Moss v. SCI – Mahanoy Superintendent Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole

• Decision Date: 29 August 2018
• Docket Number: No. 204 C.D. 2018,204 C.D. 2018
• Citation: 194 A.3d 1130
• Parties: Craig MOSS, Appellant v. SCI – MAHANOY SUPERINTENDENT PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

194 A.3d 1130

Craig MOSS, Appellant

v.SCI – MAHANOY SUPERINTENDENT PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE

No. 204 C.D. 2018

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted on Briefs June 8, 2018

Decided August 29, 2018

Reargument Denied November 9, 2018

Craig Moss, appellant, pro se.

Timothy P. Keating, Harrisburg, for appellees.

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge, HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge, HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE COVEY

Craig Moss (Moss) appeals, pro se, from the Court of Common Pleas of the 39^th Judicial District, Franklin County Branch's (trial court) November 3, 2017 order denying his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Petition). Moss raises seven issues for this Court's review: (1) whether the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. (Rule) 206.7; (2) whether the Mahanoy State Correctional Institution Superintendent and the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (collectively, Board) admitted that Moss had served his complete sentence; (3) whether Moss' sentence is illegal and, thus, unenforceable; (4) whether Moss was given credit for all time served; (5) whether this Court should, sua sponte , correct Moss' allegedly illegal sentence; (6) whether the Supremacy Clause of the United States (U.S.) Constitution¹ (Supremacy Clause) mandates that this Court decline to enforce Moss' allegedly illegal sentence; and (7) whether the trial court complied with the law. After review, we affirm.

Moss is an inmate currently incarcerated at York County Prison. On March 5, 1997, Moss was sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment for arson (First Sentence). Moss' minimum sentence release date for his First Sentence was December 6, 2000 with a maximum sentence release date of March 5, 2017. On May 1, 2000, Moss received a 10-year maximum sentence for aggravated assault (Second Sentence) to commence upon the expiration of his First Sentence.² Thereafter, Moss' maximum sentence release date was recalculated to March 5, 2027. Moss was paroled on April 7, 2008. Moss remained at liberty on parole until January 15, 2017, when he was arrested in York County on new criminal charges. The Board lodged a detainer against Moss that prevented his release on bail pending disposition of the new charges.³

Moss filed his Petition on October 5, 2017, while under the Board's detainer. Therein, Moss alleged that because his minimum sentence for the First Sentence was 42 months and his minimum sentence for the Second Sentence was 15 months, his aggregated minimum sentence was 57 months. Moss further contended that when he reached his First Sentence minimum date on December 6, 2000, his Second Sentence began to run simultaneously and was completed on December 6, 2010. Thus, Moss argued that the Board violated his constitutional rights by improperly detaining him.

On October 11, 2017, the trial court issued a rule to the Board to show cause why Moss was not entitled to the relief requested. The trial court's order also directed the Board to "file a response to the [P]etition within 20 days of service upon the [Board ]" and advised the parties that "[t]he [Petition] shall be decided under [Rule] 206.7[.]" Trial Ct. Order, October 11, 2017. On October 31, 2017, the Board filed its response. Notably, the Board's response did not answer each numbered averment in the Petition, but instead summarized the factual background pertaining to Moss' incarceration, reiterated that Moss' maximum release date is March 5, 2027 and asserted that Moss' claim that he is being held after his First Sentence expired is meritless.

On November 3, 2017, the trial court "decide[d] the [P]etition on the [P]etition and answer" and found that Moss should remain in custody since he had not completed his full 30-year sentence. On November 21, 2017, Moss filed the instant appeal⁴ from the trial court's order.⁵

I. Whether the Trial Court Complied With Rule 206.7

Moss first argues that the trial court abused its discretion because it did not comply with Rule 206.7 when, absent his request, it disposed of the Petition, thereby depriving him of the right to conduct discovery, request oral argument or seek leave to amend his Petition.

Rule 206.7(b) states that "[i]f an answer [to a petition] is filed raising no disputed issues of material fact, the court on request of the petitioner shall decide the petition on the petition and answer." Pa.R.C.P. No. 206.7(b) (emphasis added). Rule 206.7(c) specifies that if an answer raises disputed factual issues, discovery may be conducted as the trial court permits. See Pa.R.C.P. No. 206.7(c).

