Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co.
Decision Date | 13 May 1943 |
Docket Number | No. 8128.,8128. |
Citation | 134 F.2d 860 |
Parties | TENNANT v. PEORIA & PEKIN UNION RY. CO. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
E. E. Horton, of Peoria, Ill., for appellant.
E. V. Champion, of Peoria, Ill., Mark D. Eagleton and Wm. H. Allen, both of St. Louis, Mo., for appellee.
Before SPARKS, MAJOR, and KERNER, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiff, entered in accordance with a jury verdict, in an action to recover damages resulting from the death of plaintiff's intestate while in the employment of defendant.
The action was brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq. The amended complaint, so far as now material, alleged that Harold C. Tennant, plaintiff's intestate, while engaged in the scope of his duties and employment as a switchman on the defendant's train, was run over and crushed by said train, from which he sustained fatal injuries. Death was alleged to have been the result of defendant's negligence in whole or in part in two respects, (1) that the defendant in moving and switching its engine and cars failed to ring a bell, in violation of Rule 30 of certain rules and regulations then in effect, and (2) that the defendant failed and omitted to exercise ordinary care to discover the whereabouts of said Harold C. Tennant and negligently moved the engine and cars at a time when his whereabouts was unknown to the members of the switching crew.
The case was submitted to the jury solely upon the first charge of negligence. So far as the record before us discloses, no request was made for submission upon the second charge, and no complaint of the court's action in this respect is shown. Notwithstanding plaintiff's contention here that the proof requires an affirmance upon each of the charges, we are of the view that the case must be decided upon the charge which was submitted to and decided by the jury.
Defendant presents a number of contested issues, the most important of which is the court's refusal to direct a verdict in response to its motion made at the close of the plaintiff's, and renewed at the close of all the proof in the case. Under this issue, defendant contends (1) that proof of negligence was not sufficient to take the case to the jury, and (2) that in any event there was a total want of proof that any negligence shown was the proximate cause of decedent's injuries. Other issues of lesser importance are presented, including alleged error in the court's charge to the jury and its refusal to give special interrogatories submitted by the defendant, and the contention that the verdict was excessive and not in accordance with law.
At the time of his injury and death on July 12, 1940, Tennant was working as a member of a switching crew in one of defendant's East Peoria (Illinois) yards, known as the "B" yard. The crew consisted of Harkless, the foreman; England, the engineer or motorman; Cole, the fireman or motorman's helper; and two switchmen, Tennant and Bonner. Tennant, sometimes referred to as the "pin puller," was the switchman who followed the engine and Bonner was the field man. Tennant had been employed in this same capacity on the same crew for a number of months, and in the same yards for about four years. The crew went on duty at eleven o'clock at night and off at seven o'clock in the morning. One of the jobs which this crew performed regularly each night, and the one which it was engaged in performing on the night of the fatal occurrence, was the removal of cars from track B-28. In so doing, after certain other switching had been done, the engine (a Diesel, electrically operated) was brought down from the north through divide switch B-28 and onto track B-28. The front or pilot end of the engine was headed south. B-28 track south of B-28 switch was a straight track, extending substantially north and south. At this time there were twenty cars, in different groups, on this track. The job to be performed was the coupling together of these cars and moving them northwardly out of this track to assigned locations in the yards.
The brief for each side contains a lengthy statement of the circumstances surrounding the decedent's death. Inasmuch as the proof must be considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we adopt her statement as to what occurred at and shortly prior to the time of the accident. As the engine moved south on track B-28, the engineer was in his cab on the right side (west side), the fireman in his cab on the opposite side, Tennant was riding on the right front footboard of the engine (on the engineer's side), and Harkless and Bonner had gone ahead, southwardly, down the track on the engineer's side. Harkless marked the empties and the loads and Bonner released the car brakes. Bonner made all the couplings except the first, that is, the coupling between the engine and the first car, which was made by Tennant. The engine was moved on signal from Bonner from time to time until the cars had all been coupled. It was dark and the signals were given by lantern. During this coupling work, the engine had stopped and started some six or eight times. When the coupling had been finished, Harkless and Bonner were at the south end of the train on the engineer's side. Harkless gave the engineer a back-up signal, which meant that the engineer was to back northwardly and pull the cars out of track B-28. At that time, neither Harkless nor Bonner saw Tennant's light. The engineer, in response to Harkless' signal, put his engine in motion, backing it and pulling the cars northwardly. No bell was rung for this or any of the other movements had in the operation which took place on track B-28.
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