State v. &dagger
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
| Writing for the Court | JONES |
| Citation | 72 S.E. 564,90 S.C. 138 |
| Decision Date | 13 November 1911 |
| Parties | STATE v. GARLINGTON et al.† |
72 S.E. 564
90 S.C. 138
STATE
v.
GARLINGTON et al.†
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Nov. 13, 1911.
1. Criminal Law (§ 1167*)—Appeal—Harmless Error—Indictment.
Where accused were found guilty upon the fourth count only, the question of whether the other counts sufficiently charged an offense is immaterial on appeal, in absence of prejudicial error in admitting evidence under such other count.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3101-3106; Dec. Dig. § 1107.*]
2. Criminal Law (§ 1169*)—Appeal—Harmless Error—Admission of Evidence.
The admission of immaterial evidence is not reversible in absence of a showing of prejudice to accused therefrom.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law. Cent. Dig. §§ 3137-3143; Dec. Dig. § 1169.*]
3. Criminal Law (§ 1168*)—Appeal—Harmless Error.
Any error in refusing to entertain a motion by accused at the close of the state's evidence for the direction of a verdict, because of the trial court's practice of hearing such mo-
[72 S.E. 565]tions only after all the evidence was in, was cured where, after accused's refusal to put in any evidence, the motion was renewed and refused after argument when the court offered to permit accused to put in evidence; accused not having been prejudiced by the ruling on the original motion.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3129-3136; Dec. Dig. § 1168.*]
4. Criminal Law (§ 699*)—Discretion of Trial Court—Order of Argument.
Matters of detail as to the order in which the arguments Of the state and accused shall be made is ordinarily for the trial judge's sound discretion.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law. Cent. Dig. §§ 1655, 1656; Dec. Dig. § 699.*]
5. Criminal Law (§ 645*) — Trial — Argument — Rigut to Open and Close — Waiver.
An accused who has the right to open and reply may waive either or both of such rights.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law. Cent. Dig. §§ 1507-1509; Dec. Dig. § 645.*]
6. Criminal Law (§§ 763, 764*)—Trial—Instructions—Province of Jury.
A requested charge that on a prosecution for larceny a strong presumption arises that there was no felonious intent if the taking was open, and that, if there was no subsequent attempt to conceal the property and an avowal of its taking, such presumption must be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence', was properly refused as invading the jury's province and violating the constitutional inhibition against the court's expressing an opinion as to the weight of the testimony.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1731-1748; Dec. Dig. §§ 763, 764.*]
Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Richland County; George E. Prince, Judge.
"To be officially reported."
John W. Garlington and another were convicted of fraudulent breach of trust, and they appeal. Affirmed.
Dial & Todd, Christie Benet, R. E. Carwile, and B. L. Abney, for appellants.
SolicitorW. Hampton Cobb and J. W. Thurmond, for the State.
JONES, C J. The appellants, having been brought to trial upon an indictment containing five counts, were found guilty upon the fourth count only, and now appeal to this court from the judgment and sentence.
The fourth count, upon which the conviction was had, charges a breach of trust by the said defendants by the conversion to their own use of the sum of $55,596 in money, of the property of the Seminole Securities Company, intrusted to the defendants and converted to their own use with fraudulent intention. It is alleged in the first ground of appeal that there was error in the refusal of a motion made by the defendants at the trial to quash the first, second, and third counts of the indictment upon certain grounds then stated. In the view taken by this court, however, it is not necessary here to set out the grounds of this motion in detail; but it is sufficient to say that the motions involved no charge of duplicity or improper joinder of counts, but were merely demurrers to the legal sufficiency of the averments contained in the said three counts.
As the defendants were acquitted by the verdict upon each of the counts so sought to be quashed, it is somewhat difficult to perceive how they could have been prejudiced by any alleged error in refusing to quash these counts. It is true that it is charged by the appellants in this exception that, by reason of the refusal to quash these counts, certain evidence was admitted as relevant and competent which could not otherwise have been introduced, and that thereby the defendants suffered prejudice. While, however, it is so charged in general terms that irrelevant and incompetent evidence was so admitted, it has not been made to appear...
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State v. Beaty, Appellate Case No. 2015-000718
...also State v. Mouzon , 326 S.C. 199, 485 S.E.2d 918 (1997) ; State v. Crowe , 258 S.C. 258, 188 S.E.2d 379 (1972).In State v. Garlington , 90 S.C. 138, 144–45, 72 S.E. 564, 566 (1911), we held that in cases in which no defendant introduces evidence, the defendant(s) have the right to open a......
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State v. McIntire, No. 16636
...made a five minute argument, but before so doing, protested the ruling which limited them to this length of time. In State v. Garlington, 90 S.C. 138, 72 S.E. 564, 566, the Court in passing upon the question whether the defendant in a criminal case who has a right to open and reply in argum......
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Lundy v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co
...refused the request on the ground that it embodied a charge on the facts. Weaver v. Railway, 76 S. C. 49, 56 S. E. 657, 121 Am. St. Rep.[72 S.E. 564] 934; Martin v. Railway, 84 S. C. 568, 66 S. E. 993; Turbyfill v. Railway, 86 S. C. 395, 68 S. E. 687; Finch v. Railway, 87 S. C. 190, 69 S. E......
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State v. Mouzon, No. 2440
...jury. State v. Crowe, 258 S.C. 258, 188 S.E.2d 379 (1972); State v. Gellis, 158 S.C. 471, 155 S.E. 849 (1930); cf. State v. Garlington, 90 S.C. 138, 72 S.E. 564 (1911). The right to open and close the argument to the jury is a substantial right, the denial of which is reversible error. Stat......
-
State v. Beaty, Appellate Case No. 2015-000718
...also State v. Mouzon , 326 S.C. 199, 485 S.E.2d 918 (1997) ; State v. Crowe , 258 S.C. 258, 188 S.E.2d 379 (1972).In State v. Garlington , 90 S.C. 138, 144–45, 72 S.E. 564, 566 (1911), we held that in cases in which no defendant introduces evidence, the defendant(s) have the right to open a......
-
State v. McIntire, No. 16636
...made a five minute argument, but before so doing, protested the ruling which limited them to this length of time. In State v. Garlington, 90 S.C. 138, 72 S.E. 564, 566, the Court in passing upon the question whether the defendant in a criminal case who has a right to open and reply in argum......
-
Lundy v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co
...refused the request on the ground that it embodied a charge on the facts. Weaver v. Railway, 76 S. C. 49, 56 S. E. 657, 121 Am. St. Rep.[72 S.E. 564] 934; Martin v. Railway, 84 S. C. 568, 66 S. E. 993; Turbyfill v. Railway, 86 S. C. 395, 68 S. E. 687; Finch v. Railway, 87 S. C. 190, 69 S. E......
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State v. Mouzon, No. 2440
...jury. State v. Crowe, 258 S.C. 258, 188 S.E.2d 379 (1972); State v. Gellis, 158 S.C. 471, 155 S.E. 849 (1930); cf. State v. Garlington, 90 S.C. 138, 72 S.E. 564 (1911). The right to open and close the argument to the jury is a substantial right, the denial of which is reversible error. Stat......