Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Co. v. Anthony

Decision Date22 November 1961
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 786.
Citation199 F. Supp. 286
PartiesLOUISIANA & ARKANSAS RAILWAY CO., Plaintiff, v. Nina N. ANTHONY and Graydon Anthony, Partners, d/b/a Graydon Anthony Lumber Company, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas

Hardin, Barton & Hardin, Fort Smith, Ark., for plaintiff.

Shaver, Tackett & Jones, Texarkana, Ark., for defendants.

JOHN E. MILLER, Chief Judge.

Statement

This is an action by the plaintiff, Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Company, a Delaware corporation, against defendants, Nina N. Anthony and Graydon Anthony, partners, d/b/a Graydon Anthony Lumber Company, seeking to recover the amount which it had paid in settlement of a claim asserted against it by one Herman Cloudy, under the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S. C.A. § 51 et seq., for which plaintiff claims the defendants are obligated to indemnify it.

The plaintiff in its complaint filed February 21, 1961, in addition to the usual allegations of corporate capacity and jurisdiction, alleged:

That on or about the 4th day of September 1941 the plaintiff and defendants entered into what is commonly referred to as an "Industry Track Agreement" for the construction of a 737-foot industrial spur to serve the defendants' lumber yard; that said contract contained provisions which fixed minimum clearances, liabilities of the parties, and indemnification of the railroad by the industry; that the same parties entered into a similar Industry Track Agreement on the 22nd day of May, 1957, by which the 737-foot industrial spur was extended an additional 185 feet.

That on the 15th day of May, 1959, at approximately 10:00 p. m., one of its trains was switching and coupling cars on the said industrial spur track, and that while engaged in the operation one Herman Cloudy, a brakeman employed by plaintiff and acting in the scope of his employment in the switching and coupling operation as such brakeman, was struck by an overhang of a shed and/or pole erected by the defendants in violation of the minimum clearances set forth in the Industry Track Agreements, which caused him to fall from the car on which he was riding into the path of its wheels, resulting in serious and permanent personal injuries to Cloudy.

That said Cloudy made a claim against it for the injuries sustained by him at the time and place above alleged under the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, under which the plaintiff did not have a meritorious defense, and would have been found liable to Cloudy for failure of its nondelegable duty to provide him with a safe place in which to work, even though the said Cloudy was injured as a direct result of the primary and active negligence of the defendants in violating the minimum clearance provisions of the Industry Track Agreements by erecting their loading shed and dock and allowing the same to remain in a close and dangerous proximity to the said industrial track.

That the plaintiff notified the defendants of the accident and injuries to Cloudy as well as his subsequent claim, and demanded that defendants assume liability for the payment of said claim on the ground that any negligence of plaintiff at said time and place with respect to said accident was secondary and passive in character, in that defendants' negligence in placing their loading shed in close and dangerous proximity to the spur track was the primary, active and direct cause of the accident and injuries suffered by Cloudy; that the defendants declined to accept responsibility for the handling and payment of said claim; that it entered into negotiations with Cloudy for the settlement of his claim, and that as a result of the negotiations Cloudy agreed to accept the sum of $35,700 in full and final settlement for such injuries. Under the terms of the settlement plaintiff also agreed to pay an additional sum of $2,018.50 due the Hempstead County Memorial Hospital for medical care rendered to Cloudy following the accident; that in addition thereto plaintiff expended approximately $1,500 as investigation and legal expenses in concluding the said Cloudy claim, making its expenses in connection with the handling and settlement of Cloudy's claim total $39,218.50. That at the time of concluding said settlement with said Cloudy and by agreement with defendants, plaintiff took a release from Cloudy, releasing the plaintiff and the defendants from any and all liability as a result of said accident, a true and correct copy of the release executed by Cloudy, marked Exhibit A, attached to and made a part of the complaint.

At the time of negotiating said settlement plaintiff again demanded that defendants admit their liability for said claim and pay the amounts above stated therefor, but defendants declined.

Plaintiff further alleged that the defendants were negligent in erecting their loading sheds in close and dangerous proximity to the industrial track; that defendants knew or by the exercise of ordinary care should have known that the loading sheds constituted a hazard and danger to plaintiff's employees engaged in switching operations at the time and place in question; that the defendants' negligence was a direct and proximate cause of the injuries suffered by Cloudy; and that the aforementioned negligence of the defendants was active, positive and primary and without which negligence said accident would not have occurred, and plaintiff would not have been exposed to litigation and liability to Cloudy. That the negligence, if any, of the plaintiff was passive, secondary and remote in character and that its liability to Cloudy for his said injuries arose solely under the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act; that plaintiff was not equally at fault with defendants and plaintiff is entitled to be indemnified by defendants for all loss and damages suffered by it as a result of the claim of Herman Cloudy.

