Atchison, T.&S.F.R. Co. v. Schneider

• Decision Date: 25 January 1889
• Citation: 20 N.E. 41,127 Ill. 144
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: ATCHISON, T. & S. F. R. CO. v. SCHNEIDER et al.

127 Ill. 144

20 N.E. 41

ATCHISON, T. & S. F. R. CO.

v.SCHNEIDER et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

January 25, 1889.

Appeal from circuit court, Cook county; R. S. TUTHILL, Judge.Williams & Thompson

, for appellant.

W. P. Black, for appellees.

WILKIN, J.

This a proceeding by appellant against appellees, under chapter 47 of our statute, to condemn certain lots on State street, in the city of Chicago, for railroad purposes, on which appellees held leases. On the lots were two buildings, numbered 574 and 578,-the first held by Schneider, at a rental of $60 per month; and the other by Hickey, at $110 per month. Both leases expired April 30, 1889. The building occupied by Schneider is a two-story frame,-the lower story being used by him for the manufacture and sale of cigars; and the upper one sublet for a dwelling, at $30 per month. The other building is a three-story brick, with basement. Hickey's lease covered the basement and first and second stories, in which he kept a saloon. At the time of the hearing June 14, 1888, these leases had about 10 1/2 months to run. The jury, having heard the evidence produced by the respective parties as to the value of these leasehold interests, and having examined the premises, made their report, giving to petitioners the right to take and appropriate the property, and allowing each of said appellees the sum of $1,200 ‘as compensationfor their respective leasehold interests,’ and the sum of $1,300 to each ‘as compensation for inconvenience and cost of removal from the premises.’ Judgments being entered on this report, appellant prayed an appeal, which was allowed on its filing bond in the sum of $10,000, which bond was duly presented and approved, whereupon appellant moved for an order allowing it to enter upon and use the said premises pending the appeal, but the motion was denied. Appellant then paid the amount of the judgments to the county treasurer, and, on presentation of his receipt therefor, the court granted the order of entry. A reversal is urged here mainly upon the ground that the verdict of the jury is unauthorized by the facts appearing in the record.

At the instance of appellees the court instructed the jury as to the measure of compensation as follows: ‘The jury are further instructed that in determining the amount of compensation to be awarded to the defendants, respectively, in this case, they may properly take into consideration all evidence tending to show the actual value of the leasehold interest to the respective defendants, of which it is proposed to deprive them; the actual loss to be sufferred by these defendants, respectively, from the loss, destruction, or deprivation of the improvements placed by them in the properties specially adapted to the conduct of their business, if any, shown by their evidence; the reasonable costs of removal, and of refitting in other localities for the further conduct of business, as shown by the evidence; and also any injury that the jury may find from the evidence will result to said defendants, respectively, by reason of the unavoidable interruption of their business, incident to their removal from their present site, and their establishing in new locations during the period of such interruption, if any shown by the evidence.’ Substantially the same rule was announced in instructions asked by appellant. No controversy can therefore be raised here as to that question, and, accepting it as a fair legal guide to the jury in fixing the amount which appellees should be paid as just compensation for being deprived of their property, it is impossible to escape the conviction that the verdict in this case on which judgments were entered is the result of prejudice, inadvertence, or mistake. In the first place, it must strike the impartial mind as remarkable that under leases so essentially different as to the property leased, the amounts of rent reserved, and the uses to which the buildings were appropriated, the leasehold interests should be of precisely the same value, and that the cost and inconvenience of removal in each case should be exactly the same. But the evidence, instead of explaining or reconciling this apparent inconsistency, only makes it more glaring, and leaves no doubt that the amounts were arbitrarily fixed by the jury, regardless of the proofs. Appellant introduced four witnesses as to the value of the leasehold interests, each of whom testified that the rent reserved, viz., $60 in the one case, and $110 in the other, was the full rental value of the premises, and that neither was worth more than the said amounts agreed to be paid. Appellees both testified in their own behalf, but neither contradicted appellant's witnesses on that subject, and only one witness introduced by them does so, and he only as to the lease of Hickey, which he says in his judgment is worth $200 per month, or a bonus of $90 per month. Appellant also introduced two witnesses as to the cost of removal. One of these swears that the cost to Schneider to move his fixtures, and put them up in another building, replacing what might be necessary with new material, would be $235.40, and to Hickey $161; the other estimates the cost to Schneider at $263.50, and to Hickey at $148.50. While the evidence of appellees and witnesses introduced by them on this element of damages would justify a finding of much larger sums than those fixed by either of said witnesses, it is impossible to so construe their evidence as to sustain their finding of $1,300, reported by the jury. In fact, by their own testimony, Schneider's expense for furniture and fixing up his establishment was only between $700 and $800, and that of Hickey about 1,200; in which last amount he admits is included the cost of his moving into the building, and a pool table, for which he paid $375. The verdict of the jury is not...