Colony Coal & Coke Corporation v. Napier
| Decision Date | 22 June 1939 |
| Docket Number | No. 946.,946. |
| Citation | 28 F. Supp. 76 |
| Parties | COLONY COAL & COKE CORPORATION v. NAPIER et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
Jesse Morgan, of Hazard, Ky., for plaintiff.
Napier & Napier, of Hazard, Ky., for defendant Joe Napier.
James H. Jeffries, of Pineville, Ky., for defendants Ramoneda Bros.
The bill of complaint alleges that plaintiff is the owner of, has the legal title to, and is in the actual possession of, a described boundary of land located in Perry County, Kentucky, containing approximately 209 acres, which is valuable because of the timber growing and standing thereon and the coal and mineral deposits thereunder; "that the defendants have set up some kind of claim to said lands and the timber standing and growing thereon as well as the minerals thereunder, the exact nature of the claims of the defendants, this plaintiff does not know, but it here alleges and charges that the defendants are now preparing and threatening to forcibly enter upon said lands and cut and remove therefrom, the standing and growing timber thereon; for the purpose of cutting and removing said timber and manufacturing same they are threatening to construct haul roads, tram roads and other contrivances over and through its lands for the purpose of manufacturing and removing, hauling and transporting said timber thereover and therefrom and by their claims and threatened acts of trespass they have cast a cloud upon the title to said lands of the plaintiff and are thereby greatly harassing and annoying the plaintiff in the enjoyment and use of its said lands and timber growing thereon and the coals and minerals thereunder and the purposes for which it has held the same for several years."
The relief sought is an injunction restraining the defendants from committing the acts alleged to be threatened and from continuing the conduct charged.
An action of this nature (as distinguished from an action to quiet title under Section 11, Kentucky Statutes) is authorized by Section 2361 of the Statutes of Kentucky.
The provisions of Section 24 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 41, so far as material here, confer original jurisdiction upon the district courts of the United States in a suit of a civil nature "where the matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of $3,000" and "is between citizens of different States".
In respect to the matter in controversy and the value thereof, the bill alleges "that the acts and threatened acts and conduct of the defendants are such that it has greatly annoyed the plaintiff in the use and enjoyment of its said lands and casting a cloud upon its said title to said lands and therefore and thereby injuring the vendable value thereof very materially", and "that the matter in controversy herein exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum of Three Thousand ($3,000) Dollars".
Each of these allegations is traversed by answer, thereby imposing upon plaintiff the burden of establishing by proof the existence of this prerequisite to Federal jurisdiction.
The only evidence introduced by the plaintiff to support its allegations as to jurisdictional amount was the testimony of Mr. W. A. Hull, its land agent, who, after describing in a general way the nature and location of the land described in the bill, its relation to other properties owned by the plaintiff, and his experience for the past twenty four years in dealing with lands of this character in that territory, testified as follows:
"Q. 47-Now, then Mr. Hull, from the experience you have told the Court in the number of years you have been dealing with properties of this kind, say whether or not the 209 acres of land set forth in the bill in this case, being a part of this block of property that you have, and considering it in that relation, is it of the value of $3000.00 or more?
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The question is whether the value of the entire tract of land described in the petition is the proper standard by which to measure the value of "the matter in controversy" in this action.
The plaintiff relies upon authorities dealing with suits to quiet title where it was shown that the cloud to be removed affected the title as a whole. Woodside v. Ciceroni, 9 Cir., 93 F. 1; Lehigh Zinc & Iron Co. v. New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co., C.C., 43 F. 545; Frontera Transportation Co. v. Abaunza, 5 Cir., 271 F. 199; Greenfield v. United States Mortgage Co. of Scotland, C.C., 133 F. 784.
The rule applicable to such cases has been thus stated in a recent authority on Federal practice: "The value of the matter in controversy in a suit to quiet title or to remove a cloud therefrom would seem to be the difference between the value of the land without the cloud and the value with the cloud thereon." 1 Moore's Federal Practice, p. 527.
Except in a collateral or incidental aspect, this case is not a suit to quiet the plaintiff's title. The only specific relief sought is an injunction to prevent trespass upon and to restrain the assertion of a claim against the land, the nature and extent of which claim is undisclosed.
In an action to enjoin trespass, the result of which would be to destroy or impair the use and enjoyment of the plaintiff's land as a whole, it has been held that the amount in controversy is determined by the value of the land. Smith v. Bivens, C.C., 56 F. 352; Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Cunningham, C.C., 103 F. 708; In re Turner, C.C., 119 F. 231; Swan Island Club, Inc., v. Ansell, 4 Cir., 51 F.2d 337; Winola Lake & Land Co., Inc., v. Gorham, D.C., 13 F.Supp. 721. This is not at variance with the general rule that in a suit for an injunction, the amount involved for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of a Federal Court is the value of the right to be protected or the extent of the injury to be prevented. This rule has been applied in numerous cases and under varying circumstances.
In the case of Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light, Heat & Power Company, 239 U.S. 121, 36 S.Ct. 30, 32, 60 L.Ed. 174, the Court said: "We are unable to discern any sufficient ground for taking this case out of the rule applicable generally to suits for injunction to restrain a nuisance, a continuing trespass, or the like, viz., that the jurisdictional amount is to be tested by the value of the object to be gained by complainant." See, Hunt v. New York Cotton Exchange, 205 U.S. 322, ...
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...14A C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3702, at 41 (2nd ed. 1985); see also Colony Coal & Coke Corp. v. Napier, 28 F.Supp. 76 (D.Ky.1939). No cases have considered the precise issue of whether the amount in controversy is determined by the value of the trust ......
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