Jones v. B&J Rocket Am., Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 May 2016
• Docket Number: Cause No.: 3:14-CV-135
• Parties: STANLEY D. JONES, Plaintiff, v. B & J ROCKET AMERICA, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

STANLEY D. JONES, Plaintiff, v. B & J ROCKET AMERICA, INC., Defendant.

Cause No.: 3:14-CV-135

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION

May 17, 2016

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the court on the "Motion to Reconsider December 1, 2015 Opinion and Order or, Alternatively, to Certify for Interlocutory Appeal" filed by Defendant B & J Rocket America, Inc. (DE 29). Plaintiff Stanley Jones filed a brief in opposition to the motion (DE 33) and B & J Rocket filed a reply (DE 36). For the reasons discussed below, the motion is DENIED. A telephonic scheduling conference will be set in this case by separate docket entry.

BACKGROUND

Stanley Jones began working for Middlebury Enterprises, Inc., the predecessor of B & J Rocket, in March of 1993 as a saw operator. Jones held various positions with the company, including press operator, press operator supervisor, and machine maintenance, and ultimately was promoted to plant manager. In 2009, B & J Rocket purchased Middlebury and retained the latter's employees, including Jones. On March 5, 2012, B & J Rocket hired a new plant manager and Jones was demoted to assistant plant manager. Finally, on October 22, 2012, Jones was told that his employment with B & J Rocket would be terminated as of December 31. He signed a "retirement announcement" in mid-December and received a severance payment equal to three month's salary. Jones was 63 years old at the time.

Jones filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC on April 3, 2013, alleging that he was terminated because of his age and his disability.¹ After receiving a Notice of Right to Sue letter, Jones filed this lawsuit, alleging in his Complaint that B & J Rocket discriminated against him in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Complaint, pp. 4-5. B & J Rocket contends that Jones' demotion and eventual termination (or "forced" retirement, but this distinction is not relevant for present purposes) were not based on his age or disability at all, but rather on the company's conclusion that it needed to hire a new plant manager since Jones had stated the planned to retire in a few years and because Jones' work performance was not meeting the company's legitimate expectations.

B & J Rocket filed a motion for summary judgment on June 29, 2015 (DE 20), seeking judgment in its favor as to both Jones' age claim and disability claim. B & J Rocket argued that 1) Jones failed to file his charge of discrimination in a timely manner, and 2) Jones failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of age or disability discrimination. On December 1, 2015, this court entered an Opinion and Order granting B & J Rocket's motion as to Jones' claims based on his demotion and denying the motion as to his claims based on his termination. Opinion and Order (DE 25).

In its motion to reconsider, B & J Rocket states that "[i]n its Opinion and Order . . . theCourt appears to have patently misunderstood B & J Rocket and, as a result, did not address two legal arguments that were advanced by B & J Rocket in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment." Motion to Reconsider, p. 2. B & J Rocket elaborates as follows:

First, even if Bent Andersen was the decision-maker or had sufficient input with respect to the decision to terminate Jones' employment as assistant plant manager, B & J Rocket explained that Bent Andersen's comment alone does not directly point to an unlawful discriminatory motive because it was not made around the time of-and did not make any reference to-the termination of Jones' employment as assistant plant manager. . . . Second, B & J Rocket explained that Jones may not use evidence of time-barred conduct to establish his prima facie case of discrimination with respect to Jones' termination as assistant plant manager.

