellant said he was storing it for a friend. Appellant consented to the officer's request to search the garage. After finding personal property from the camper in the garage, the officer asked appellant for permission to search the basement and house. Appellant consented, and additional items of personal property from the camper were found in the basement and house.

The State of Minnesota charged appellant with receiving stolen property. Appellant moved to suppress all evidence obtained by police as a result of the warrantless search and to dismiss for violation of his speedy-trial right. The district court denied appellant's suppression motion, holding that the officer's warrantless search of the camper was permissible under the plain-view doctrine and that appellant consented to the searches of his garage, basement, and house. The district court also denied appellant's motion to dismiss for violation of his speedy-trial right. After a trial, the jury found appellant guilty of receiving stolen property. Appellant filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction. The district court denied appellant's motion. This appeal followed.

ISSUES

I. Did the district court err by denying appellant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless search of his property?

II. Did the district court err by denying appellant's motion to dismiss for denial of his right to a speedy trial?

III. Did the district court err by holding that the evidence was sufficient to convict appellant of receiving stolen property?

ANALYSIS

I.

Appellant argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence that police obtained from the warrantless search of his property. “When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress, we review a court's factual findings under our clearly erroneous standard” and its “legal determinations, including a determination of probable cause, de novo.” State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Minn.2012) (citation omitted). A factual finding is clearly erroneous if it lacks evidentiary support in the record, if it was induced by an erroneous view of the law, or if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. State v. Roberts, 876 N.W.2d 863, 868 (Minn.2016).

The United States Constitution guarantees the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A warrantless seizure is presumptively unreasonable unless an exception applies. Milton, 821 N.W.2d at 798.

A.

The district court found that the officer's actions with respect to the camper were permissible under the Fourth Amendment, because the plain-view doctrine was satisfied. Under the plain-view doctrine, police may seize an object that they believe to be the fruit or instrumentality of a crime without a warrant if (1) the object's incriminating nature is immediately apparent; (2) the police are legitimately in the position from which they view the object; and (3) the police have a lawful right of access to the object. Id. at 799.

To seize an item under the plain-view doctrine, the police must have probable cause to believe the item seized is of an incriminating nature. State v. Holland, 865 N.W.2d 666, 671 (Minn.2015). “Police have probable cause to seize an object in plain view if the facts available to the officer would warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that certain items may be ... useful as evidence of crime.” Id. (quotation omitted). To determine whether an object may be useful as evidence of a crime, an officer may consider background information that casts light on the nature of the object. Id. at 672.

Appellant argues that the camper's incriminating nature became immediately apparent only after the officer and B.W.F. saw the bolts on the camper from his dirt driveway. Respondent contends that the plain-view doctrine was satisfied when the officer and B.W.F. viewed the camper from County Road D. While on County Road D, B.W.F. pointed out the camper to the officer. The record suggests that the officer, from a position on County Road D, confirmed that the make and model of the camper on appellant's property matched those of the camper that B.W.F. reported stolen. But these facts were insufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the camper might be evidence of a crime. The district court's analysis supports this conclusion, as it determined “that the unique bolts on the camper were visible from the driveway, and after seeing the bolts, it was immediately apparent that the camper was the one stolen from B.W.F.” The camper's incriminating nature became immediately apparent only after the officer and B.W.F. entered appellant's dirt driveway.

Next, we must determine whether the officer's position on the dirt driveway was lawful. Appellant argues that the driveway is curtilage and that the officer had no right to be present on it for the purpose of examining the camper. Respondent argues that the officer was legitimately present on the driveway, as the driveway is beyond the curtilage or, alternatively, impliedly open to the public.

“Although the Fourth Amendment refers only to ‘persons, houses, papers and effects,’ courts generally have held that it applies also to the ‘curtilage.’ ” State v. Crea, 305 Minn. 342, 345, 233 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Minn.1975). The curtilage is an area immediately and intimately connected to the home, such that a resident has a reasonable expectation of privacy in it. Florida v. Jardines, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1414–15, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013) ; Milton, 821 N.W.2d at 799 ; Garza v. State, 632 N.W.2d 633, 639 (Minn.2001). The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that the driveway to a house is within a home's curtilage. State v. Lewis, 270 N.W.2d 891, 897 (Minn.1978) ; Crea, 305 Minn. at 346, 233 N.W.2d at 739. In Crea, the court recognized that police officers entered the curtilage when they walked onto the property's driveway. Crea, 305 Minn. at 346, 233 N.W.2d at 739. In Lewis, the court held, “the driveway to a house is part of its curtilage for purposes of executing a search warrant.” Lewis, 270 N.W.2d at 897. By entering appellant's dirt driveway, the officer and B.W.F. entered the curtilage of appellant's home.

Generally, police may not search the curtilage without a warrant. Milton, 821 N.W.2d at 799. However, police with legitimate business may enter areas within the curtilage of the home if those areas are impliedly open to the public. Crea, 305 Minn. at 346, 233 N.W.2d at 739. The impliedly-open exception permits police to “walk on the sidewalk and onto the porch of a house and knock on the door if they are conducting an investigation and want to question the owner.” Id. “[I]n such a situation the police are free to keep their eyes open and use their other senses.” Id.

The district court cited State v. Krech, 403 N.W.2d 634 (Minn.1987), for the proposition that “police do not need a warrant or even probable cause to approach a dwelling in order to conduct an investigation if they restrict their movements to places visitors could be expected to go (e.g. walkways, driveways, porches)” and concluded that the officer had a legitimate right to be on appellant's...