The defendants, in their answer filed March 9, 1961, and in their amended answer filed September 11, 1961, admitted:

That the parties entered into the "Industry Track Agreement" of September 4, 1941, for the construction of 671 feet, rather than 737 feet of industrial track as alleged by plaintiff, and that the same parties entered into a supplement agreement during the year 1944 for the construction of an additional 66 feet of industrial track, thus making a total of 737 feet; that the 1944 agreement contained similar provisions as the agreement of 1941 between the parties; that the agreement dated May 22, 1957, which called for the construction of an additional 185 feet of industrial track contained similar provisions as the 1941 agreement with reference to clearance liability and indemnity, and served to supplement the 1941 agreement.

That Herman Cloudy was employed as a brakeman by the plaintiff and was injured at the time and date alleged by the plaintiff while engaged in the course of said employment. However, the defendants deny that Cloudy was struck by a shed or overhang of the roof located or maintained by them upon or near the track.

The defendants further admitted that plaintiff notified them of the accident, injuries and resulting claim of Herman Cloudy; that the plaintiff demanded that the defendants assume liability; that they declined to accept responsibility for liability, and that the plaintiff paid the sums as alleged in the settlement of Herman Cloudy's claim.

Defendants deny that they negligently constructed and maintained a loading shed upon or near the railway right of way, or that such shed caused or contributed to the cause of injuries sustained by Herman Cloudy, and that the plaintiff and Herman Cloudy were free of negligence.

The defendants alleged to the contrary that any conditions complained of on or about the railway right of way were well known to the plaintiff and its employee, Herman Cloudy, both of whom assumed any and all liability arising from the known surrounding conditions. In this connection, the defendants alleged that the involved shed was constructed and in existence prior to the location of the involved spur track.

The defendants admitted that the 1941 and 1944 Industrial Track Agreements were in full force and effect at the time Herman Cloudy was injured. However, as a further defense they denied that the provisions of either of the Industrial Track Agreements imposed liability upon defendants for injuries sustained through the negligence of the plaintiff, and they denied that plaintiff was relieved of liability for its negligence by the terms of the contract.

The cause was tried to the court without a jury on September 20 and 21, 1961. At the conclusion of the testimony the case was submitted, and the attorneys for the parties were requested to file written briefs and arguments in support of their respective contentions. The briefs and arguments have been received and considered, along with all the testimony and exhibits thereto, and the court now makes and files herein its findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated.

Findings of Fact
1.

The plaintiff, Louisiana and Arkansas Railway Company, is a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware with its principal place of business being in Shreveport, Louisiana.

The defendants, Nina N. and Graydon Anthony, are citizens of Arkansas and residents of Hope in Hempstead County, Arkansas, and are partners doing business under the name of Graydon Anthony Lumber Company, which has its principal place of business at Hope in Hempstead County, Arkansas.

The amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs.

2.

The parties entered into an agreement entitled "Industrial Track Agreement" on October 15, 1941, plaintiff being referred to as carrier and the defendants being referred to as shipper, in which the carrier agreed to construct a spur track 671 feet long and to serve the shipper's premises with...

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8 cases
  • Pickens-Bond Const. Co. v. North Little Rock Elec. Co.
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • November 9, 1970
    ...and Arkansas Railway Co., 316 F.2d 858 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830, 84 S.Ct. 74, 11 L.Ed.2d 61 (1963), aff'g 199 F.Supp. 286 (W.D.Ark.1961) (involving Arkansas contract and Arkansas law); 41 Am.Jur.2d 697, Indemnity § 13; 42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 8, p. 574. In construing a cont......
  • Anthony v. Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Company
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • April 30, 1963
    ...Act. The case was tried to the court without a jury. The court found for plaintiff in an opinion reported as Louisiana & Arkansas Ry. v. Anthony, D.C. W.D.Ark., 199 F.Supp. 286. The questions presented on this appeal 1. Were appellants guilty of negligence proximately causing Cloudy's injur......
  • Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Star City Gravel Co.
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    • June 13, 1978
    ...316 F.2d 858 (8th Cir. 1963), the appellate court, although affirming the disposition made by the trial court, Louisiana & A. Ry. v. Anthony, 199 F.Supp. 286 (W.D.Ark.1961), held that the active-passive characterization of negligence was inapplicable since a contractual indemnity situation ......
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