Crosby S. Gage & Valve Co. v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore
| Decision Date | 04 October 1943 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2267. |
| Parties | CROSBY STEAM GAGE & VALVE CO. v. MANNING, MAXWELL & MOORE, Inc. (UNITED STATES, Intervener). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Harrison F. Lyman, of Boston, Mass. (Fish, Richardson & Neave, of Boston, Mass., of counsel), for plaintiff, and opposing the motion.
Frederick A. Tennant and Nathan Heard, both of Boston, Mass., for defendant.
Samuel E. Darby, Jr., of New York City, Tom C. Clark, Asst. Atty. Gen., Samuel S. Isseks, Sp. Asst. to Atty. Gen., Melville C. Williams, Sp. Atty., of New York City, and Edmond J. Ford, Sp. Asst. to Atty. Gen., for the United States.
Seymour D. Lewis, Sp. Atty., of Washington, D. C. (Wendell Berge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ernest S. Meyers, Sp. Asst. to Atty. Gen., and Francis R. Shields, Sp. Atty., of New York City, on the brief), for the United States, for the motion to intervene.
This is a motion by the Government to intervene in a patent litigation between two private parties. It raises a significant procedural question.
Plaintiff's complaint is to this effect: As the owner of certain patents on valves, it entered into a license agreement with a third party to which the defendant succeeded. Under that agreement defendant is licensed to manufacture, sell and use the valves in the oil industry. Defendant is required by the agreement to pay royalties, make statements of royalties due and, what is now important, "not to sell * * * valves * * * at a price lower than the minimum price" set forth in a schedule. Defendant purported to terminate without just cause the agreement before its expiration date but continued to manufacture and sell the valves without accounting for or paying royalties. Plaintiff seeks specific performance of the agreement and an accounting.
Defendant's answer raises the defenses that it validly terminated the agreement, that the agreement violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, Act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7, 15 note, and that the patents were invalid.
The United States of America moves to intervene as a defendant. Its proposed answer sets forth that the license agreement violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in that it fixes prices of articles in interstate commerce and is part of a continuing conspiracy between plaintiff and defendant to restrain trade. Supporting the motion, counsel for the Government have informed the Court that if allowed to intervene, the Government would not ask for adjournments, would not delay the case, would take at most a few days to offer testimony, and would be chiefly concerned with directing the attention of the Court first to the operation of this and similar license contracts made by plaintiff, and second to the form of decree which the Government deems appropriate.
Defendant acquiesces in, but plaintiff opposes, the Government's motion.
It was conceded at the bar that under Rule 24 (b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, the Court has discretion to permit the intervention. This conclusion is implicit in the rulings made by Judges Healey, Leibell and Knight upon the Government's applications to intervene in the three cases of American Optical Co. v. New Jersey Optical Company, D.C.D.Mass.1943, 3 F.R.D. 169, General Electric Co. v. Hygrade Sylvania Corp., D.C.S.D.N.Y., 45 F.Supp. 714, and Woburn Degreasing Co. v. Spencer Kellogg & Sons, D.C.W.D.N.Y., 3 F.R.D. 7, although in each of those cases the application to intervene was denied. See also Securities and Exchange Commission v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 458-460, 60 S.Ct. 1044, 84 L. Ed. 1293; Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 638, 57 S.Ct. 904, 81 L.Ed. 1307, 109 A.L.R. 1319. And the real issue is whether, having discretion to permit intervention, the Court should exercise it favorably to the moving party.
It is easy enough to see what are the arguments against intervention where, as here, the intervenor merely underlines issues of law already raised by the primary parties. Additional parties always take additional time. Even if they have no witnesses of their own, they are the source of additional questions, objections, briefs, arguments, motions and the like which tend to make the proceeding a Donnybrook Fair. Where he...
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Ingebretsen v. Jackson Public School Dist.
...expeditiously by a brief amicus curiae and not by intervention. Bush, 740 F.2d at 359, quoting Crosby Steam Gage & Valve Co. v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 51 F.Supp. 972, 973 (D.Mass. 1943). Consequently, the court denies AFALC's motion for permissive intervention. AFALC will be allowe......
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...33 F.2d 617, reversed on other grounds, 1931, 283 U.S. 163, 51 S. Ct. 421, 75 L.Ed. 926; Crosby Steam Gage & Valve Co. v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., D.C.D.Mass.1943, 51 F.Supp. 972; Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 1942, 317 U.S. 173, 63 S.Ct. 172; United States v. Socony-V......
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...Donnybrook Fair" (Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., D.C., 207 F.Supp. 252 at 257 and Crosby S. Gage & Valve Co. v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, D.C., 51 F.Supp. 972 at 973)). But that was not the problem under consideration when Chief Judge Becker of this Court made his order......
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...briefs, arguments, motions and the like which tend to make the proceeding a Donnybrook Fair. Crosby Steam Gage & Valve Co. v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 51 F.Supp. 972, 973 (D.Mass.1943). Therefore, the court declines to allow full-scale intervention which will inevitably bring about d......