However, courts in this Commonwealth have construed Rule 206.7(b) to allow court decisions "without the fact-finding process" based on the petition and answer "[i]f the answer does not raise disputed issues of fact[.]" U.S. Spaces, Inc. v. Berkshire Hathaway Home Servs., Fox & Roach , 165 A.3d 931, 933 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting Rule 206.4, Comment , which was the predecessor to Rule 206.7 ); see also Duquesne Light Co. v. Rudolph N. Rohn Co., Inc. , 753 A.2d 286, 288 (Pa. Super. 2000) ("If an answer is filed which does not dispute issues of fact, the court shall decide the petition .") (emphasis added); Chaney v. Fairmount Park Real Estate Corp. (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 2388 C.D. 2011, filed June 25, 2012) 6, 46 A.3d 833, ––––, slip op. at 8 ("[W]here an answer is filed that does not raise disputed factual issues, the court shall decide the petition based solely on the parties' filings.") (emphasis added). If there is no dispute of material fact, "there is no justification for the taking of depositions under [Rule] 206.7(c)." In re Nomination Paper of Nader (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 568 M.D. 2004, filed December 4, 2008), slip op. at 8 n.3, 2008 WL 7810659, aff'd , 603 Pa. 139, 982 A.2d 1220 (2009).

Here, because Moss admits that there are no disputed issues of material fact, thereby negating the need for depositions or discovery, Rule 206.7(a) authorized the trial court to decide the Petition based solely on Moss' Petition and the Board's answer. Accordingly, the trial court complied with Rule 206.7, and Moss' argument to the contrary is without support.

II. Whether the Board Admitted Moss' Averments

Moss next contends that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing his Petition when the Board admitted Moss' averments, including his contention that he completed his sentences. According to Moss, by failing to directly answer any of the Petition's numbered averments as required by Rules 206.7 and 1029, the Board admitted them all. Relatedly, Moss claims that since the Board failed to respond to his assertion that he should no longer be in custody, there were no disputed issues of material fact, and the trial court should have decided the Petition in his favor.

Rule 1029 provides, in relevant part:

(a) A responsive pleading shall admit or deny each averment of fact in the preceding pleading or any part thereof to which it is responsive. A party denying only a part of an averment shall specify so much of it as is admitted and shall deny the remainder. Admissions and denials in a responsive pleading shall refer specifically to the paragraph in which the averment admitted or denied is set forth.

(b) Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required are admitted when not denied specifically or by necessary implication. A general denial or a demand for proof, ... shall have the effect of an admission.

....

(d) Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required shall be deemed to be denied.

Pa.R.C.P. No. 1029 (emphasis added). Further, Rule 206.7 states that where a court issues a rule to show cause, only unanswered factual averments not expressly denied are deemed admitted. See Pa.R.C.P. No. 206.7. Importantly, "[u]nder any rule of pleading, a conclusion of law is not an admission; only unanswered assertions of fact are considered so." Commonwealth v. $26,556.00 Seized from Polidoro , 672 A.2d 389, 393 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996).

Here, because the trial court issued an order to show cause on October 11, 2017, the Board was required to respond in accordance with Rule 206.7. On October 31, 2017, the Board filed an answer but did not "admit or deny each averment of fact in the preceding pleading" as required by Rule 1029(a).⁷ However, the only factual allegations in Moss' Petition relate to his convictions and the sentences imposed.⁸ The remaining averments pertain to the legal effect of the time Moss served on the expiration of his sentences and are, thus, legal conclusions to which no responsive pleadings were required. Therefore, the legal conclusions regarding the completion of Moss' sentences were "deemed to be denied." Pa.R.C.P. No. 1029(d). Accordingly, because the Board did not admit to Moss' legal conclusion that he completed his sentences, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Moss' Petition.

III. Whether Moss' Aggregated Sentence is Enforceable

Moss also claims that his sentence is illegal and, thus, unenforceable. Moss specifically asserts that the Board lacked authority to aggregate his sentences, and that he is being detained beyond his maximum sentence release date. Importantly, the parties agree that Moss received consecutive sentences. See Moss Reply Br. at 5; Board Br. in Opposition at 5-6. This Court has consistently held that "once a sentencing court imposes a consecutive sentence, aggregation with other consecutive sentences is ‘automatic and mandatory’ under [S]ection 9757 of the Sentencing Code[,⁹ 42 Pa.C.S. § 9757 ]." Forbes v. Pa. Dep't of Corr. , 931 A.2d 88, 92 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007), aff'd , 596 Pa. 492, 946 A.2d 103 (2008) ; see also Commonwealth v. Allshouse , 33 A.3d 31 (Pa. Super. 2011). Further, since an inmate receives a new minimum and maximum sentence release date based on "the total of all offenses with respect to which sentence is imposed[,]" the sentence order is irrelevant. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9757 ; see also Forbes ....