U.S. v. Neville Chemical Co.

• Decision Date: 12 October 1989
• Docket Number: No. 86-5333,86-5333
• Citation: 888 F.2d 130
• Parties: 20 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,197 Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v NEVILLE CHEMICAL COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 130

888 F.2d 130

20 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,197

Unpublished Disposition

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v NEVILLE CHEMICAL COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 86-5333.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Sept. 11, 1989.

Decided Oct. 12, 1989.

Before SCHROEDER and BEEZER, Circuit Judges, and SAMUEL P. KING, ^* District Judge.

MEMORANDUM ^**

Neville Chemical Company manufactures chlorinated paraffin and generates hazardous wastes. After waiving its right to a jury, Neville was tried and convicted of knowingly disposing of these wastes without a permit in violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6928(d)(2). We affirm.

Neville first contends that the district court failed to correctly interpret the statute. The penalty provision of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6928(d)(2) applies to any person who

knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste ...

(A) without a permit ... or

(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of such permit ...

Neville argues that this language requires a finding of "specific intent" to violate the statute; that is, the court must find that Neville knew it had disposed of wastes, knew they were hazardous, and knew there was no permit.

We reject Neville's argument. In United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir.1989), we recently held that knowledge of lack of a permit is not required to violate the statute. A trial court need find only that the defendant knew the wastes were disposed of and that they were hazardous. Id. at 1038-39. The district court "required neither proof of knowledge of the law or proof of specific intent" and found that Neville knew the buried waste was hazardous. This standard is consistent with Hoflin and we affirm.

Neville next argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Neville had specific intent to violate 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6928(d)(2). Even though specific intent is not an element of this offense, the statute does require knowledge that the waste was hazardous. Neville asserts that it lacked such knowledge and bases its assertion on the testimony of Robert Shimko. However, the evidence supports the finding that at least some employees knew...