STANDARD ENG. & CONST'RS v. USEPA, ETC.
Decision Date | 16 January 1980 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. H-79-629. |
Citation | 483 F. Supp. 1163 |
Parties | STANDARD ENGINEERS AND CONSTRUCTORS, INC. v. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REGION 1; William R. Adams, Jr., Regional Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency, Region 1; City of Meriden, Connecticut; and Francis Cammisa and Jack A. James, Inc. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
William T. Shea, Meriden, Conn., for plaintiff.
George J. Kelly, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Richard Blumenthal, U. S. Atty., Hartford, Conn., for Federal defendants.
Thomas H. Connell, Michelson, Kane, Royster & Barger, Hartford, Conn., for Francis Camissa and Jack A. James, Inc.
Morton H. Greenblatt, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Meriden, Conn., for City of Meriden.
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS
The plaintiff, Standard Engineers and Constructors, Inc. (Standard) was an unsuccessful contract bidder on a federally funded sewer facility project sponsored by the City of Meriden. Standard now seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against further funding, construction, or other activity related to performance of the contract on which it unsuccessfully bid. The federal defendants, United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and William R. Adams, Jr., Region 1 EPA Administrator, have moved to dismiss on the grounds that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. The Court finds that Standard does not have standing to sue for the violations alleged and the federal defendants' motion to dismiss is therefore granted.
In 1977 the defendant City of Meriden, Connecticut applied for and received a construction grant from the defendant United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under Title II of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281-97. With a view to utilizing this federal grant, the City publicly solicited bids for the construction of a trunk line sewer facility in Meriden.
On June 6, 1979, the City publicly opened all bids and determined that defendant Francis Camissa and Jack A. James, Inc. (Camissa & James) had submitted the lowest bid. The plaintiff Standard's bid, which was approximately $150,000 higher than the Camissa & James bid, was the next lowest bid. Camissa & James, however, failed to submit with its bid two certification forms — a "Certification of Bidder Regarding Equal Employment Opportunity"1 and a "Certification of Nonsegregated Facilities"2 — as required by the contract bid documents issued to all prospective bidders. Camissa & James did not submit these certifications to the City until approximately five days after the opening of the bids, thus permitting it to compare its own bid figures with those of the other competitors before complying with the bid requirements.
After the Meriden Board of Public Works and Sewer Authority had voted to award the contract to Camissa & James, Standard filed a protest with the City pursuant to the EPA regulations governing bid protests, 40 C.F.R. § 35.939. In that protest, Standard argued that the bid submitted by Camissa & James was "nonresponsive" and "qualified" because it was not accompanied by the required certification forms. Standard further argued that by permitting Camissa & James to submit the required certification forms five days after the bids had been opened, the bidding procedure afforded Camissa & James a competitive advantage or preference over all other bidders.3
After a hearing before the City's Board of Public Works and Sewer Authority, the City Board voted to deny Standard's protest. Standard appealed the City's decision to the defendant EPA Regional Administrator. After both Standard and Camissa & James had been given an opportunity to submit written arguments in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 35.939(e)(2), the Regional Administrator denied the protest on October 10, 1979, adopting the Report and Recommendation of Regional Counsel dated October 9, 1979. Standard thereupon filed the present action.
The federal defendants contend that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present action. Before reaching the issue of whether the plaintiff has alleged grounds sufficient to provide a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction, the Court must determine whether the plaintiff has standing to sue for the violations alleged.
In Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 60 S.Ct. 869, 84 L.Ed. 1108 (1940), the Supreme Court held that unsuccessful bidders lack standing to challenge federal agency action with respect to government contracts. In attempting to articulate the rationale for its decision, the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that unsuccessful bidders should be permitted to bring suit in the public interest as so-called "private attorneys general":
Perkins, 310 U.S. at 132, 60 S.Ct. at 879.
In Edelman v. Federal Housing Administration, 382 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1967), the Second Circuit expressly followed Perkins and adopted the Supreme Court's rationale in ruling that "bidding procedures are for the benefit of the public generally and confer no private rights on the bidder." Id. at 597.
Several courts, beginning with the District of Columbia Circuit in Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 371, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C.Cir.1970), have since questioned the continued authority of Perkins. In Scanwell, the court ruled that an unsuccessful bidder had standing to challenge agency action in connection with the awarding of a governmental procurement contract. The Scanwell court expressly espoused the "private attorney general" theory as the primary rationale for its decision:
Scanwell, 137 U.S.App.D.C. at 376, 424 F.2d at 864.
Citing Scanwell for authority, a number of courts have granted unsuccessful government contract bidders standing to sue. See, e. g., Rossetti Contracting Co. v. Brennan, 508 F.2d 1039, 1042 (7th Cir. 1975); Merriam v. Kunzig, 476 F.2d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1973); Wilke v. United States, 485 F.2d 180, 182-83 (4th Cir. 1973). The Second Circuit has not ruled on the standing issue presented here since its pre-Scanwell decision in Edelman v. Federal Housing Administration, supra, in which the court held that an unsuccessful bidder lacked standing.
In order to determine the "authority" of the Supreme Court's Perkins decision in the context of the case at bar, and to resolve the standing issue presented, the Court must examine the well established test first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1971). Under the Supreme Court's ruling in Data Processing, a complainant has standing to challenge agency action only if (1) the complainant "alleges that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact," and (2) "the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152-53, 90 S.Ct. at 829-30.
Assuming arguendo that the plaintiff Standard has alleged a sufficient injury in fact, the Court finds that Standard fails to meet the Data Processing test for standing to sue because Standard's interest is not "arguably within the zone of interests" intended to be protected by the relevant statutes and regulations promulgated thereunder. Standard argues that the federal defendants, by denying Standard's protest and approving the bidding procedure which permitted Camissa & James to submit the required certification forms after the public opening of bids, violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964,4 Executive Order No. 11246,5 Title II of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,6 and certain Environmental Protection Agency regulations promulgated...
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