Id., pp. 2-3. B & J Rocket maintains that the court should reexamine its December 1 order with respect to these specific legal points and grant summary judgment in its entirety as to both of Jones' claims. In the alternative, B & J Rocket moves the court to certify this case for interlocutory appeal to permit the company to present its arguments to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

DISCUSSION

I. Procedural Issue.

As a threshold matter, B & J Rocket brought its present motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Defendant's Motion, p. 1. Jones contends that "[t]he Court's December 1, 2015[,] opinion was not a final judgment and is therefore not properly appealable under Rule 54(b)." Plaintiff's Response, p. 1. Jones maintains that the court's order is not a "final" judgment "because any order certified [for interlocutory appeal] under the rule must meet the finality requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. . . . This Court should therefore deny Defendant's motion under Rule 54(b) because the Court's December 1, 2015[, order] is not a final judgment and cannot properly becertified under Rule 54(b)." Id., pp. 1-2. B & J Rocket responds by arguing that Jones is confusing Rule 54(b) with Rule 59(e) or, more specifically, that "Jones misapprehends the relief requested by B & J Rocket and the federal rules governing motions to reconsider." Defendant's Reply, p. 2. B & J Rocket argues that it "has requested the Court to reconsider-not enter final judgment on-its Opinion and Order." Id. The company states that ". . . Rule 54(b) . . . provides a mechanism for a district court to reconsider its own interlocutory orders 'at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities.'" Id., p. 3 (quoting Rule 54(b) and citing Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 2010 WL 61971 * 1 (N.D.Ind. Jan. 5, 2015)). In contrast, "'Rule 59(e) does not apply until . . . a final judgment has been entered.'" Id., (quoting Livingston Downs Racing Ass'n, Inc. v. Jefferson Downs Corp., 259 F.Supp. 471, 475 (M.D.La. 2002)). . . . Rather, Rule 54(b) provides a district court with the inherent authority to reconsider its own interlocutory orders or decisions before a final judgment has been entered." Id. (citing Powers v. USF Holland, Inc., 2015 WL 3905261 * 1 (N.D.Ind. June 25, 2015)). Accordingly, argues B & J Rocket, "since a final judgment has not been entered in this action, the Court should . . . reconsider and revise its Opinion and Order to grant B & J Rocket's Motion for Summary Judgment." Id.

B & J Rocket is correct that Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) applies in this instance, as opposed to Jones' contention that the present motion should "actually [be] made under Rule 59(e), rather than Rule 54(b)[.]" Plaintiff's Reply, p. 2. Rule 59 permits a party to seek a new trial, or request that a court alter or amend a judgment rendered following trial. But of course, no such final judgment has been entered in this case, and so Rule 59 is inapplicable. B & J Rocket properly brought its present motion under Rule 54(b). This issue is essentially moot, however, since theDefendant's motion fails anyway for the reasons discussed in this order.

The Sandifer case cited by B & J Rocket sets forth the standard of review for motions to reconsider and requests for interlocutory appeal, and also explains the interplay between Rule 54(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1292:

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides that a court may alter or amend an interlocutory order any time before entry of final judgment. See Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) ("[E]very order short of a final decree is subject to reopening at the discretion of the district judge."). Unlike a motion to reconsider a final judgment, which must meet the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 or 60, "a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order may be entertained and granted as justice requires." Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 909 F.Supp. 1154, 1160 (N.D.Ind. 1995).

Reconsideration of an interlocutory order may be appropriate when the facts or law on which the decision was based change significantly after issuance of the order, or when the court has misunderstood a party, made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented by the parties, or made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension. Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990). "These grounds represent extraordinary circumstances, and the granting of a motion to reconsider is to be granted only in such extraordinary circumstances . . . Indeed, the court's orders are not mere first drafts, subject to revision and reconsideration at a litigant's pleasure." United States Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. National Presto Indus., Inc., . . . 2004 WL 1093390, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Apr. 28, 2004). Motions to reconsider serve a limited function: "to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir. 1996).

Sandifer, 2010 WL 61971 at *1. As to interlocutory appeals, the court in Sandifer explained as follows:

Interlocutory appeals are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which provides, in pertinent part, that:

When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for differenceof opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order.

Certification under § 1292(b) requires four statutory criteria be met: (1) there must be a question of law; (2) it must be controlling; (3) it must be contestable; and (4) its resolution must promise to speed up the litigation. Ahrenholz v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Illinois, 219 F.3d 674, 675 (7th Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original).

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