Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, etc.

• Decision Date: 27 July 1943
• Docket Number: No. 10278.,10278.
• Citation: 137 F.2d 176
• Parties: TENNESSEE COAL, IRON & R. CO. v. MUSCODA LOCAL NO. 123, ETC., et al. SLOSS-SHEFFIELD STEEL & IRON CO. v. SLOSS RED ORE LOCAL NO. 109, ETC., et al. REPUBLIC STEEL CORPORATION v. RAIMUND LOCAL NO. 121, ETC., et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

137 F.2d 176 (1943)

TENNESSEE COAL, IRON & R. CO. v. MUSCODA LOCAL NO. 123, ETC., et al. SLOSS-SHEFFIELD STEEL & IRON CO. v. SLOSS RED ORE LOCAL NO. 109, ETC., et al. REPUBLIC STEEL CORPORATION v. RAIMUND LOCAL NO. 121, ETC., et al.

No. 10278.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

July 27, 1943.

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Borden Burr, E. L. All, S. M. Bronaugh, and Bernard A. Monaghan, all of Birmingham, Ala., for appellants.

Crampton Harris and Ralph W. Quinn, both of Birmingham, Ala., and J. A. Lipscomb, of Bessemer, Ala., for appellees.

Irving J. Levy, Associate Solicitor, U. S. Dept. of Labor, and Bessie Margolin, Asst. Solicitor, U. S. Dept. of Labor, both of Washington, D. C., for appellee Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division.

Before SIBLEY, HOLMES, and McCORD, Circuit Judges.

HOLMES, Circuit Judge.

In the petition for a rehearing it is stated that the court's opinion in this case is far-reaching in its effect, extending to all iron-ore, limestone, and coal-mining employees in the United States, and "is of the greatest concern to millions of people and the general public". In the same petition it is argued that the facts upon which the court's conclusion was based "applied to only a few of the appellants' employees and never applied to a great many employees". Passing over the inconsistency of these statements, it is only necessary to say that if the facts on which our opinion is based apply only to a few of appellants' employees, then the law as we have declared it affects only those few, because the law arises out of the facts: Ex facto jus oritur.

The parties agreed below that, if the issue as to working time should be decided against appellants, the court should then determine whether or not the employees were entitled to recover and, if so, how much. In the absence of this agreement there was nothing to show that reference to a master for an accounting was necessary after the issue as to working time was finally adjudicated. A declaratory judgment is for the purpose of finally settling an actual controversy, and ordinarily should not be entered if it will not do so. We do not understand that appellants even now are objecting to the reference. They seem to think they have been cut off from presenting defenses to claims against them on the accounting; but in this they are in error except that the declaratory judgment herein as to what constitutes working time will be res judicata in any controversy that may arise between the same parties. In order to remove all doubt on this subject, it is ordered that our former opinion and judgment be amended by striking out the following: "that appellants have not compensated said employees for some of said working time."

The apparent confusion in which the appellants find themselves is doubtless caused by their failure to recall the nature of the actions that they themselves originally instituted. This appeal involves three separate civil actions that were consolidated for trial in the court below and disposed of by a single judgment. All of these suits were brought under the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act, which provides that in cases of actual controversy the courts of the United States shall have power to declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party petitioning therefor, and that such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and be reviewable as such.¹

This is a procedural statute that provides an additional remedy for use in cases of which the federal courts already have jurisdiction. It should be given a liberal construction and application.² A court may not arbitrarily refuse to exercise such jurisdiction in a proper case, but must decide the issue presented in accordance with the law and the evidence. The procedure is expressly provided for in number 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, and the technicalities of equity practice do not prevail therein. The courts are limited in their jurisdiction to cases of actual controversy of a justiciable nature, thus excluding an advisory decree.³

In the case before us both sides joined in the petition for a judicial declaration of the rights and legal relations of the parties, and no objection was made to a consolidation of the cases for trial or to the entry of a single judgment containing such declaration. On the contrary, at a pretrial hearing it was agreed by all of the parties that the primary issue in controversy was what constituted the working time that made up the workweek of employees within the meaning of Section 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. ß 207. The contention of each side was stated, and it was agreed that, if the court decided the above issue against appellants, it would then determine whether appellees were entitled to recover and, if so, how much. The rights of all parties were reserved to present their respective claims and defenses upon an accounting. From these and other agreements in the record,⁴ it appears that there is only one controverted issue before us at this time, which is what constitutes the working time of these underground oremining employees.

The objections to the majority opinion raised on the petition for rehearing may be subdivided, and stated under three heads, as follows:

(1) That the declaration is too narrow to cover all but a few of appellants' employees.

(2) That it is so restricted as to time as to include only the period extending from the date of the Act to the filing of suit.

(3) That this court erroneously declared the law as to when the working time of the employees began and ended.

As to the first objection, we have previously pointed out that the declaratory judgment is limited by the facts of the case. It is decisive of the exact controversy that appellants petitioned the court to determine and agreed was the primary issue to be decided. They asserted, and asked the court to say, that no part of the time spent by their underground employees in the bath house, or in going to and from the bath house, or to and from the portal, or to and from the man-loading station, or to and from their actual working places, constituted a part of the workweek under Section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act. We held, in substance, that no part of the time spent in going to and from the bath house, or in the bath house, or in going to and from the portal, was working time, but that the employment began at the time the employees were required to report and did report at the portal for departure underground, and ended upon their return thereto at the end of the shift, less the lunch period. If not required to report at any special time, as contended, then the compensatory employment should begin at the time of departure for the trip underground.

The second objection is that this court did not declare the rights and legal relations of the parties as they existed or may exist subsequent to the date suit was filed. There are no facts in the record to support a finding covering this period, and no finding thereon was made by the district court; but we were told at the hearing, and it is stated in one of the briefs, that after the filing of these suits wages were paid upon a portal-to-portal basis. We cannot enter advisory judgments upon hypothetical facts. The declaratory judgments procedure does not change the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial power. The courts are limited in their jurisdiction to cases of actual controversy of a justiciable nature.⁵ We have, therefore, decided the only actual controversy over which we have jurisdiction; and the plenary effect of the judgment as res judicata is ample protection for the future.

The third point stressed by appellants is that a mixed question of law and fact was submitted to the district court, in answer to which it incorrectly found the facts and erroneously declared the law. On appeal both contentions may be reduced to a single question of law, which is: Was the finding of fact of the court below as to working time clearly erroneous? In reviewing the decision of the trial court we are bound by Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that: "Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses."

Even where there is no dispute about the facts, if different reasonable inferences may fairly be drawn from the evidence, an appellate court is forbidden to disturb the findings based on such inferences unless they are clearly erroneous. That this dispute turns upon questions of fact does not withdraw it from judicial cognizance in an action for a declaratory judgment. "The legal consequences flow from the facts and it is the province of the courts to ascertain and find the facts in order to determine the legal consequences. That is everyday practice."⁶ The parties saw fit to submit the issues of fact to the court, without a jury, but this does not render indistinguishable the issues of law and fact. What constituted the workweek of these employees and how many hours they were suffered or permitted to work are questions of fact.

Upon reviewing the judgment as to the facts, an appellate court looks first to the findings of the court below, and then to the evidence in the record to ascertain whether or not those findings are clearly erroneous. The character of the controversy and the issue to be determined are the same as if this were merely an action by an employee for damages under Section 7 of the Act, viz: How many hours constituted his workweek or how long did his employer suffer or permit him to work? In its ultimate aspect this is a dispute over wages, only one element of which is in controversy: the working time, which is a factual quantity of wages just as the regular rate is a factual element of wages. These two factors...