Lagarde v. RECREATION & PARK COM'N FOR PAR. OF E. BATON ROUGE

• Decision Date: 18 May 1964
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 1287.
• Citation: 229 F. Supp. 379
• Parties: Malcolm S. LAGARDE, Willie Major, Wesley Nicholas, Allen White, Roosevelt Spencer, and Alvin Scott, Individually and in behalf of Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. RECREATION AND PARK COMMISSION FOR the PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE, a public corporation, and Ralph M. Hileman, Superintendent of Recreation and Parks for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

229 F. Supp. 379

Malcolm S. LAGARDE, Willie Major, Wesley Nicholas, Allen White, Roosevelt Spencer, and Alvin Scott, Individually and in behalf of Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. RECREATION AND PARK COMMISSION FOR the PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE, a public corporation, and Ralph M. Hileman, Superintendent of Recreation and Parks for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 1287.

United States District Court E. D. Louisiana, Baton Rouge Division.

May 18, 1964.

Johnnie A. Jones, Baton Rouge, La., for plaintiffs.

Sargent Pitcher, Jr., Dist. Atty., 19th Judicial Dist. Parish of East Baton Rouge, State of Louisiana, for defendants.

WEST, District Judge.

This is a class action filed by a group of Negro citizens, all of whom are residents of and domiciled in the Parish of East Baton Rouge, State of Louisiana. This suit was filed on November 17, 1953, at which time the plaintiffs alleged that they, and other Negroes similarly situated, were being systematically denied the use and enjoyment of the municipally owned and operated recreational facilities in the City of Baton Rouge and the Parish of East Baton Rouge, such as the golf courses, tennis courts, swimming pools, dance pavilions, skating rinks, picnic grounds, etc. They alleged that such denial of the use of these facilities was discriminatory, and constituted a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Petitioners, in their suit, seek a declaratory judgment by this Court declaring the rights and legal relations of the parties hereto, and they further seek an injunction enjoining and restraining the respondents from denying them, and other Negroes similarly situated, the use of the municipally owned and/or operated recreational facilities in the City of Baton Rouge and the Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

Respondents filed an answer on February 1, 1954, in which they admitted that the "Recreation and Park Commission has maintained in the establishment of recreational facilities in said areas the tradition and custom of segregation * * *," and that "Defendants have attempted throughout the years to equalize recreational facilities in proportion to needs * * *," and that they "presently operate 19 different recreational facilities, more or less, 10 of which are for white persons and 8 of which are for members of the negro race." The answer, filed in 1954, further alleged that plans were underway to develop recreational facilities, including a golf course, for the exclusive use of members of the Negro race. (Since that time, new facilities, including a golf course, have been developed and opened, on a segregated basis, for members of the Negro race.) The answer further intimated that if the respondents were forced to desegregate these recreational facilities, that it would necessitate the closing of all public recreational facilities in the City and Parish. On March 25, 1955, this case was brought on for hearing before this Court, as then constituted, on a motion by petitioners for a judgment on the face of the pleadings. A pre-trial conference was ordered, and the Court, on October 5, 1955, continued the pre-trial conference pending a decision by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Dawson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 220 F.2d 386 (CA 4 1955), which was then pending before it on review from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that for the State or City to require segregation on the basis of race in the use of certain recreational facilities (bathing beaches and bath houses) in the State of Maryland was violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This case was, upon review, affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States, 350 U.S. 877, 76 S.Ct. 133, 100 L.Ed. 774, on November 7, 1955.

No further action was had in this case until September 28, 1962, when a motion was filed by petitioners requesting a judgment in accordance with the original prayer, and on the face of the original pleadings. No date for hearing was set at that time, and it was not until January 17, 1964, that this matter came on for hearing on plaintiffs' motion. The granting of the motion was opposed by the respondents, whereupon, because of the long lapse of time between the initial filing of this suit and the date of the hearing, the Court ordered petitioners to file, within a specified time, depositions or other evidence in support of their claim, and granted respondents time to file, if they could, countervailing evidence. In other words, the Court elected to treat petitioners' motion as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the deposition of each of the petitioners was taken, together with the deposition of Eugene Allen Young, the Superintendent of the Recreation and Park Commission for East Baton Rouge Parish, and the deposition of R. Gordon Clanton, the head lifeguard and pool manager of the City Park Swimming Pool as of July 23, 1963. (On that date certain Negroes were allegedly denied the use of the swimming pool solely because of their race.) All of these depositions show, beyond any question of doubt, that petitioners, and possibly others of their class, have attempted to make use of the recreational facilities in question, and have been denied the use thereof solely because of their race. These depositions, together with the admissions in the original answer, are unrefuted to the effect that the facilities in question are, indeed, operated on a segregated basis. No countervailing affidavits or evidence of any kind was filed by respondents.

Any defense that might previously have been available to respondents was pretty much eliminated by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Watson et al v. City of Memphis, Tennessee, et al, 373 U.S. 526, 83 S.Ct. 1314, 10 L.Ed.2d 529 (1963). In that case, the issue, simply stated, was whether the City of Memphis could further delay in meeting fully what the Supreme Court of the United States considered to be its constitutional obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment to desegregate its public parks and other municipal recreational facilities. That suit was commenced in May, 1960, and at the time of filing the suit, the City of Memphis did not deny that the majority of the relevant facilities were operated on a segregated basis, nor did it deny its duty under the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, to terminate its policy of conditioning use of such facilities on race. The City of Memphis, however, cited the fact that it had effected a certain measure of desegregation in some of its recreational facilities, and pleaded for more time, urging the need and wisdom of proceeding slowly and gradually in its desegregation efforts. The United States District Court in Memphis granted the City six months within which to file a plan of desegregation of all of its recreational facilities. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. But upon review, the United States Supreme Court reversed both the District Court and the Court of Appeals, holding that the delays provided for in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083 (1955), for the gradual desegregation of public school systems were not applicable to the desegregation of public recreational facilities. The Court concluded that the same administrative problems not being involved, the granting of time, as in school cases, would not be justified. In concluding its opinion, the Supreme Court said:

"Since the city has completely failed to demonstrate any compelling or convincing reason requiring further delay in implementing the constitutional proscription of segregation of publicly owned or operated recreational facilities there is no cause whatsoever to depart from the generally operative and here clearly controlling principle that constitutional rights are to be promptly vindicated. The continued denial to petitioners of the use of city facilities solely because of their race is without warrant. Under the facts in this case, the District Court's undoubted discretion in the fashioning and timing of equitable relief was not called into play rather, affirmative judicial action was required to vindicate plain and present constitutional rights. Today, no less than 50 years ago, the solution to the problems growing out of race relations `cannot be promoted by depriving citizens of their constitutional rights and privileges,' Buchanan v. Warley, supra, 245 U.S. 60 at 80-81, 38 S.Ct.

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